

Rooted Everywhere, Exclusive Somewhere: Do Institutions Make Territorial Identities?

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Abstract

Influential literatures presume institutions forge territorial identities: decentralization is expected to build regional attachment, globalization to breed cosmopolitans and a nationalist backlash. We test these premises with the joint EVS/WVS (92 countries), measuring identity from a five-item closeness battery (town, region, country, continent, world) and classifying each respondent into a typology: exclusively attached to one level (subcountry, country, or supracountry), plural, or unattached. Most people are plural identifiers, and this plurality is largely world-inclusive; exclusive cosmopolitans are rare and concentrated among immigrants, while exclusive country identification reflects grievance, not tradition. The two institutional dimensions behave asymmetrically: globalization sharpens exclusive attachments and, in formative years, broadens identity into world-inclusive plural profiles rather than building exclusively cosmopolitan ones, whereas decentralization builds subcountry identity nowhere. Migration reshapes identity, toward the country in less-globalized destinations, beyond it in more-globalized ones, inherited by the second generation. We propose an interactive context–composition account.

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[§]Given that the study draws on pre-existing observational data, it was not preregistered; the descriptive analyses are exploratory, while the socialization and migration designs test predictions specified *ex ante* by the institutional and cleavage literatures. We compensate for the absence of preregistration with complete replication materials and a robustness appendix documenting every specification choice.

I. INTRODUCTION

Where do territorial identities come from, and do political institutions produce them or merely coexist with them? Two prominent literatures in comparative politics largely rest on the assumption that institutions shape territorial identities. Multilevel governance work holds that decentralization builds regional identity: granting a region genuine self-rule should, over time, cultivate a population that identifies with it (Keating, 1998; Brancati, 2006; Erk and Anderson, 2009; Fitjar, 2010; Massetti and Schakel, 2016). The work on the political consequences of globalization holds that international openness restructures identity into a cosmopolitan–nationalist cleavage: living in a globally connected society should generate cosmopolitans and a nationalist reaction against them (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 2018; Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde, 2014; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). Both are causal claims about the institutional origins of mass identity and both carry substantial weight: for instance, for the stability of states with geographically concentrated minorities, the sources of the populist backlash, and the identity foundations of supranational integration, among others.

Despite their prominence, these claims have rarely been evaluated. The standard evidence is usually based on cross-country correlations, typically confined to Western Europe or the OECD (on regional identity, e.g. Keating (1998); Fitjar (2010); Henderson et al. (2013); on the cosmopolitan cleavage, e.g. Kriesi et al. (2006); Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde (2014)): decentralized states contain stronger regional identities, and globalized states contain more cosmopolitans. Such correlations are consistent with institutions forging identity, but equally with reverse causation, with contemporaneous adult adaptation, and with the self-selected sorting of individuals and regions; the observational cross-section cannot adjudicate among these mechanisms. Moreover, the outcome of interest depends heavily on measurement choices that the literature has left unexamined.

We address both problems. Using the joint European and World Values Surveys 2017-2022 (156,658 respondents in 92 countries covering every world region), we measure territorial identity from a five-item battery of closeness to town, region, country, continent and world, and construct a validated typology of exclusive, plural, and unattached identities. Our point of departure is Marks (1999) insight that territorial identity is inherently multi-level and non-zero-sum: individuals attach simultaneously to sub-country, country, and supra-country communities, and the analytically decisive contrast is

between exclusive identifiers, attached to a single level, and inclusive ones, who hold several identities at once, with a residual category, the unattached, who feel close to no level at all. We adopt a classification based on this trichotomy.

We then evaluate the two theories above in three steps. Descriptively, we relate each identity category to country-level globalization and decentralization. Our data are a single cross-sectional wave, and our first descriptive analyses make no causal claims from cross-country or cross-individual comparisons as such. They just shed light on existing individual and country level empirical patterns. Instead, we address causal questions with designs that recover exogenous or quasi-temporal variation embedded within the wave. To test whether institutions leave a socialization imprint, we exploit the age structure of the sample. An impressionable-years design reconstructs the institutional environment (regional authority and globalization) each respondent experienced during ages 15–25, and identifies effects from the within-country timing of institutional change across birth cohorts, net of country, birth-cohort, and survey-year fixed effects. We complement it with an event study keyed to the date of each country’s trade liberalization reform. Finding little role for institutions, we turn to migration and exploit the second generation (the native-born children of immigrants, who never migrated) to separate contextual transmission from self-selection.

Our first contribution is to measurement. Because most respondents report closeness to several levels at once, the rule used to classify them drives the substantive conclusion: resolving ties toward the highest attached level inflates the “cosmopolitan” category to roughly 40% of the world, whereas reserving each exclusive label for a strict peak yields 3%. In our own typology, the plural nested identifier is the modal type worldwide (around 65%); exclusive cosmopolitans are rare and disproportionately foreign-born; and exclusive country identity is associated with economic grievance rather than traditionalism.

Our second contribution is a set of asymmetric findings on the two institutional transformations of interest. Globalization is systematically associated with the structure of territorial identity: it sharpens exclusive attachments, activates the educational cleavage, and, among cohorts socialized under it, strengthens country and plural rather than supracountry attachment. Decentralization is associated with no increase in subcountry identity: neither across countries, once individual composition is held constant, nor across the cohorts who came of age after major reforms. The impressionable-years and

critical juncture designs yield precise nulls for decentralization and, for globalization, a formative effect that runs against (not toward) the exclusive cosmopolitan prediction. Globalization's formative effect, where it exists, redirects identity toward inclusive-plural rather than exclusively cosmopolitan attachment.

Our third contribution concerns what actually moves territorial identity. Migration does and the destination sets the direction. Relative to natives, immigrants are more exclusively attached to the country in less-globalized destinations, but more exclusively attached to the supracountry level in more-globalized ones. This reversal is not an artifact of who migrates: it survives controls for country of origin and, tellingly, reappears among the second generation—respondents born in the destination who never themselves migrated. Since the pattern persists in people who made no move of their own, it cannot easily be attributed to migrant self-selection; instead, we believe it is exactly what the intergenerational transmission of a destination-context effect would produce.

