

Between the Protester and the Protest: Moral Considerations in Street Demonstrations

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Abstract

Why might some protesters feel a stronger moral obligation to be at a demonstration than others standing beside them, and why might this differ across demonstrations? Protest research has long treated moral motivation as something that drives participation rather than something to be explained. This article takes up that question by examining what shapes the duty to protest – the belief that one ought to participate in protest because it is the right thing to do. Drawing on data from the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation* (CCC) surveys, I analyse 9,925 respondents across 67 street demonstrations in seven European countries. The results show that anger about the protest issue is the strongest individual-level predictor of the duty to protest, followed by dissatisfaction with how democracy performs. At the demonstration level, connective action events are associated with a heightened sense of duty, while position issues and publicly moralised issues show weaker, marginally significant associations. By contrast, prior protest participation shows no independent association with the duty to protest, but its effects depend on whether demonstrations are publicly or privately moralised. At publicly moralised events, experienced and first-time participants report comparably strong levels of duty. At privately moralised events, the sense of duty is much weaker among less experienced protesters but rises with experience. These findings offer one of the first empirical accounts of variation in the duty to protest, showing that both individual characteristics and the protest settings in which protesters mobilise together explain DtP.

Keywords: Duty to Protest; Duty to Vote; Political Participation; Europe; Protest Survey.

Introduction (TBD)

Theoretical Framework

Moral motivation is one of the strongest drivers of protest participation (Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). Citizens may take to the streets because they believe that doing so is morally appropriate. When political participation is experienced as something one ought to do regardless of the consequences, it is usually referred to as civic duty, a concept most extensively studied in the context of electoral participation as the duty to vote (Blais & Achen, 2019; Dalton, 2008; Feitosa et al., 2022). Although protest can also be experienced as a civic duty (Medina, 2022; Onuch, 2014), this idea has received far less systematic attention. Drawing on this literature, I refer to this sense of obligation as the duty to protest (DtP), the personal belief that a citizen has the moral obligation to participate in protest because it is the right thing to do. DtP is grounded in the individual's sense of right and wrong, but directed towards concerns that extend beyond the self, giving it both an individual and civic dimension (Galais & Blais, 2016a).

Like the duty to vote, DtP is an ethical imperative that is not contingent on expected outcomes or the expressive benefits of participation. Yet DtP differs in one important respect: it is not a standing obligation that applies the same way to every opportunity for participation, but a conditional norm that citizens experience only when circumstances require it (Medina, 2022; Onuch, 2014). This conditionality means that whether, and how strongly, protest is experienced as a duty depends in part on the setting in which it occurs. Because a moral judgement of this kind depends on both the person making it and the situation being judged, the strength of DtP should vary across individuals and protest events. This raises the question of what accounts for this variation and how the protest context shapes it.

Protest research has established that participants at the same demonstration differ in why they are there (Gómez-Román & Sabucedo, 2014). Yet researchers have rarely examined moral motivation as one of these differences. It has been studied mainly as an antecedent of protest participation, as a reason people take to the streets, and less so as something to be explained in its own right (Sabucedo et al., 2018; Vilas & Sabucedo, 2012). When moral motivation is the object of study, the focus is usually on individuals (Skitka et al., 2005, 2021) rather than on the contexts in which they mobilise. As a result,

far less is known about whether and through what mechanisms the conditions of a demonstration shape the sense of duty among those already mobilised.

I argue that the setting of the protest does not create but may strengthen or weaken the sense of DtP that protesters feel. Demonstrators differ in their affective appraisals, political evaluations, and prior experiences, each of which may influence how strongly they feel a duty to participate. The features of the protest setting then shapes that obligation through the way an event is mobilised, the level of public contestation surrounding the protest issue, and the extent to which that issue is moralised. These contextual features can also condition how strongly individual-level characteristics are associated with the sense of duty (Gómez-Román & Sabucedo, 2014). The following sections develop these individual- and contextual-level explanations in turn.

