Patronage has been equated as an important dimension of the party government model. The distribution of selective benefits – especially the distribution of public jobs - is, however, strongly dependent on the capacity of parties to bend the rules. Indeed, conflating patronage with corruption could erode the relationship between the parties and citizens. Within this backdrop, this article seeks to address two interrelated objectives. First, it embarks on a comparative endeavour to assess the extent to which legal rules across 19 European democracies grant politicians with room for manoeuvre in the distribution of public jobs. Second, a case study is entailed to analyze the ‘style of patronage’ (Müller, 2000). While Katz and Mair’s (1995) cartel model derives from a perception that the dominant parties employ the resources of the state for their survival, the reliance on state resources is not limited to parties with access to power. On the contrary, their model equates the possibility that opposition parties are also granted access to the spoils of the state, or to at least some share of patronage appointments. This perception requires further empirical testing. Although a ‘collusion’ pattern (Katz & Mair, 1995) has been identified between all parties since the outset of Portuguese democracy (Lobo, 2000; Morlino, 1995), research has emphasized the relevance of opposition parties in deterring incumbents’ grip over appointments (Grzymala-Busse, 1998). Hence, the article seeks to analyze the extent parties have shifted from a pattern of consensus to a pattern of conflict regarding the use of patronage resources. Empirically, this article employs a systematic content analysis of legal framework across Europe. Looking at the Portuguese case, the content analysis of parliamentary debates is complemented with in-depth interviews to 51 top officials, ministers and specialists, which will further specify patronage operational enactments and strategies undertaken by political parties.