These results motivate an interactive account of identity formation in which context and composition are jointly necessary. The same individual characteristic maps onto opposite attachments in different political economies: education roots individuals regionally in closed economies and uproots them in open ones; migration draws newcomers toward the country in poor destinations and beyond it in rich ones. Even socialization, where detectable, follows this conditional logic. Institutions, on this account, operate less as direct producers of identity than as contexts that fix what traits and biographies come to mean; a reframing with implications for how the multilevel-governance and globalization cleavage literature interpret their own cross-sectional regularities.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II reviews the relevant literature to demarcate the gap this paper addresses. Section III presents the data and our measurement strategy, constructing a five-category typology of territorial identity and validating it against independent, non-territorial attitudes. Section IV maps the descriptive structure of identity: its individual-level correlates, its association with country-level globalization and decentralization, and the way the two dimensions interact. Section V tests the socialization hypothesis directly, using a formative-window exposure design and a critical-juncture event study to ask whether coming of age under decentralization or globalization leaves a durable imprint on identity. Section VI turns to migration, using the second generation to separate destination context from self-selection. We

conclude by drawing out the implications of the interactive context–composition account for the study of territorial identities.

II. DO INSTITUTIONS MAKE TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES? THEORY AND EXPECTATIONS

i. The Institutional Thesis

The last decades of the twentieth century reconfigured the territorial architecture of the state in two directions ([Jurado and León, 2021](#)). On the one hand, a broad wave of decentralization redistributed authority downward: many European countries strengthened their regions' decision-making power through different constitutional architectures, and across Latin America and the post-communist world, elected regional and local governments proliferated where central appointees had governed before ([Hooghe et al., 2016](#)). This trend also hit sub-Saharan Africa, where a large number of countries experienced a significant proliferation of subcountry administrative units, with varying levels of decision-making power, ever since the mid-1990s ([Grossman and Lewis, 2014](#)). On the other hand, an equally broad wave of economic integration redistributed country authority upward and outward: among others, successive rounds of trade liberalization, the deepening of the European single market after 1986, the founding of the WTO in 1995, and the liberalization of capital and communication economies into a single global market ([Held et al., 1999](#); [Wacziarg and Welch, 2008](#)) are examples of this process. Therefore, by the turn of the century, the nation-state that mid-century social science had treated as the natural container of territorial identity¹ had been unbundled from both ends; its authority had been dispersed downward to newly empowered regions or localities, and upward to supracountry and global arenas.

Two research programs converge on the proposition that these institutional transformations shape mass territorial identity. They concern different institutions and push identity in different directions, but they share a causal architecture: the structure of governance and exposure imprints itself, over

¹In the classical theories of national identity, the extension of markets, mass schooling, standardized communication, and centralized administration were precisely the process that built nations in the first place: it dissolved parochial local ties and merged populations into national communities defined by a shared language and public culture ([Deutsch, 1953](#); [Gellner, 1983](#)).

time, on the identities of those who live under it.

The first program concerns the downward dispersion of authority; that is, decentralization and the making of a regional people. Where states have devolved genuine self-rule to regions, scholars assume a regional people to form in response. The mechanism is institutional in a strong sense. A region endowed with its own parliament, budget, and competences creates an arena of political life: elections to be contested, parties and elites with a stake in the regional level, policies that make the region a unit of shared fate, and symbols that make it a unit of shared belonging. Citizens thereby acquire both reasons to interact with the regional level and cues that it matters, and regional attachment follows (Keating, 1998; Brancati, 2006; Erk and Anderson, 2009; Fitjar, 2010; Henderson et al., 2013). The claim is not that autonomous regions and strong regional identities merely coincide but that the former help produce the latter: institutions are, over time, identity-forming. That directional claim is also what makes the thesis contestable, since the same coincidence is equally consistent with the reverse arrow; that is, regions with strong prior identities winning autonomy (Hooghe et al., 2016) and with both driven by deeper historical differences.

The second program concerns the upward and outward dispersion of authority and exposure. Where societies have been open to cross-border flows of goods, people, and capital, identity is expected to reorganize along a new cleavage that crosses the old left–right divide (Kriesi et al., 2006; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). According to this literature, exposure to a globalized environment generates a cosmopolitan pole among those positioned to benefit from openness (the educated, mobile, and skilled) and a nationalist reaction among those exposed to its risks (Teney, Lacewell and De Wilde, 2014; De Wilde et al., 2019; Norris and Inglehart, 2019). The predicted sign therefore depends on where a person sits, but the underlying claim is again causal and again structural: living in an open, connected society restructures how citizens locate themselves between the country and the world, pulling some outward toward the supra-country and driving others back into the country.

For all their differences, the two literatures share a premise. Each treats mass territorial identity as, largely, a product of the institutional and structural environments; each posits that this environment leaves a durable mark; and each has been built largely on evidence from Western Europe and the OECD, where decentralization and globalization are both far advanced. What neither specifies is when and how the imprint is laid down, whether it is stamped on the cohorts who come of age under

the institutional reform or continuously refreshed by present exposure, and whether it operates the same way beyond the affluent democracies.

ii. Who Attaches Where: the Individual Account

Beneath the institutional thesis lies an older and more empirically grounded tradition, one that locates the sources of territorial identity not in the institutional architecture but in the socio-economic composition of each individual within a society. Institutions supply the territorial levels to which a person might attach, and this literature explains who chooses what from it. Its findings sort into two camps of predictions that go in opposite direction: some individual traits root a person in the near and the country, others uproot them toward the distant and the supra-country.

Among the former, country and local attachments are stronger among older people and those more religious. Age reflects a longer connection to the national community: older cohorts have lived more of their lives before travel, media, and mass education appeared and thus were raised before the cosmopolitan turn ([Jones and Smith, 2001](#); [Smith and Kim, 2006](#)). Likewise, religiosity is usually linked to membership in communities (i.e. congregations, parishes, etc.), whose reach is usually at the country or local rather than global level, and which tie people to a place and to the members of that same community ([Storm, 2011](#); [Bonikowski and DiMaggio, 2016](#); [Huddy and Del Ponte, 2019](#)). Attachment to the region rests on similar roots: a regional or minority language and ascription to a territorialized minority bind people to sub-country communities ([Laitin, 1998](#); [Guibernau, 1999](#); [Cetrà, 2019](#)). These traits anchor identity in communities that precede globalization and predict attachment to the local, region, or country, rather than to the wider world.

As for the latter, education, income, occupational skills, urban residence, and being a migrant appear to push attachment in the opposite direction, upward and outward toward supra-country and cosmopolitan identification. The mechanism is based on exposure and resources: schooling and skill acquisition increase mobility, information, and cross-border contact, making it possible to experience and reward wider identities, decreasing the perceived risk of openness ([Norris, 2000](#); [Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001](#); [Kuhn, 2015](#)). Interestingly, the cleavage literature sharpens these uprooting traits into a political division. Where the compositional tradition reads education and income as

resources for cosmopolitan identity, the cleavage account reads them as stakes in a distributive conflict: globalization divides citizens into winners, who identify beyond the country and welcome openness, and losers, who retreat into it and turn against it (Kriesi et al., 2006; Häusermann and Kriesi, 2015; Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Then, the same characteristics that mark a person as a likely cosmopolitan classify her, in the cleavage literature, as a winner from integration.