Individual differences in the Duty to Protest

The most immediate way individuals relate to a cause is through their emotions. Anger arises when people appraise a situation as unjust and hold an external actor responsible (Lazarus, 1991; van Zomeren et al., 2008). As an action-oriented response, anger motivates efforts to confront or change undesirable situations (Frijda, 1986), which makes it a well-established predictor of collective action (van Stekelenburg et al., 2011). Anger may also strengthen individuals' sense of duty to participate in protest. People can feel angry about an issue for many reasons, but when anger stems from a perceived violation of moral principles, it represents more than just dissatisfaction (Skitka, 2010; Wisneski & Skitka, 2017). Moral convictions are experienced as strong, non-negotiable commitments, and their violation can make inaction harder to reconcile with the belief that something should be done (Skitka et al., 2005; van Zomeren et al., 2012). Among those already mobilised, greater anger about a protest issue may therefore signal a more intense response to a perceived moral wrong and be associated with a stronger sense of obligation to act. This leads to the first hypothesis:

***H1.** Participants who feel greater anger about the protest issue will report a stronger sense of DtP.*

Beyond their emotional responses to a given issue, activists also form opinions about how well the political system is functioning. Citizens grow dissatisfied when they perceive a discrepancy between what they expect democratic governance to deliver and how

democratic institutions and authorities perform in practice (Onuch, 2014; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). Norris (2011) calls such citizens *critical citizens*. They remain committed to democratic principles while holding political authorities accountable. This commitment can provide a normative basis for civic participation. Galais and Blais (2016a), for instance, show that the duty to vote rests on prior support for democracy. Such support does not guarantee satisfaction with how democracy actually performs. When democratic institutions fall short of these ideals, some citizens may conclude that established institutional avenues of representation and redress no longer suffice. Protest need not reflect a rejection of democracy, but can represent an effort to exercise oversight and address perceived shortcomings (Rosanvallon, 2008). For some activists, protest becomes an obligation to act against perceived democratic failings rather than merely a strategic choice (Medina, 2022). Since this sense of duty may deepen with the perceived gravity of those failings, I expect that the more dissatisfied a protester is with how democracy works, the more strongly they should experience DtP.

H2. *Participants who are less satisfied with how democracy functions will report a stronger sense of DtP.*

Protesters also differ in how much political experience they bring to every demonstration. Experienced activists tend to differ politically from first-time participants. They are usually more interested in politics, more confident in their ability to participate, and more likely to see themselves as political actors (Finkel, 1985; Quintelier & van Deth, 2014). Whether participation shapes these characteristics or mainly attracts people who already possess them is contested. Some studies treat participation as formative, indicating that political experience can shape how individuals engage in the future (McAdam, 1989). Others find greater support for a selection mechanism in the sense that participation adds little to dispositions already in place (van Ingen & van der Meer, 2016). This is consistent with research showing that civic duties tend to develop through early socialisation and remain relatively stable once learned (Feitosa & Galais, 2020; Galais, 2018). Following this account, experienced protesters should differ from first-timers partly because political engagement is already more central to them.

Selection also implies that the relationship between protest experience and DtP should be weak. If a sense of duty is a disposition that draws people into protest in the first place, then repeated participation should add little to an obligation already in place. Yet those

with more protest experience may still report a somewhat stronger sense of duty, given that repeated participation reflects a deeply ingrained commitment to political action. Hence, I expect a positive but modest relationship between prior protest experience and the sense of DtP.

H3. *Participants with more protest experience will report a stronger sense of DtP.*

Contextual Conditions for the Duty to Protest

Activists differ from one another, as do the demonstrations they attend. Three characteristics of the protest context may be associated with how strongly DtP is experienced. These include the mobilisation logic through which the event is organised, the issue's position in public debate, and the degree to which a given issue is publicly moralised. Since the mobilising context influences how strongly different motives matter among demonstrators (van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), one salient dimension to consider is the organisational logic that structures participation and frames the meaning of protest.

Bennett and Segerberg (2012) distinguish between collective and connective action as two logics of mobilisation. Protests coordinated as collective action are organised by established organisations such as trade unions and political parties, which supply participants with a shared grievance frame, a collective identity, and a sense of solidarity (Della Porta & Diani, 2006). In these settings, the organisation provides much of the normative structure surrounding participation, so protesters may participate out of solidarity or organisational loyalty rather than a personal sense of duty. Likewise, participants' sense of DtP may already be expressed through other institutional channels for addressing their dissatisfaction, including lobbying, negotiations, or internal advocacy, reducing the extent to which it may be directed towards protest.

