

Exploring the effects of place-based identities on populist attitudes: a panel data analysis

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In an increasingly globalised and rapidly changing world, many citizens seek to redefine the boundaries of the communities to which they belong. While research has linked place-based attitudes to political discontent, we know much less about whether changes in place-based identities shape populist attitudes over time. We argue that stronger attachment to a territory reinforces perceptions of a bounded political community, sharpening distinctions between “the people” and distant political elites. We further expect these dynamics to be particularly salient in rural areas, where stronger place-based identities and higher levels of political discontent have been widely documented.

Drawing on six-wave panel data from Spain, we estimate fixed-effects models to examine how within-individual changes in place-based identities at different territorial scales relate to changes in populist attitudes. We find that increases in place-based identity are associated with stronger populist attitudes among rural residents, whereas these relationships are weaker among urban dwellers. This pattern emerges regardless of whether attachment is directed towards the municipality, the autonomous community, Spain, or the European Union. This suggests that the political consequences of place-based identity depend less on the territorial scale itself than on the strengthening of territorial belonging. By uncovering how changes in place-based identity shape populist attitudes across social contexts, the article contributes to research on place-based identity, political discontent, and populism.

Introduction

One of the great political paradoxes of the twenty-first century is that globalisation has not diminished the importance of place. Instead, it has made territorial belonging more politically relevant than ever (Ford and Jennings, 2020). The growing mobility of people, capital, goods, and ideas has transformed the social environments in which citizens live, weakening many of the traditional boundaries that once structured collective life. Yet rather than eroding the importance of place, these transformations appear to have reinforced the search for stable communities capable of providing belonging, recognition, and a sense of continuity amid rapid social change (Cramer, 2016; Fitzgerald, 2018). In this context, territorial belonging has become an increasingly important way through which individuals define who they are and where they fit within society.

If globalisation has reshaped the communities to which people feel they belong, it has also transformed the way political conflict is organised. Political competition has always relied upon collective identities capable of distinguishing between “us” and “them”. However, these boundaries are being drawn in territorial terms. As Lizotte (2019) argues, contemporary populism has progressively territorialized political conflict by portraying globalisation as a process that benefits highly mobile political and economic elites while undermining the economic, cultural, and social relevance of territorially rooted communities. Populist narratives therefore increasingly construct “the people” as a territorially bounded community whose interests are threatened by distant elites and external actors, giving rise to a *territorialized demos* (Lizotte, 2019).

This growing political relevance of territorial belonging raises an important question. If political conflict is gradually more organised around territorially defined communities, how do these communities become politically meaningful? Existing research has largely addressed this question by looking at places rather than people. A substantial body of work has demonstrated that territorial inequalities, economic decline, demographic change, unequal access to public services, and perceptions of place-based resentment all shape political behaviour and contribute to support for populist parties and attitudes (see, e.g., Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2024; Cramer, 2016; Huijsmans, 2023; Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). While these studies convincingly show that place matters, they tell us considerably less about whether changes in the way individuals identify with territories themselves alter their political attitudes. As Arzheimer and Bernemann (2024) observe, the role of

place has recently become a major issue in the study of populism, yet the mechanisms through which place affects individual political orientations remain far from clear.

This article argues that place-based identity constitutes one of these missing mechanisms. We contend that stronger identification with a territory transforms communities of belonging into politically meaningful communities by reinforcing perceptions of a bounded collective whose interests deserve protection. As place-based identity becomes a more central component of individuals' self-understanding, political conflict is increasingly interpreted through the distinction between a territorially defined sense of *we* and external actors perceived as failing to represent or actively threatening that community. Because populist discourse relies on precisely this opposition between “the people” and distant elites, stronger place-based identities should increase individuals' receptiveness to populist attitudes.

We further argue that this relationship should depend on territorial context. Rural communities not only tend to foster stronger place-based identities but are also more frequently embedded in narratives of decline, peripheralization, and political neglect (Cramer, 2016; Lyons and Utych, 2021; Zumbrunn et al., 2025). Consequently, place-based identities should become more politically salient in rural than in urban settings, making increases in territorial identification more likely to translate into stronger populist attitudes among rural residents.