One complication obscures the clean division between rooting and uprooting traits that we have outlined so far. According to existing evidence, minority nationalists in Catalonia, Scotland, and Flanders bypass the central state to Europe and beyond, embracing a supracountry framework that makes their regions politically viable outside of the country to which they belong (Keating, 2001; Jolly, 2015). This literature suggests that the European Union, once portrayed as a threat to small nations, soon became an escape route instead: regionalists could credibly claim that they did not need the country because their region belonged directly to a larger community (Jolly, 2015). At the individual level, this yields a recognizable profile: the “inclusive regionalist” who holds regional and world identities together against the country one (Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001; Brigevid, 2018).

Actually, that most people hold several territorial attachments at once, rather than choosing among them, is among the most robust findings of the identity literature (Brewer, 1999). One tradition sees these attachments as nested, ordered by scope, with region within country and country in a wider whole (Marks, 1999; Díez Medrano and Gutiérrez, 2001). The second sees them as a marble cake, so entangled that they cannot be separated or ranked (Herrmann, Risse and Brewer, 2004). In either case, according to empirical evidence, the modal citizen is not an exclusive identifier but a plural one. This is something that speaks to the complexities behind the systematic comparative study of identities and thus an empirical challenge that deserves further attention.

iii. When Do Identities Form? Socialization vs. Context Effects

The institutional thesis is, to a large extent, an argument about persistence. To say that a devolved region or an open economy shape a territorial identity is to say that exposure to an institution might leave a mark that lasts. Everything therefore turns on a question the first two sections have left open: at what point in a life is territorial identity fixed, and is it fixed at all?

An option might be that political identities crystallize early in an individual's life and then consolidate. This argument rests on Mannheim's theory of generations, carried into empirical research as the "impressionable-years" model: during a formative window of roughly 15 to 25, as young people first engage with the political world, their basic orientations take shape, and once formed, they become resistant to later changes (Mannheim, 1952; Inglehart, 1977; Sears and Funk, 1999). Late adolescence and early adulthood matter because this is when people leave the family home, encounter politics as autonomous actors, and settle the attachments they will carry forward: what is learned earlier is too diffuse, and what is encountered later meets an already-formed self. If socialization is the mechanism, then the "impressionable-years" model encapsulates what is called a *cohort* effect.

An alternative option could be to consider that what a person was exposed to at youth fades when the exposure ends, and therefore that the effect on individuals is not a cohort one but a *contemporaneous-context effect* instead. In psychology of attitude change, the "lifelong-openness" model holds that orientations remain revisable throughout life rather than crystallizing once (Sears, 1983; Alwin and Krosnick, 1991). Accordingly, territorial attachment is not a sediment but a dynamic response to present circumstances, continuously updated as those circumstances change (Gabel, 1998; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000; Hooghe and Marks, 2005). Therefore, territorial identity should move with the present levels of decentralization and globalization, tracking where a country stands today rather than where it stood when any given respondent was young. Where socialization reads as a durable imprint, this instrumental-context account describes a constant individual adjustment.

These two accounts result in competing and observable predictions. If socialization is at work, territorial identity should carry a cohort effect: People who came of age under more decentralized or more globalized institutions should have distinctive attachments throughout life, regardless of the institutions under which they live at the time of the survey. If the contemporaneous-context account is right, identity should instead show no such imprint of the past but track the present institutional environment of a respondent's country, changing as that environment shifts. The difficulty here is that the two approaches are not easy to tell apart empirically: age, birth cohort, and survey period are mechanically linked. So neither comparing the old with the young nor comparing one country with another can, on its own, isolate a cohort effect from a life-cycle or a period effect. Our empirical strategy in this paper proposes a design that enables us to overcome this challenge: we use a large N

comparative survey with institutions changing at *different times in different countries*. How we measure territorial identity and operationalize each of these competing predictions is set out in the research design below. Specifically, we test the contemporaneous-context prediction in Section IV, where identity is related to present institutional context, and the socialization prediction in Section V, where we focus on whether the institutions of one’s formative years leave a durable cohort imprint.

III. DATA AND MEASUREMENT

We employ the joint EVS/WVS 2017–2022 database, which comprises 156,658 respondents in 92 countries pertaining to all world regions. The outcome variables of reference are the five-item territorial closeness battery: “How close do you feel to... your village/town, your region, your country, your continent, the world” (4-point scale).² A first descriptive approximation to the raw data in Figure 1 shows that local, regional and country attachment are a near-universal phenomenon. Conversely, the continental and world tiers split the sample in half, underscoring heterogeneity, and thus identifying a potential source of interesting variance for our purposes. As shown in Figure 1, 87.5% feel close or very close to their locality, 85.7% to their country, 82.4% to their region, but only 54.0% to their continent and 49.3% to the world.

We also select the following individual-level covariates from the database: sex, age, education (ISCED), income, employment status, religiosity (belonging to a religious denomination), ideology, town size and respondent and parent country of birth. Individual covariates are selected to represent what we here call rooting and uprooting conditions. Following the literature, we select individual level conditions that bind a person to a bounded near community (locality or country), as well as

²The question has a long but inconsistent history in the WVS and EVS. Earlier waves measured territorial belonging either as a forced ranking – asking to which single geographical group one belongs “first of all” (WVS items G001/G002) – or as a graded closeness scale directed at groups of people (“fellow nationals,” “European Union citizens”) with a Europe-specific supranational tier. The joint EVS/WVS 2017–2022 harmonizes these into a single symmetric four-point closeness scale applied identically to all five territorial levels (town, region, country, continent, and world) with generalized rather than Europe-specific referents. We regard this as the best available wording: it is the only version that records the intensity of attachment, measures every tier on the same scale, refers to territorial levels rather than a mix of people and places, and is portable across all world regions; so it alone can recover the multiple, nested profiles that our typology requires.

those that detach them from nearby communities and orient them towards an upward (and even outward) attachment. Among the former, we consider religiosity, age, or right-wing ideological self-identification, while among the latter, we consider education, income, migrant condition, or the size of the place of residence.