In connective action protests, by contrast, mobilisation relies more on loose personal networks and digital platforms than on organisational hierarchies to coordinate action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Protesters are less likely to receive a fully structured moral framework from an organisation, which leaves more room for their own sense of duty to shape their experience of participation. The distinction between collective and connective

mobilisation thus directly tests whether DtP varies with the organisational conditions under which people protest.

I further expect the mobilisation logic to condition the effect of prior experience on DtP. Experienced protesters carry stronger political commitments into new demonstrations (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017). Comparisons of occasional and regular activists across national settings show that mobilisation history and context together shape why people participate (Gómez-Román & Sabucedo, 2016). In connective action settings, these commitments may matter more because mobilisation relies less on formal organisational structures to provide normative guidance. Prior experience should therefore reinforce DtP more in these settings than in collectively organised protests. Hence, the following hypotheses:

H4a. *Participants in connective action demonstrations will report a stronger sense of DtP than participants in collective action demonstrations.*

H4b. *The effect of protest experience on DtP will be stronger in connective action demonstrations than in collective action demonstrations.*

The degree of public contestation or consensus around a protest issue may also matter for how strongly protesters feel a DtP. Issues differ in the degree of public consensus about the desired outcome, or in the extent to which they involve competing positions on what should be done (Stokes, 1963). *Valence issues* are those on which the public broadly agrees on the desired end, for instance, reducing crime or opposing corruption. *Position issues* divide public opinion along competing values, such as reproductive rights or regional autonomy. This distinction may affect both an issue's moral clarity and the perceived need to act. On valence issues, the moral position may seem relatively clear, but this consensus may also lower the perceived need or urgency to protest. Conversely, position issues involve contrasting moral claims, which makes it less clear what the morally correct position is and what constitutes appropriate action. For protesters who regard the issue as important, however, the contestation and normative ambiguity that position issues generate may threaten their values and in turn reinforce the perceived need to defend them through protest. In this sense, participants at demonstrations addressing position issues should report a stronger sense of DtP than those at demonstrations addressing valence issues. Hence, I expect that:

H5. *Position issues will be more strongly associated with DtP than valence issues.*

Yet the position an issue occupies in public debate does not tell us about how an issue is moralised in public discourse. An issue can divide opinion while still being widely framed in moral terms, just as an issue with broad public support may not be moralised at all. Moralisation can increase emotional investment in an issue and reduce tolerance for compromise (Ryan, 2014). But strong moral commitment does not necessarily imply that protest is understood as a collective responsibility. This effect of moralisation on DtP may depend on whether the underlying harm is framed as a shared public wrong or as a matter of personal conviction.

Drawing on Mooney's (Mooney, 2001) distinction between types of morality policy, I distinguish between publicly moralised issues and privately moralised. When an issue is publicly moralised, the harm is understood as public and shared, suggesting a collective response. Issues framed this way typically include environmental protection, access to healthcare, and economic inequality, among others. Privately moralised issues rest on deeply held personal convictions but are not seen as harm to be publicly shared. Examples include reproductive choices, gambling, and end-of-life decisions. The classification is not fixed because how an issue is framed can shift as political conflict evolves (Mucciaroni, 2011).

Public moralisation may amplify DtP because it converts individual moral commitment into a shared one. When protesters gather around an issue framed as a public wrong, the protest context can reinforce the sense that they ought to participate. The harm is understood as a collective responsibility, which makes participation an expression of that shared obligation. On privately moralised issues, participants may hold equally strong convictions, but those convictions may be less likely to translate into a felt obligation to participate.

Moreover, the effect of moralisation on DtP may not be the same for all protesters. Experienced protesters bring stronger political commitments to a demonstration compared to first-timers (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2017), and how much those commitments matter may depend on what the context itself supplies. A publicly moralised issue frames the harm as shared, which may support a sense of duty even among participants who bring little of their own. On privately moralised issues, that

support is absent, so what protesters bring should matter more. Given that the direction of these relationships is theoretically uncertain, I treat both the main and interaction effects as exploratory questions.