To evaluate these expectations, we analyse six waves of a Spanish panel survey collected between 2020 and 2025 (Pannico et al., 2025) and estimate individual fixed-effects models. This research design enables us to examine whether within-individual changes in place-based identity are associated with corresponding changes in populist attitudes while accounting for stable individual characteristics. Moreover, by considering four different territorial scales—the municipality, the autonomous community, Spain, and the European Union—we assess whether these relationships vary depending on the territorial object of identification.

Our findings provide strong support for the proposed argument. Increases in place-based identity are associated with stronger populist attitudes among rural residents, whereas these relationships are substantially weaker or absent among urban dwellers. In addition, this pattern is remarkably consistent across all four territorial scales. The political consequences of place-based identity therefore appear to depend less on which territorial

community individuals identify with than on how strongly territorial belonging becomes part of their self-understanding.

This article makes three contributions to the literature. First, it shifts attention from the territorial conditions associated with political discontent to the identity-based mechanisms through which territorial belonging becomes politically consequential. Second, by exploiting longitudinal panel data and fixed-effects models, it provides evidence on how changes in place-based identity within individuals translate into changes in populist attitudes over time, moving beyond the predominantly cross-sectional evidence available to date. Finally, it demonstrates that the political consequences of place-based identity are contingent upon territorial context, showing that rural settings amplify the translation of territorial belonging into populist attitudes. More broadly, the article suggests that the territorialization of contemporary politics is not simply a consequence of where people live, but of how strongly territorial belonging becomes part of who they are.

Theoretical framework

People have a fundamental need to belong to a social collective, to be part of a reference community, and, consequently, to categorize both themselves and others into different social groups. This is the central premise of Social Identity Theory (Fitzgerald, 2018; Huddy, 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Within this theoretical tradition, a group is understood as a collection of individuals who perceive themselves as similar to one another and whose shared identity is grounded in common emotional attachment and collective evaluation (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Perceiving oneself as a member of a group provides individuals with a reference framework for thinking, acting, and interacting with others, while simultaneously contributing to the construction of self-esteem and self-concept (Livingstone et al., 2008). The counterpart of group identification is intergroup comparison, whereby individuals evaluate the relative position of their own in-group vis-à-vis relevant out-groups, potentially giving rise to perceptions of either disadvantage or privilege (Huddy, 2001; Tajfel and Turner, 1979).

Such categorization may be structured around a wide range of social characteristics, including gender, religion, language, ethnicity, occupation, or place, among others. It is precisely this latter dimension —place— that has gained particular prominence in recent

years. Globalisation and technological development have been accompanied by increasing social and cultural homogenization, leading many individuals to experience feelings of dislocation, indistinctiveness, and rootlessness. In response, many seek to draw boundaries—including geographical ones—around their community and their place in the world (Cramer, 2016; Fitzgerald, 2018). Consequently, when individuals incorporate a territory into their self-definition, that territory ceases to be merely a geographical space and instead becomes a criterion for group membership.

In a similar vein, Place Identity Theory, developed within environmental psychology, argues that places acquire symbolic meanings that extend far beyond their physical characteristics and are rooted in individuals' lived experiences (Proshansky, 1978). Although there is no clear consensus regarding the distinctions and relationships among the concepts of place attachment, place dependence, sense of place, and place identity (Peng et al., 2020), there is broad agreement concerning the definition of the latter. Place identity refers to the dimension of personal identity that is shaped by the environment in which individuals live or with which they maintain a strong emotional bond (Bonaiuto et al., 2002; Hernández et al., 2010; Proshansky, 1978). Accordingly, place identity is built upon a collective sense of social identity intertwined with the symbolic meaning of place (Harner, 2001).

The stronger this identification with a place becomes, the greater the tendency to perceive those who inhabit that place as members of the same in-group and to interpret political reality through the interests of that territorial community. Identification with a place therefore reinforces the distinction between an in-group—those who share that territory—and various out-groups—those associated with other places—thereby providing the basis for intergroup comparisons and for the emergence of attitudes and behaviours aimed at defending the interests of the group.

This process has important political consequences. Attachments to place are associated with social cohesion and community development, but they may also constitute a source of community conflict (Forester, 1987; Manzo and Perkins, 2006). As predicted by Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), individuals tend to favour members of their own in-group while interpreting situations perceived as detrimental to that group more intensely (Zumbrunn et al., 2025). Recent evidence shows that individuals with stronger place-based identities are more likely to perceive that their community is treated unfairly or inadequately by political institutions, which in turn translates into lower levels of

political trust, greater sensitivity to the distribution of public resources, and stronger hostility towards intellectuals and experts (Lunz Trujillo, 2022; Lyons and Utych, 2021; Zumbrunn, 2024a). In other words, place-based identity makes individuals particularly sensitive to any signal of collective disadvantage affecting their place.