Figure 1. Closeness by territorial tier

i. Measuring individual level territorial identity configurations

As mentioned, our main outcome of interest builds on the geographical-closeness battery common to the ISSP National Identity modules and the EVS/WVS, which asks respondents how close they feel to their locality, region, country, continent, and the world. This literature reads the items as graded measures of the intensity of territorial attachment rather than of the content of identity — who counts as a "true" member (Jones and Smith, 2001) — and prior work has used them to construct local, country, and cosmopolitan categories directly (Norris, 2000; Ariely, 2012). This is a deliberate departure from the dominant instrument for territorial identity, the Linz–Moreno scale, which forces subcountry and country attachment onto a single linear axis and cannot represent their joint intensity or genuine dual identity (Guinjoan and Rodon, 2016). The standard objection to any cross-national use of these items is measurement non-equivalence: full scalar invariance (the assumption that a given answer reflects

the same level of attachment in every country) frequently fails, which formally prohibits comparing category levels across countries (Davidov, 2009).

We build a typology of territorial identity to insulate our work from this concern from the onset. Therefore, our typology is not a bookkeeping step, but rather our analysis's first substantive claim. We represent each respondent's territorial profile with three scores on the 1–4 scale: subcountry $s = \max(\text{local}, \text{region})$, country $n = \text{country}$, and supracountry $c = \max(\text{continent}, \text{world})$. Five configurations follow, operationalizing Marks (1999) trichotomy of exclusive, multiple, and unattached identities:

- **Exclusive subcountry** — s strictly exceeds both n and c ;
- **Exclusive country** — n strictly exceeds both s and c ;
- **Exclusive supracountry** — c strictly exceeds both s and n ;
- **Multiple** — the maximum is shared by two or more blocs (no strict winner);
- **Unattached** — "not close" (≤ 2) to all five levels.

Our rule reserves each exclusive label for a strict peak and gathers all ties into an explicit *Multiple* category, which is where inclusive identity belongs.³ According to Figure 2, genuine cosmopolitans (those strictly closer to the supracountry bloc than to anything below) are one in thirty-three; likewise, the plural nested identifier is the global norm with two respondents in three falling unto this category: specifically, 30% of respondents have a single strict peak, 66% a tied peak, and 4% are *Unattached*. The exclusive categories are genuinely peaked, not marginal ties, and *Multiple*,⁴ by definition, collects the tied profiles. These shares are essentially invariant to reasonable alternative definitions available in the Appendix.

³An alternative option would be to assign each respondent the *highest* level at which the maximum occurs — cosmopolitan if $c \geq n$ and $c \geq s$, and so on. This would direct every tie upward: a respondent equally close to town, nation, and world would be filed as cosmopolitan. As a result, the "cosmopolitan" category would sum up to ~40% of the world, but three-quarters of it would be composed of undifferentiated profiles.

⁴Our "Multiple" category captures plural identifiers, and remains deliberately agnostic between the nested and marble-cake readings mentioned in Section 2 of the paper: it records that a person attaches to several levels at once without assuming they order them. That this category is the largest in nearly every country in our sample is, in itself, evidence that plural attachment is the human default. Since the mentioned literature is built almost entirely on European identity, we present evidence that the pattern extends well beyond the European case in which it was found.




Figure 2. Territorial Identity Typology

Our typology therefore classifies each respondent by the tier they rate highest relative to their own remaining tiers, rather than by the absolute height of any single rating. This within-person construction is deliberate. When scalar invariance assumption breaks ([Davidov, 2009](#)), respondents in different countries use the scale differently; some leaning systematically toward the extreme “very close”, others toward the middle, so raw scores are not comparable across borders. Two features of our design protect our analyses from this problem. First, because classification depends only on which tier a respondent ranks highest among their own answers, a uniform national tendency to inflate (or deflate) every rating cancels: it lifts all five tiers together and leaves the peak unchanged. Second, every model includes country fixed effects, which absorb precisely these country-specific scale shifts. Identification thus rests on within-person and within-country variation, not on cross-national comparisons of what “very close” means.

ii. Construct validation

ii.1 Delving into Inclusive Identities

The identified two-thirds of respondents in the *Multiple* category invites an obvious question: does a tied score imply genuine plural identity (for instance, closeness to town, country, and world alike) or merely disengaged respondents that answer “close” to every item without discriminating ([Krosnick,](#)

1991)? These two possibilities produce identical closeness profiles, so the profile alone cannot tell them apart. We separate them with the following two diagnostics.

The first diagnostic is about the intensity of the tie. Multiple identifiers are far from uniform: within the category, mean closeness ranges from 2.6 at the tenth percentile to 4.0 at the ninetieth (median 3.2). A respondent tied high, that is, someone who feels very close to all five levels (mean ≥ 3.5 , a third of the category), is making a strong claim of inclusive attachment; one tied low (≤ 2.5 , a tenth) is closer to indifference.

The second diagnostic focuses on cross-battery discrimination; that is, whether a respondent who flatlines on the territorial items nonetheless differentiates on an unrelated battery. For this purpose we chose the five confidence-in-institutions questions (government, parties, parliament, civil service, and regional organization) available also in the survey questionnaire. The logic is that of a within-survey lie detector: a person who genuinely feels equally close to town, country, and world but holds ordinary, differentiated views of institutions is expressing a real inclusive identity, whereas one who answers every question uniformly is a probable flatliner whose responses carry little information. Approximately a quarter of *Multiple* identifiers (23%) give identically flat confidence answers.




Figure 3. Developing the two diagnostics

Crossing the two diagnostics helps us further separate our *Multiple* category into **engaged plural identifiers** (tied high and discriminating; 25%), **indifferent responders** (tied low and flat throughout; 15%), and a **mixed middle** (57%). The partition is validated by variables that do not

play a role in constructing it (see Figure 3), namely, interviewer-rated interest, interview length, and political interest.⁵ Across the three outcomes of interest, the three groups line up monotonically: engaged plural identifiers highest, indifferent lowest, mixed in between. The engaged–indifferent gap is strongly significant for interviewer interest and political interest and weaker for the noisier interview-length marker. We believe this exercise is useful since now the roughly one-in-ten respondents whose plural profile reflects disengagement are isolable, so they cannot silently inflate any *Multiple* based estimate and can be flagged or set aside where it matters.

ii.2 Overall Typology Validation

Moreover, if the five categories capture real territorial orientations, they should predict independent, non-territorial attitudes too. We arrange our five identity categories against two theoretically and empirically near-orthogonal attitude dimensions (individual-level $r = -0.02$) by constructing two indexes with other variables in the questionnaire. **Nationalism** (national pride + willingness to fight for the country) should be single-peaked for those exclusively identified with the country and lower among those whose exclusive attachment falls below or above the state. **Cosmopolitanism** (trust in other nationalities + positive evaluation of immigrants + confidence in the UN) should instead increase monotonically with the scope of exclusive territorial identity. We estimate two independent models with its own country-clustered SEs. Then, each confidence interval in Figure 4 describes the uncertainty of that index’s mean in that category; it does not, on its own, test the nationalism-vs-cosmopolitanism difference.