Research Design

The analysis draws on the *Caught in the Act of Protest: Contextualising Contestation* (CCC) project, a cross-national protest survey conducted between 2009 and 2012 (van Stekelenburg et al., 2012). Using a standardised protest survey method (Walgrave & Verhulst, 2011), the CCC project collected data from participants in street demonstrations across nine European countries. At each demonstration, pointers selected participants at regular intervals from the passing crowd and directed interviewers to distribute questionnaire booklets with pre-stamped envelopes for return by post. The overall response rate was roughly 30%. Pointers and interviewers were always different people, reducing the risk that interviewers would selectively approach participants who appeared more willing to take part. A subsample of approximately 200 participants per demonstration, roughly one in every six selected, was also interviewed face-to-face to minimise non-response bias.

The full CCC dataset consists of 92 demonstrations and more than 17,000 respondents. For this analysis, I use 14,269 respondents nested within 67 demonstrations across seven countries: Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Denmark and the Czech Republic are excluded because they contributed too few cases for stable estimation. After listwise deletion of cases with missing values on the variables of interest, the analytical sample yields 9,925 respondents. The demonstrations cover a broad range of issues, including austerity, climate change, labour rights, LGBT rights, democracy, and regional autonomy, providing substantial variation in both participant characteristics and protest contexts.


Measures

The dependent variable is the *duty to protest*, which is measured using a single item from the motivation battery in the dataset. Respondents rated their agreement with six statements about why they participated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). The DtP measure is their response to "I felt morally obliged to

participate", rescaled from 0 to 1 for ease of interpretation. The remaining motivation items (defending interests, expressing views, pressuring politicians, expressing solidarity, and raising awareness) provide alternative reasons for participation, which allowed respondents to indicate whether moral obligation was among their reasons for participating (Blais & Achen, 2019).

Figure 1 presents mean agreement with each of the six participation motivations. All six items attract high levels of agreement, which is not surprising given that respondents had already chosen to participate. Moral obligation stands out, however, as the second lowest-ranked motivation (0.70), after “express view” but below the others (0.83–0.87). Variation across items indicates that respondents did not endorse all motivations uniformly. While most participants endorsed expressive and strategic reasons for protesting, fewer saw their participation as a moral duty, making DtP a meaningful source of individual-level variation.

Figure 1. Mean Agreement with Protest Motivations



Note. Bars show mean scores on a 0–1 scale. The highlighted bar is the DV.

The individual-level predictors capture three dimensions of engagement. Anger about the protest issue is measured on a five-point scale, with higher values indicating greater anger. Satisfaction with democracy is measured on an eleven-point scale from 0 (very dissatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). Protest experience is measured with a five-category ordinal item indicating the number of demonstrations respondents have attended over their lifetime: (Never, 1–5, 6–10, 11–20, and 21 or more).

To capture the mobilisation logic of each demonstration, I classified each one according to whether its main organisers were formal, hierarchical membership organisations or decentralised networks and ad hoc coalitions. Demonstrations convened by trade unions, political parties, or professional associations were coded as *collective action* (0), including May Day marches organised by labour unions and social democratic parties, general strikes called by trade union confederations, and student protests led by student unions. Demonstrations organised through loosely networked citizen movements, grassroots coalitions, or online platforms without a single dominant organisational sponsor were coded as *connective action* (1), including citizen-led climate marches, Occupy assemblies, Pride parades, and anti-nuclear campaigns coordinated by environmental networks. Thirty-five demonstrations were classified as collective and 32 as connective.

To measure how much public support an issue enjoys, expert informants were asked to assess, for each demonstration, whether the general population largely disagreed with the demonstrators' stance (1), partly supported it (2), or largely supported it (3). This measure was reverse-coded and rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so that lower values correspond to *valence issues* with broad public support, while higher values indicate *position issues* that depart more strongly from majority opinion. About 72% of demonstrations received the midpoint value of 0.5; 19.9% were coded as 0 and 7.7% as 1.