As perceptions of grievance or threat emerge, political narratives that attribute responsibility for the problems affecting a territory to external actors—that is, to the out-group—become increasingly compelling (Fitzgerald, 2018). In this respect, the literature on place-based resentment shows that perceptions of decline or abandonment foster feelings of threat (Cramer, 2016; Huijsmans, 2023; McKay, 2019) and encourage the search for external culprits, whether distant political elites or other social groups. Within this context, the populist interpretative framework becomes particularly attractive because it structures political conflict around a moral opposition between a homogeneous “people”—a collective *we*—and distant elites—a corresponding *they*—who are portrayed as acting against the interests of the community (Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2024).

As Lizotte (2019) argues, much of contemporary populism has territorialized this conflict by portraying globalisation and the mobility of people, capital, and culture as processes promoted by cosmopolitan elites that threaten the integrity and relevance of particular communities. As a result, populist resentment is no longer understood merely as a response to material deprivation but increasingly reflects the fear that particular places may become economically and culturally irrelevant. Consequently, populism mobilizes a territorialized demos, in which “the people” are increasingly defined in spatial and territorial terms, thereby reinforcing the connection between strong place identification and receptiveness to populist discourses.

Political behaviour research has long recognised that place-based identities can constitute an important resource for political mobilization (see e.g., Arzheimer and Bernemann, 2024; Huijsmans and van der Brug, 2025; Lunz Trujillo and Crowley, 2022). In particular, numerous studies have shown that strong national identification is associated with greater support for populist radical right parties, especially when such identification takes on an exclusionary character and defines the national community in closed and bounded terms (see e.g., Bar-On, 2018; Bonikowski, 2017; Lubbers and Coenders, 2017). As traditional social cleavages have weakened over time, place-based identities have become increasingly important as sources of collective belonging and as criteria for distinguishing

those who belong to the community from those who do not (Fitzgerald, 2018; Lizotte, 2019).

From this perspective, stronger place-based identity does not automatically generate populist attitudes. Rather, it increases individuals' propensity to interpret politics as a conflict between a territorial in-group and external actors held responsible for the community's difficulties. Populism provides precisely this interpretative framework by portraying political elites as actors who have ignored, harmed, or betrayed the community to which individuals feel they belong. Consequently, as place-based identity becomes stronger, support for populist attitudes should also increase.

However, restricting this argument to the nation implicitly assumes that only national identities are capable of structuring political behaviour. Fitzgerald (2018) challenges this assumption by arguing that attachments to smaller-scale territorial communities —such as municipalities, towns, or regions— perform psychological functions that closely resemble those of nationalism. Under the concept of localism, she defines attachment to the local community as a feeling grounded in pride in one's place, a sense of belonging, identification with fellow community members, and a preference for greater political autonomy. The distinction between nationalism and localism therefore lies primarily in the scale of the reference group rather than in the psychological nature of the attachment itself.

From this perspective, there is no theoretical reason to expect that only national identification should have political consequences. If different territorial scales constitute imagined communities that provide individuals with identity, self-esteem, and a sense of belonging, each of them can serve as the basis for similar processes of political mobilization (Fitzgerald, 2018). For example, some studies show that the local scale functions as a refuge of political representation for citizens experiencing higher levels of resentment (García del Horno, 2026; Hegewald, 2024), while also constituting a particularly important component of their social identity (Borwein and Lucas, 2023a). Indeed, the literature has frequently linked localism and populism: localist parties often rely on populist rhetoric, while many populist parties explicitly invoke territorially rooted identities to define who constitutes “the people” and who represents distant elites or external groups (Lundåsen and Erlingsson, 2023).

Consequently, the mechanism linking place-based identity and populism should not depend on the specific object of identification —whether the nation, the region, or the local community— but rather on the intensity with which individuals incorporate a territory into their social identity. The stronger this identification becomes, the more likely individuals are to interpret politics through the defence of a bounded territorial community and, consequently, the more receptive they should be to populist discourses and attitudes portraying that community as being in conflict with distant elites or external groups.