Both predictions hold in Figure 4: nationalism shows a clean single peak among exclusive country identifiers (−0.14, +0.12, −0.61), while cosmopolitanism runs monotonically upward (−0.07, +0.06, +0.24). That the two lines cross each other is the decisive proof: two independent attitude scales moving in opposite directions along the same ordering seems to confirm that exclusive attachment to

⁵“Respondent interested during the interview”: It’s the interviewer’s assessment, recorded at the end of the interview (the interviewer’s judgment of how engaged the respondent appeared, not a self-report). “Interest in politics”: This one is a respondent self-report question, the standard WVS/EVS item, “How interested would you say you are in politics?”. “Total length of interview” in minutes, it’s fieldwork metadata recording how long the interview took. It runs from 2 to 1320 minutes, median 55. We comprise it to 15–180 minutes, treating durations under 15 min or over 3 hours as implausible/data errors and setting them missing.

one territorial level correlates with a genuine territorial orientation. The remaining two categories sit off the scope axis, so we form no predictions for them; we simply describe where they fall. *Multiple* identifiers score like exclusive country identifiers on pride (+0.08) but are no more cosmopolitan than average (+0.01). The *Unattached* score low on both dimensions (-0.58 and -0.21), a joint score that reads more as general disengagement than as any particular territorial orientation.




Figure 4. Typology validation

IV. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSES

i. Individual-Level Patterns

Next, we model who holds which identity with a multinomial logit of the five-category typology on a selection of individual z-standardized covariates (sex, age, education, income, unemployment, immigrant status, religiosity (denomination membership), and town size)⁶ estimated with design weights and country fixed-effects. We report average marginal effects (AMEs),

⁶We deliberately keep left-right ideology out of this model: it is missing for a quarter of respondents, and the nonresponse appears to be non-random (55% in the Middle East and North Africa and roughly a third across Asia and post-communist Europe, against 9% in Western Europe, with fourteen countries more than half missing) so retaining it would drop about a quarter of the sample and tilt it toward Western democracies.

expressed as percentage-point changes in each category's predicted probability associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in each covariate; the multinomial logit is estimated with *Multiple* as the base outcome.

We report the results covariate by covariate, focusing for each on the most important shift:⁷

- **Immigrant status** → the sharpest cleavage in the data: +2.9 pp into exclusive supracountry and +1.8 into *Unattached*, drawn -2.8 and -1.7 out of exclusive subcountry and country. Migration is two exits from the country at once, upward and out.
- **Religiosity** → the strongest integrator: +3.2 pp into *Multiple*, its single largest effect, pulled out of the cosmopolitan pole (-1.3) and out of the *Unattached* (-1.7). It broadens the attachment rather than narrowing it down to the country.
- **Age** → a rooting trait: +1.5 pp into *Multiple* and -1.0 out of exclusive subcountry (with -0.5 out of supracountry). Older cohorts consolidate the nested profile and drift from both sub- and supracountry extremes.
- **Education** → uprooting from the subcountry: -0.9 pp out of exclusive subcountry, redistributed upward to both country (+0.3) and supracountry (+0.4). Schooling lifts and splits identity rather than leaning towards one pole.
- **Income** → does not touch on an exclusive category: its whole action is out of *Unattached* (-0.6) and into *Multiple* (+0.7).
- **Unemployment** → the grievance signature: +1.0 pp into exclusive country attachment and +0.8 into detachment, away from *Multiple* (-0.9). Exclusive country identity seems to connect principally with covariates leaning to an economic grievance story, not tradition.
- **Sex (female)** → clearly rooting: +1.2 pp into exclusive subcountry, and less likely into the country (-0.6) or supracountry (-0.4) poles.

⁷These effects are not an artifact of disengaged responders. Re-estimating the multinomial with the 15% of *Multiple* respondents flagged as indifferent removed — about a tenth of the sample, all from the base category — leaves every marginal effect essentially unchanged: no cell moves by more than 0.3 pp, and if anything the effects sharpen slightly, since the excluded responders add noise rather than structure.

- **Town size** → municipal-scale differentiation: -1.2 pp out of exclusive subcountry, $+0.4$ into each pole (country and supracountry). Urban life detaches identity from the local and lifts it to broader tiers.




Figure 5. Who holds which identity

ii. Contextual Dynamics

The previous analyses control for country-level heterogeneity through country fixed-effects. We now examine two institutional dimensions that give substantive content to the existing heterogeneity across countries in our sample: the KOF globalization index (Gygli et al., 2019) and expenditure decentralization at local and regional levels (OECD/UCLG SNG-WOFI). As previously explained, we view these as the two institutional manifestations of multilevel governance in the second half of the twentieth century: the upward dispersion of authority to supranational and international institutions, and the downward dispersion of authority to subcentral governments. We then examine whether these two institutional dimensions of multilevel governance are associated with different patterns of

territorial identification.⁸

These associations are cross-sectional and measured at the country level, that is, the same form of evidence on which the institutional literatures themselves rest, and which, as we noted at the outset, cannot by itself distinguish institutions forging identity from reverse causation, contemporaneous adaptation, or sorting. We present them, accordingly, not as tests of the causal claims but as their descriptive foundation. Their value at this stage is twofold: to establish, on a genuinely global sample rather than the OECD or Western Europe, where these regularities were first observed, and whether they hold at all; and to lay out the patterns whose mechanisms Sections V and VI then interrogate.

We estimate a fully specified multinomial logit of the typology on the individual covariates and both macro-level variables. Standard errors are computed using a country block bootstrap over the 77-country sample.⁹ Both contextual variables (KOF globalization and expenditure decentralization) enter the model as z-standardized variables, so the reported AMEs represent percentage-point changes in predicted probabilities associated with an increase in one-standard deviation in each contextual variable. We report the results in Figure 6.

Globalization significantly correlates with our typology's exclusive categories. Specifically, it pushes citizens out of exclusive subcountry identity (-2.0pp , $p < 0.05$) and into the other both exclusive poles (country ($+1.4\text{pp}$, $p < 0.01$) and supracountry ($+0.9\text{pp}$, $p < 0.001$)) while leaving the *Multiple* essentially unchanged. Integration seems to promote committed, exclusive identities at the country and supracountry poles alike, without favoring either.