Lastly, each demonstration was coded as publicly or privately moralised based on the 11 issue domains it addressed. Demonstrations centred on personal morality and individual rights, specifically those concerning abortion and LGBT rights, were coded as privately moralised (0). The remaining nine domains (austerity, climate change, democracy, workers' rights, anti-fascism and racism, nuclear energy, student funding, regional autonomy, and women's rights) involved collective moral claims about public welfare and were coded as publicly moralised (1). Overall, 60 of the 67 demonstrations were classified as publicly moralised and seven as privately moralised.

The models also include five individual-level control variables that are established predictors of civic norms and protest participation (Dalton, 2008; Galais & Blais, 2016b; Verba et al., 1995). Sociodemographic characteristics include gender (female = 1), age (four categories: under 30, 30–44, 45–59, and 60 and above), and education (three levels:

primary or less, secondary, and university). Left-right self-placement is measured on an 11-point scale, with higher values indicating a more right-wing position, while organisational membership is coded 1 for any active or passive membership. Full question wording and summary statistics for all variables are reported in provided in the Appendix.

Methods

I estimate linear regression models with standard errors clustered at the demonstration level since demonstrators are nested within demonstrations. Although the original DtP variable is ordinal, linear estimation is appropriate here because the coefficients are straightforward to interpret, and nonlinear specifications tend to produce substantively equivalent results (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). I also include country fixed effects throughout to absorb cross-national variation that is not the focus of this analysis. I present four nested models. Model 1 includes only the controls, establishing a baseline level of DtP. Model 2 adds the three individual-level channels (anger, democratic satisfaction, protest experience). Model 3 adds only the contextual features to the baseline, and Model 4 combines both levels. In addition, I estimate a second set of models with cross-level interactions between protest experience and the demonstration-level variables to test whether the protest context conditions the effect of prior experience on the duty to protest. All non-dichotomous variables are rescaled to range from 0 to 1, so that all coefficients represent the effect of moving from the minimum to the maximum value.

Results

The four nested models in Table 1 yield a consistent and theoretically coherent picture. Among the controls, education shows the most stable negative association with DtP across all specifications. Model 2 introduces the individual-level predictors, with anger emerging as the strongest predictor of DtP and showing a positive association consistent with H1. Dissatisfaction with democracy is likewise positively and significantly associated with DtP, consistent with H2. By contrast, protest experience has no significant independent effect, which does not support H3. As the interaction models will show, however, the absence of a main effect is masking meaningful variation across protest contexts.

At the contextual level, participation in connective action demonstrations is positively

associated with DtP, consistent with H4a. Similarly, both position issue type (H5) and public moralisation are positively associated with DtP, although these effects are only marginally significant. The full model, which adds these contextual factors to the individual predictors, raises the explained variance to roughly 9%, compared with 7.5% in the individual-level specification.

Table 1. OLS Regression on the Duty to Protest

	(1) Controls	(2) Individual	(3) Context	(4) Full
Female	0.0039 (0.0073)	-0.0016 (0.0079)	0.0024 (0.0078)	-0.0039 (0.0083)
Age	0.1344*** (0.0130)	0.1262*** (0.0144)	0.1341*** (0.0129)	0.1203*** (0.0128)
Education	-0.0802*** (0.0166)	-0.0688*** (0.0158)	-0.0851*** (0.0170)	-0.0753*** (0.0166)
Left-right	-0.0623 (0.0421)	-0.0204 (0.0427)	-0.0429 (0.0345)	0.0132 (0.0347)
Organisation member	0.0482*** (0.0139)	0.0473*** (0.0144)	0.0504*** (0.0134)	0.0482*** (0.0133)
Protest experience		-0.0105 (0.0191)		0.0046 (0.0165)
Anger		0.1728*** (0.0215)		0.1880*** (0.0188)
Satisfaction with democracy		-0.0464** (0.0206)		-0.0438** (0.0214)
Connective action			0.0566*** (0.0175)	0.0675*** (0.0172)
Position issue			0.0689* (0.0391)	0.0692* (0.0368)
Public moralisation			0.1086* (0.0633)	0.1223* (0.0624)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES
N	9,925	9,925	9,925	9,925
R2	0.0559	0.0749	0.0676	0.0897

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.


