Research on compliance with EU’s rule of law value have concentrated on either the “toolbox” or the roles of the European Commission and the European Parliament. But so far research has neglected analysing the intergovernmental dimension of the rule of law enforcement, and concretely the role of Council of the EU. While the difficulties of activating Art.7 of the Treaty are normally attributed to the unanimity requirement, the institutional design of the Council also imposes important obstacles to the success of the rule of law enforcement that are often overlooked. Particularly influential seems to be the Presidency. The use of the rotating presidential mandate as a tool for the member state in charge to pursue its own interests has led to a lack of coherence and continuity in the Council’s approach to this matter. Some presidencies have pushed forward the procedure, but others have been reluctant or even completely passive towards it.

This project conducts a comparative study of the performance of various national governments regarding the rule of law issue, and concretely the Art.7.1, during their term in the rotating presidency of the Council (2018-2021). The aim is to determine to what extent the Presidency enjoys real agenda-shaping powers by analysing how the governments of the member states succeed or fail to impose their preferred outcome on Council’s activity (action or inaction) through the selection of different strategies (agenda setting, agenda structuring and agenda exclusion), and what constraints they might face in doing so. Concretely, inter-institutional relations, and particularly EC agenda-shaping powers, appear to be especially influential in the process, although other structural factors such as context and the size of the member state also appear to play a role. To confirm this, the project conducts a series of interviews with key Council actors.