⁸We deliberately set GDP aside here: across our countries it correlates about 0.8 with KOF, so the two carry near-identical information, whereas globalization and decentralization are essentially orthogonal ($r \approx 0.16$), so together they span two genuinely independent axes of country context.

⁹The 77-country estimation sample is the set of survey countries with a valid OECD/UCLG SNG-WOFI subcountry-expenditure figure (78 of 92) and complete individual covariates; globalization (KOF, 90 countries) is not the binding constraint. Its regional composition tracks the full sample closely — all six world regions are represented, and each region's share differs by at most two percentage points from the full 92 — with one meaningful exception: the Middle East and North Africa falls from 10% to 6% of the sample, because the SNG-WOFI database does not report Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, or Libya (the remaining dropped cases are small Asian territories — Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore, Taiwan, and the Maldives). This remains a far more globally balanced sample than the RAI would allow, which covers no Sub-Saharan African and only one MENA country — the reason we take SNG-WOFI as the primary decentralization measure.




Figure 6. Contextual effects

Decentralization shows quite a different behavior. If any institutional force should build the identity of the subcountry, it is fiscal self-governing; yet, once controlling for individual composition and globalization, expenditure decentralization does not show a positive association with exclusive identity of the subcountry: its marginal effect is, if anything, negative (-0.5pp) and far from significant ($p = 0.57$). Paradoxically, decentralization behaves in the opposite direction from theory; it is actually associated to exclusive country identity ($+1.8\text{pp}$, $p < 0.001$), plausibly because fiscally decentralized states are disproportionately large federations (Germany, Canada, the United States, India, Brazil) whose country identities are, if anything, especially robust. Decentralization thus coincides with stronger country attachment, not with the regional attachment it is theorized to foster. The finding is not an artifact of our employed decentralization measure: substituting it with the Regional Authority Index (RAI, (Hooghe et al., 2016)) on the coinciding 64-country sample reproduces the same null on exclusive subcountry identity (-0.8pp , $p = 0.48$).

iii. Cross-Level Interactions

The same two macro dimensions that differentiate the typology in 4.2 should also condition the individual cleavages of 4.1. We estimate this as in 4.2: a single multinomial logit of the five-category typology on the eight individual covariates, globalization (KOF), the OECD/UCLG measure of

expenditure decentralization, and an interaction of every covariate and our macro-level variables. As in Section 4.2, the two macro-level variables (globalization and decentralization) enter the model as country-level main effects, alongside their interactions with each individual covariate. Because these variables vary only across countries, ordinary standard errors would overstate precision; we therefore base all inference on a country block bootstrap, resampling whole countries with replacement so that the uncertainty reflects the number of countries, not the number of respondents.

Each of the eighty cells in Figure 7 (eight covariates $\times$ five categories $\times$ two macro variables) reports an AME second difference. The first difference is a covariate's average marginal effect — how much, in percentage points, that covariate shifts the probability of a given identity category. The second difference asks how that marginal effect itself changes as the macro variable rises: the cell is the change in the covariate's AME on a category, per one-standard-deviation increase in globalization or decentralization, in percentage points. A positive cell means the covariate's pull toward that category is stronger in more globalized (or more decentralized) countries; a cell near zero means the covariate operates the same way regardless of context.




Figure 7. Cleavages are conditional: mostly on globalization, not decentralization

Globalization does the conditioning: 10 of the 40 covariate-category cells reach significance, and they seem to send a coherent message. Globalization organizes who ends up in the exclusive

supracountry category. The immigrant advantage in this regard grows by +1.8 pp per SD of KOF ($p < 0.05$) and education's by +0.6 pp ($p < 0.001$). And it narrows the routes out: the religious and the old, who usually resist supracountry exclusivity, resist it more sharply as societies globalize (-1.2 and -0.2 pp, both $p < 0.01$). Globalization also shapes *Multiple* category by pulling in women (+1.3 pp, $p < 0.001$) while pushing out the educated (-1.3 pp, $p < 0.05$) and draws women and the old out of *Unattached* (-0.4 and -0.2 pp, $p < 0.05$). The uprooting cleavages, in short, sort people upward more where the society is more globally connected.

On the contrary, conditional effects of the level of expenditure decentralization are practically null. Only 2 of 40 cells reach significance, and they build no coherent channel. Just one touches a subcountry cleavage: urban residents lean somewhat more toward exclusive subcountry membership where spending is decentralized (town size, +1.2 pp, $p = 0.01$). It is an isolated cell rather than a pattern. No coherent individual-level channel runs from decentralized spending to subcountry identity. As in section 4.2, the upward dimension of multilevel governance reaches into the individual cleavages and reorders them; the downward dimension does not.

V. SOCIALIZATION AS THE EXPLANATION: TWO DESIGNS

So far, we have shown that territorial identity tracks the present institutional environment. That is consistent with the contemporaneous-context effect, but also with a socialization account in which the imprint was laid down earlier and merely coincides with present conditions. This section separates the two by asking whether the institutions of one's formative years leave a mark independent of present context.

We here borrow from the *impressionable-years* literature and its main hypothesis which (Sears, 1983; Krosnick and Alwin, 1989; Sears and Funk, 1999; Dinas, 2013; Neundorff, Niemi and Smets, 2016) holds that political orientations crystallize in late adolescence and early adulthood (ages 15–25) and remain comparatively fixed thereafter; if so, the institutional environment under which a cohort comes to adulthood should leave a durable mark on its territorial identity. The framework's value here is that it converts a diffuse claim – that institutions “shape” identity – into a precise and falsifiable one: individual exposure during a specific developmental window, not exposure in general, should have

an effect, and this imprint should persist as the cohort ages.