** $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$*

The cross-level interaction models (Table 2) show that the relationship between protest experience and DtP is not uniform across protest settings. Although experience has no significant main effect in Table 1, it becomes positive and significant once the interactions are introduced. This suggests that its association with DtP is context-dependent. The interaction between experience and connective mobilisation is positive and marginally

significant. As Figure 2 illustrates, DtP increases with prior experience at connective action demonstrations but remains flat or declines slightly at collective action events, and the gap widens among more experienced participants. This is consistent with the expectation that prior experience is more strongly associated with DtP in settings that rely less on formal organisational structures to supply normative guidance (H4b).

The more striking pattern is the negative, highly significant interaction between experience and public moralisation, indicating that the positive association between prior participation and DtP is substantially weaker at publicly moralised events. Put plainly, public moralisation confers a strong sense of duty even on less experienced protesters, whereas at privately moralised demonstrations, that sense of duty is more strongly associated with prior experience. Figure 3 illustrates this pattern clearly. At publicly moralised events, DtP is already uniformly high across experience levels, with little variation. At privately moralised demonstrations, however, DtP is much lower among less experienced protesters but rises steeply with accumulated experience, so that the most experienced participants report levels of duty close to those observed at publicly moralised demonstrations.


Figure 2. Predicted Duty to Protest by Protest Experience and Mobilisation Type



Note. Average adjusted predictions from Model 1 (Table 2). All other variables are held at their observed values.

Together, these findings show that variation in DtP reflects both what protesters bring to a demonstration and what the protest setting supplies. Individual characteristics, particularly anger and political dissatisfaction, account for the largest share of this variation. Contextual features also matter, albeit modestly. Connective mobilisation is associated with a stronger sense of DtP, while both position issues and public moralisation show marginal positive associations. But as the interaction effects show, context matters most in moderating the relationship between protest experience and DtP.

Figure 3. Predicted Duty to Protest by Protest Experience and Issue Moralisation



Note. Average adjusted predictions from Model 2 (Table 2). All other variables are held at their observed values.

Table 2. Interaction Models: Protest Experience X Protest Context

	(1) Mobilisation type	(2) Issue moralisation
Female	-0.0041 (0.0084)	-0.0042 (0.0083)
Age	0.1219*** (0.0127)	0.1211*** (0.0129)
Education	-0.0753*** (0.0164)	-0.0759*** (0.0166)
Left-right	0.0087 (0.0347)	0.0116 (0.0332)
Organisational member	0.0481*** (0.0133)	0.0475*** (0.0130)
Protest experience	-0.0231 (0.0227)	0.1185*** (0.0294)
Anger	0.1874*** (0.0187)	0.1882*** (0.0187)
Satisfaction with democracy	-0.0429* (0.0215)	-0.0435** (0.0212)
Connective action	0.0388 (0.0266)	0.0667*** (0.0170)
Position issue	0.0646* (0.0364)	0.0678* (0.0369)
Public moralisation	0.1231* (0.0626)	0.1953** (0.0757)
Experience x Connective action	0.0471* (0.0266)	
Experience x Public moralisation		-0.1227*** (0.0342)
Country fixed effects	YES	YES
N	9,925	9,925
R2	0.0903	0.0907

Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.

** $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$*

Robustness checks

1. Re-estimate the full model with each of the other five motivation items as the DV to test whether the predictors are specific to moral obligation or capture general protest motivation.
2. Replicate the main models using ordered logit to confirm that results are not sensitive to treating an ordinal DV as continuous.
3. Re-run the experience $\times$ moralisation interaction dropping each of the seven privately moralised demonstrations one at a time to verify that the finding is not driven by a single case.
4. Re-estimate using multiple imputation to check whether results hold when accounting for the cases lost (about 30%) through listwise deletion.
5. Re-estimate using a multilevel model with random intercepts at the demonstration level to confirm that the results are not sensitive to how the analysis accounts for respondents being nested within demonstrations.