H1: *Increases in place-based identity increase populist attitudes.*

Although previous research has consistently demonstrated that place-based identity has important political consequences, much less is known about how territorial context conditions these effects. In particular, the type of community —whether rural or urban— has received relatively little attention in studies of place-related identification processes (Belanche et al., 2021). Nevertheless, both theoretical considerations and empirical evidence suggest that place-based identity may play a particularly important political role in rural contexts.

First, a growing body of research shows that rural residents tend to develop stronger attachments to the places in which they live. Comparative evidence indicates that they exhibit, on average, higher levels of place-based identity than their urban counterparts (Anton and Lawrence, 2014; Lyons and Utych, 2021; Zumbrunn et al., 2025). In the Spanish case, Belanche et al. (2021) find that rural residents display significantly higher levels of affective and evaluative identification with their communities. These findings suggest that place occupies a more central position in the self-concept of rural inhabitants.

However, differences in the average levels of place-based identity are not, by themselves, sufficient to explain why it should exert stronger political effects in rural areas. Our central argument is that place-based identity acquires a different political meaning in rural contexts. Over the past decades, a substantial body of research has documented the increasing politicisation of the rural–urban divide, linking it to perceptions of abandonment, declining influence, and the economic, demographic, and cultural marginalization of many rural territories (Claassen et al., 2025; Cramer, 2016; García del Horno et al., 2024; Huijsmans, 2023; Munis, 2022). Indeed, the association between territory and populism is far from new. Some of the earliest populist movements emerged

in rural settings, including the American People's Party and the Russian Narodnichestvo movement (Crulli, 2024; Strijker et al., 2015). More recently, political phenomena such as support for Donald Trump, Brexit, and the Yellow Vests have once again placed territory at the centre of political conflict (Brookes and Cappellina, 2023; Scala and Johnson, 2017; Valero, 2022).

At the same time, recent scholarship cautions against interpreting this renewed rural–urban divide as simply reflecting higher levels of populism among rural residents. Crulli (2024) shows that populist attitudes are widely distributed across urban and rural populations and that territorial differences are explained primarily by thicker ideological components, such as nativism and authoritarianism, rather than by the thin-centred populist dimension itself. Likewise, contemporary European populism does not represent a particular social class or type of settlement. Consequently, rural contexts do not appear to generate inherently higher levels of populist attitudes.

What does seem to distinguish rural territories, however, is that place-based identities are more frequently embedded in contexts characterized by peripheralization, demographic decline, and structural disadvantage (Cramer, 2016; Fitzgerald, 2018; Schmalz et al., 2021; Ulrich-Schad and Duncan, 2018). Evidence from Central Europe, for example, shows that living in peripheral regions marked by adverse economic and demographic conditions increases the likelihood of holding populist attitudes because such environments foster subjective perceptions of disadvantage (Dvořák et al., 2024). Similar conclusions emerge from studies documenting higher levels of place-based resentment in rural, deprived, or politically peripheral areas (Borwein and Lucas, 2023b; De Lange et al., 2023; García del Horno, 2026). Under these circumstances, strong place-based identities provide a particularly favourable framework through which individuals interpret their experiences as a conflict between the local community and external actors held responsible for its situation.

We therefore argue that rural context acts as an amplifying factor in the relationship between place-based identity and populism. The greater centrality of place within the identities of rural residents, together with the stronger presence of narratives of abandonment and peripheralization, makes it more likely that increases in place-based identity will translate into a populist interpretation of politics. Accordingly, we expect the positive effect of place-based identity on populist attitudes to be significantly stronger among rural than among urban residents.

H2: *The positive effect of place-based identity on populist attitudes is stronger among rural than urban residents.*

Data and methods

To examine how within-individual changes in place-based identity are associated with changes in populist attitudes, we draw on data from an annual Spanish panel survey (POLAT) conducted by the *Democracy, Elections and Citizenship* research group (Pannico et al., 2025). The survey follows a nationally representative sample of young and middle-aged Internet users living in Spain. To ensure the representativeness of the sample, quota sampling is employed with respect to gender, education level, municipality size, and religion. Although the panel has been fielded annually since 2010, the analyses reported here rely on the waves conducted between 2020 and 2025, which contain the variables required for this study.