To move from structure to process we need variation in institutional exposure that is plausibly exogenous to a respondent's identity: accordingly, we treat the age structure of the sample as a quasi-panel, comparing cohorts within each country who reached adulthood under different institutional environments while holding constant everything about the country and everything common to a birth-cohort worldwide. We do this in two studies. Study 1 is a continuous-exposure design that measures the institutional environment each cohort experienced during its impressionable years and tests both arguments in parallel (regional self-rule for the decentralization thesis and the KOF index for the globalization thesis) asking whether cohorts formed under more empowered regions, or under more open and connected economies, carry more regional or more cosmopolitan identities into adulthood. Given that globalization seems to be the only institutional channel through which territorial identity might be shaped, Study 2 sharpens the globalization test by replacing gradual exposure with a discrete critical juncture, dating each country's trade liberalization and asking whether the cohorts that came of age after the opening differ from those that came of age before. Together they subject the institutional thesis to a qualified test of the same causal claim.

i. Design 1: Exposure as a Formative-Window Average

With the aim of testing for this hypothesis, we first construct *impressionable-years* institutional exposure measures and relate them to adult identity. We measure the latter through the arithmetic mean of the relevant annual, country-level variables across the 11 years spanning their ages 15 through 25, taking regional self-rule from the Regional Authority Index (RAI, coded annually 1950–2018) for decentralization and the KOF Globalization Index (annual, 1970–2022) for globalization. Two features follow from this construction. First, because the measures are country-level and the window is fixed by birth year, exposure varies only at the country-by-birth-year level. Second, we require at least six of the eleven formative years to fall within the measure's coverage, dropping cohorts whose window predates the series or is too sparsely covered. We then standardize the exposure over the pooled estimation sample, separately for each design, so a coefficient is the effect of a one standard deviation move along the cross-country, cross-cohort distribution of formative exposure. For example, a Spaniard born in 1960 passed ages 15–25 (calendar years 1975–1985) under the post-Franco devolution and so carries a

high, rising self-rule average, whereas a Spaniard born in 1945 (window 1960–1970) carries the low, flat pre-democratic value, and it is that within-country gap between neighbouring cohorts that identifies the effect.

Using membership in each of the five typology categories as the outcome, we estimate a linear probability model per category, so each coefficient reads directly as a change in the probability of membership, in percentage points per one standard deviation of formative-years exposure. Each model includes country, five-year birth-cohort,¹⁰ and survey-year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered by country, and no individual-level controls, since traits such as education are realized after the impressionable years and would lie post-treatment. The country fixed-effects absorb every cross-country difference (for instance, the level of decentralization or globalization); the birth-cohort effects absorb the worldwide generational trend, that is each successive cohort’s baseline propensity toward any given identity; the survey-year effects absorb fieldwork timing. Therefore, the variation of interest of these five models is the within-country difference across cohorts in the exact moment of institutional change. Importantly, to avoid any noise, we only focus on non-immigrants, so that country of socialization is country of residence during the impressionable-years. Figure 8 reports the pooled results.

Merging the full RAI panel to 66 survey countries builds no typology category; least of all the one it is theorized to build. The effect on exclusive-subcountry membership is negative and non-significant and the other four categories are equally flat (exclusive country, exclusive supracountry, *Multiple*, and *Unattached*; all $p > 0.1$). Growing up under a more self-ruling region makes a person no more likely

¹⁰We set breakpoints every five years — 1900, 1905, 1910, ..., 2010 — for a total of 22 bins. A respondent born in 1960 lands in [1960, 1965); one born in 1964 lands in the same bin; one born in 1965 moves to the next. Each person gets exactly one cohort label from their birth year.




Figure 8. Formative-years exposure

to end up exclusively attached to that region.¹¹ KOF exposure shows a similar pattern. Growing up globalized does not raise exclusive-supra-country (cosmopolitan) membership: the effect is, if anything, negative. What globalization exposure does instead is reorganize the typology away from localism and toward the country and the *Multiple* profile: it moves cohorts out of exclusive-subcountry identity and into exclusive-country identity and the *Multiple* category, leaving *Unattached* unchanged.

Finally, since a pooled analysis can hide offsetting regional effects, we re-estimate each design within world regions and the OECD, focusing on each institution's theoretically relevant category. As

¹¹The null regarding the RAI is precise, not underpowered. Three descriptive facts demonstrate this is the case. First, there is plenty of variation to work with. Even after the country and cohort fixed effects strip out the differences between countries and between generations, more than a third of the variation in how much regional self-rule each cohort grew up under still remains. And it is substantial: in 45 of the 66 countries the self-rule a cohort was exposed to shifts by at least three points across generations. Second, the design is precise enough to have caught a real effect if there was one. Given its standard errors, it would reliably pick up a shift of one to two percentage points per standard deviation of exposure; yet every estimate sits within a few tenths of a point of zero. So we can genuinely rule out any formative imprint larger than roughly one or two points, rather than simply having failed to find one. Third, and most tellingly, the very same setup does find effects for globalization. Run on the same people, it shows that growing up more globalized shifts membership in the exclusive-country category and in the *Multiple* category. So the design can clearly detect formative effects of the size that would matter; it detects them for globalization and simply does not for regional authority.




Figure 9. Formative-years exposure by world region on theory-relevant category

Figure 9 shows, formative regional authority raises exclusive-subcountry membership nowhere: the OECD and Western-European coefficients — where the multilevel-governance literature’s own cases sit — are, if anything, negative, and the estimates for post-communist and Latin American countries are small and insignificant. Formative globalization raises exclusive-supracountry membership in no region either; the only non-null is a marginal effect outside the OECD.

ii. Design 2: Exposure as a Critical Juncture

Using a formative-window average might vanish the effect of a sharp and sudden change, that is a critical juncture. We therefore re-run the globalization design as an event study anchored on a genuine discrete juncture: each country’s trade-liberalization date from [Wacziarg and Welch \(2008\)](#), the year its trade openness began. Exposure becomes the share of a person’s ages 15–25 falling after liberalization. With country and survey-year fixed effects only, growing up after liberalization appears to build the cosmopolitan pole: exclusive-supracountry membership rises +1.6 pp per full window of post-liberalization exposure ($p < 0.001$).

Next, we add five-year birth-cohort fixed effects, which absorb everything common to a cohort across the world (for instance, the secular trend itself) so that the treatment is identified only from differences across countries when the opening arrived: cohorts of the same age, one raised in a country that liberalized early and one in a country that liberalized late, experienced different formative

exposure. This is the conservative and appropriate test. If the effect survives it, the imprint is plausibly the reform; if it disappears once cohort effects are in place, the apparent effect might be related to a trend all along. The result vanishes once birth-cohort fixed effects are added, to -0.8 pp ($p = 0.14$). Results seem to suggest that there exists a worldwide cohort trend — younger cohorts everywhere drifting toward exclusive supracountry identity — mechanically correlated with being young when one's own country happened to liberalize. This is exactly why a cross-sectional cohort result cannot be read as socialization.

The evidence so far converges on one conclusion: neither dimension of multilevel governance produces, in a person's formative years, the exclusive territorial-identity category the literature might presume. Decentralization is a clean null: formative years build no exclusive regional identity. Globalization's formative effect, for its part, does not run toward the exclusive cosmopolitan pole the cleavage literature anticipates: the continuous design consolidates country and plural attachment while, if anything, depressing exclusive-supracountry membership, and the liberalization-juncture design confirms that the apparent pro-cosmopolitan effect is a cohort artifact that vanishes once cohort fixed-effects absorb the worldwide secular trend.