Discussion and Conclusion (TBD)

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Appendix

Table A1. Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max	N
<i>Individual-level variables</i>					
Duty to protest	0.701	0.314	0	1	9,925
Female	0.488	0.500	0	1	9,925
Age	0.476	0.340	0	1	9,925
Education	0.863	0.232	0	1	9,925
Left-right	0.252	0.203	0	1	9,925
Organisation member	0.889	0.314	0	1	9,925
Protest experience	0.592	0.346	0	1	9,925
Anger	0.804	0.247	0	1	9,925
Satisfaction with democracy	0.488	0.256	0	1	9,925
<i>Demonstration-level variables</i>					
Connective action	0.547	0.498	0	1	9,925
Position issue	0.448	0.257	0	1	9,925
Public moralisation	0.930	0.255	0	1	9,925

Note: All variables rescaled 0-1. Analytical sample with listwise deletion.

Table A2. Surveyed Demonstrations

Country	Demonstration	Issue
BE	Climate Change	Climate
BE	March for Work	Austerity
BE	1st of May March	May Day / workers' rights
BE	No to Austerity	Austerity
BE	No Government, Great Country	Democracy
BE	Not in Our Name	Democracy
BE	Non-Profit Demonstration	Austerity
BE	We have alternatives	Austerity
BE	Fukushima never again	Nuclear energy
CH	World March of Women	Women's rights
CH	May 1st Demonstration	May Day / workers' rights
CH	Anti Nuclear Manifestation	Nuclear energy
CH	Gay Pride Geneva	LGBT rights
CH	Women demonstration Geneva	Women's rights
CH	May 1st demonstration 2011	May Day / workers' rights
CH	Anti-nuclear	Nuclear energy
CH	Pride demonstration	LGBT rights
ES	Demonstration Against Abortion	Abortion
ES	Against the Europe of Capital, Crisis and War	Austerity
ES	Demonstration against language decree	Regional autonomy
ES	Demonstration against the new labour law	Austerity
ES	We are a nation, we decide	Regional autonomy
ES	1st May, Labour Day	May Day / workers' rights
ES	Against Labor Law	Austerity
ES	Celebration May Day	May Day / workers' rights
ES	Real Democracy Now! We are not good in the hands of politicians and bankers	Democracy
ES	For employment, not capital reforms. Defend Our Rights	Austerity
IT	Euromayday	May Day / workers' rights
IT	May Day	May Day / workers' rights
IT	General Strike	Austerity
IT	Marcia Perugia-Assisi	Austerity

Country	Demonstration	Issue
IT	Gay Pride	LGBT rights
IT	No Monti Day	Democracy
NL	Retirement demonstration	Austerity
NL	Climate demo	Climate
NL	Student demo 1	Student funding
NL	Culture demo Amsterdam	Austerity
NL	Culture demo Utrecht	Austerity
NL	Together strong for public work	Austerity
NL	Student demo 2	Student funding
NL	Anti Nuclear demo	Nuclear energy
NL	Stop racism and exclusion	Anti-fascism / racism
NL	Military demo	Austerity
NL	Stop budget cuts (care & welfare)	Austerity
NL	Pink Saturday Parade Survey	LGBT rights
NL	Occupy Netherlands	Democracy
SE	May 1 March, Left Party	May Day / workers' rights
SE	Against racist politics	Anti-fascism / racism
SE	May 1 March, Social Democratic Party	May Day / workers' rights
SE	Anti-nuclear demonstration	Nuclear energy
SE	May Day (Left Party)	May Day / workers' rights
SE	May Day (SAP/LO)	May Day / workers' rights
SE	May Day (Left Party)	May Day / workers' rights
SE	May Day (Social Democratic Party/LO)	May Day / workers' rights
SE	Rainbow Parade (LGBTQ festival)	LGBT rights
UK	National Climate March	Climate
UK	May Day Labour March	May Day / workers' rights
UK	Take Back Parliament	Democracy
UK	No to Hate Crime Vigil	Anti-fascism / racism
UK	Unite Against Fascism National Demo	Anti-fascism / racism
UK	Fund Our Future: Stop Education Cuts	Student funding
UK	National Climate March 2010	Climate
UK	Second Student National Demo	Student funding
UK	Million Women Rise	Women's rights

Country	Demonstration	Issue
UK	TUC's March for the Alternative: Jobs, Growth, Justice	Austerity
UK	Occupy London	Democracy
UK	London Pride Parade	LGBT rights

Note: N = 67 demonstrations across 7 countries.