Yet this is not, strictly, a null; nor is it evidence against cosmopolitanism as such. Coming of age under globalization does leave an imprint on territorial identity; it simply adds rather than substitutes, moving cohorts into the *Multiple* category rather than avoiding the country in favor of the world. And the *Multiple* category is no retreat into the near. Examined by tier composition (to which levels its members attach, rather than how intensely), it is strongly world-inclusive: among *Multiple* identifiers, 73% feel close or very close to at least one supracountry level and 60% to the world specifically; 55% are close to both their region and the world, nearly half (48%) to all five levels at once, and for a majority (55%) the tied peak that defines the profile itself reaches the supracountry bloc. Only a quarter (24%) are close to their region but not to any wider level: the genuinely "rooted-local" type.

The plural identifier, in other words, is not the opposite of the cosmopolitan: most inclusive identities already contain the world. The decisive distinction is therefore not between the parochial and the cosmopolitan, but between exclusive cosmopolitanism, which is rare (3%), and inclusive cosmopolitanism, which is the global norm. Read in this light, formative globalization does exactly what a non-zero-sum account would predict: it broadens the range of communities to which people

feel close, adding the supracountry without uprooting them from the country.




Figure 10. The liberalization juncture

VI. DOES MIGRATION MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Since we tested the *impressionable-years* hypothesis focusing just on natives, here we turn our attention to migrants, under the observation that, as previously shown, immigrant status is the most consequential single variable in our descriptive model when building exclusive territorial attachment. In this regard, our exploratory premise is the following: if the institutional environment in which one is raised barely moves territorial identity, what does it? The natural candidate is the biographical event that actually transports a person between territorial contexts: migration. Two classic theories predict opposite consequences. *Assimilation* (Gordon 1964; Alba and Nee 2003) holds that migrants come, over time, to adopt the country identity of the destination; migration as an act of joining the “nation”. *Transnationalism* (Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Portes, Guarnizo, and Landolt 1999; Levitt 2001) holds that migrants sustain attachments that reach beyond any single state: migration as an exit upward, toward supracountry identification. Our claim is that, in principle, both are right and that, following our previous results, these attitudes should vary depending on the institutional context of destination.

We test for this through the following four elements. First, regarding basic model specification, the treatment is respondents’ immigrant status: being foreign-born, i.e. having physically crossed a border (from the respondent’s own birthplace item G027A in the questionnaire). The outcomes are the two

typology poles the theories dispute: exclusive country and supracountry identities (we also include *Multiple* as a placebo). Second, the moderator is the destination's level of globalization (the KOF index); the expectation is that a migrant integrates into whatever context the destination supplies, so the sign of migration's effect should turn on how connected that context is. Third, immigrants and natives are compared within each destination (destination fixed-effects), so the effect is identified from how the immigrant-native gap varies across destinations of differing globalization. Fourth, and hardest, is the problem of composition versus context: a globalized destination does not merely shape the migrants it receives, it attracts different ones, so an interaction could be capturing who moves where rather than the destination's own influence. We control for this in two ways: by controlling for the migrant's origin (UN world region fixed effects and origin-country KOF, which hold the sending context constant), and, decisively, by turning to the second generation (native-born respondents with at least one foreign-born parent, from the parental-birthplace items, V001 father and V002 mother) who never migrated themselves: if they inherit the same destination effect, self-selection on the act of migrating cannot be the explanation, whereas the transmission of the experienced destination-context effect should.

In Table 1, we report the results of 4 different model specifications on the categories of interest of our typology.¹² Specifically, we employ OLS estimation with destination fixed-effects, and country-clustered SEs. A naive interaction of immigrant status with the destination's globalization (the KOF index, z-scored across destinations) yields the following results in Model 1: in less-globalized destinations, immigrants are more likely than natives to hold exclusive country identity; in more-globalized ones, less. The exact opposite holds for exclusive supracountry identity.¹³ The same biographical event produces opposite outcomes by destination: joining the country identity where the society is less globally connected, exiting it upward where it is more connected.

¹²While in Models 1-3 the gap of interest is between immigrants and natives, the latter including second-generation immigrants, in Model 4 a dummy pulls the second generation out of the baseline, so the reference sharpens to natives of various generations. Likewise, the second-generation model has fewer natives because it requires parental-birthplace data (V001/V002), which drops 3,500 native-born respondents of unrecorded parentage; those can be included in the M1-M3 baseline but cannot be classified for the M4.

¹³Because immigrants concentrate in cities, adding town size modestly attenuates the immigration's main effect on exclusive supracountry identity. Yet, the interaction is unaffected.

Model	Country	Supra	Mult.	Immig.	2nd gen	Natives
Immig. $\times$ KOF (M1)	−1.57* (0.79)	+1.86* (0.74)	+1.45 (1.17)	8,185	8,480	123,853
+ origin region FE (M2)	−1.57. (0.83)	+2.04* (0.82)	+1.03 (1.13)	8,185	8,480	123,853
+ origin KOF (M3)	−1.57. (0.83)	+2.04* (0.82)	+1.03 (1.13)	8,185	8,480	123,853
Second-gen $\times$ KOF	−0.90. (0.54)	+1.11** (0.36)	+2.31** (0.82)	8,185	8,480	120,324

Table 1. The migration reversal by model specification.

Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses (** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, . $p < .10$).

The tests summarized in Models 2 to 4 in Table 1, all push toward a confirmation on the effect of context. First, controlling for origin (UN world region fixed-effects and origin-country KOF) leaves the interactions essentially unchanged in Models 2 and 3. Second, and more powerfully, the second generation respondents in Model 4, 8,480 individuals¹⁴ born in the destination to at least one foreign-born parent, who never migrated themselves, show the same reversal. An asymmetry stands out though: *Multiple* identity rises with the level of globalization in the country of destination for those belonging to the second generation but not for the first-gen. The second generation's response to a globalized destination isn't only the upward exit, it is also, and most strongly, a move into nested plural attachment. Therefore, the immigration effect, negative on country, positive on supracountry, survives origin controls, and the second generation, who never migrated, reproduces it (firmly on supracountry, suggestively on country) and expands it toward more inclusive attachments.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

TBA

¹⁴10,613 respondents are second generation; 8,480 survive listwise deletion on the model variables. The gap is almost dependent on the outcome: 1,855 lack a complete five-item closeness battery (so their typology is undefined and they can't be placed in any category), plus 278 missing an individual control. 8,480 is what the coefficient is estimated on — the same reason immigrants show 8,185 rather than the raw 9,844.

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