The questionnaire includes measures of all the key concepts analysed in this article. Populist attitudes are measured using the six-item scale developed by Akkerman et al. (2014). Respondents indicate their level of agreement with each statement on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The six items are subsequently averaged and rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger populist attitudes.

Place-based identity is measured using a survey item asking respondents the extent to which they identify with a particular place, an indicator that has been widely used in the literature on place identity (Peng et al., 2020). As argued in the theoretical section, there are strong reasons to examine the effects of place-based identity across different territorial scales. We therefore employ four versions of this item, asking respondents how strongly they identify with their municipality, autonomous community, Spain, and Europe, respectively. In all cases, responses are recorded on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 (*not at all identified*) to 10 (*very strongly identified*).

To test Hypothesis 2, respondents' place of residence is measured using a self-reported indicator of community type. Specifically, respondents were asked to characterize the place where they live by choosing one of the following categories: "*A big city*", "*Suburbs or outskirts of a big city*", "*Town or small city*", "*Country village*", or "*Farm or home*".

in the countryside”, following the wording adopted by the European Social Survey. For the purposes of the analysis, the first two categories are combined into a single urban category, while the last two are grouped into a rural category. This results in a three-category measure distinguishing between urban, town, and rural areas. This classification closely resembles widely used objective indicators of settlement type, such as Eurostat’s Degree of Urbanisation (DEGURBA) classification (Eurostat, 2021), while also allowing us to capture the gradual nature of the rural–urban continuum rather than treating it as a simple dichotomy (Nemerever and Rogers, 2021). Similar three-category classifications have been employed in recent research on the rural–urban divide (see, e.g. Crulli, 2024; García del Horno et al., 2024; Zumbrunn, 2024b).

Our models also include several control variables. First, we control for respondents’ ideological self-placement on an eleven-point scale ranging from 0 (*far left*) to 10 (*far right*). Second, we include political interest, measured on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (*very interested*) to 4 (*not at all interested*). Third, we control for respondents’ educational attainment, measured on an eleven-point scale ranging from 1 to 11. Finally, we include a measure of respondents’ subjective economic situation by asking whether their current personal financial situation is better, the same, or worse than it was one year earlier. Responses are coded as 1 (*better*), 2 (*the same*), and 3 (*worse*).

Results and discussion

This section presents the results of two complementary analyses. First, we test the effect of place-based identity on populist attitudes (Hypothesis 1) using fixed-effects linear panel regressions. Models 1 to 4 estimate the effect of each place-based identity measure separately, whereas Model 5 includes the four measures simultaneously. Second, we estimate equivalent models in which each place-based identity measure is interacted with the indicator of settlement type (Figure 1) and we test Hypothesis 2 by comparing the effects in the Appendix. To facilitate the comparison of effects across settlement types, the marginal effects from these models are presented graphically.

Table 1. Results of five fixed effects linear regression models (DV: populist attitudes)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES					
Close municipality	0.00470*** (0.000626)				0.00232*** (0.000833)
Close region		0.00520*** (0.000661)			0.00292*** (0.000923)
Close Spain			0.00445*** (0.000689)		0.00292*** (0.000841)
Close EU				0.00123* (0.000665)	-0.00179** (0.000762)
Ideology	0.00132 (0.000971)	0.00132 (0.000971)	0.00113 (0.000973)	0.00140 (0.000974)	0.00116 (0.000971)
Political interest	0.000195 (0.00254)	0.000373 (0.00254)	0.000442 (0.00255)	-0.000124 (0.00255)	0.000518 (0.00254)
Education	0.00170 (0.00140)	0.00145 (0.00140)	0.00152 (0.00140)	0.00179 (0.00140)	0.00140 (0.00139)
Economic sit (personal)	0.00362* (0.00217)	0.00354 (0.00217)	0.00374* (0.00217)	0.00351 (0.00217)	0.00367* (0.00217)
Constant	0.599*** (0.0229)	0.592*** (0.0231)	0.604*** (0.0230)	0.627*** (0.0229)	0.585*** (0.0233)
Observations	14,624	14,624	14,624	14,624	14,624
R-squared	0.015	0.016	0.014	0.010	0.018
Number of id	4,771	4,771	4,771	4,771	4,771

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: controls for region and wave omitted


Focusing on the results presented in Table 1, Models 1 to 4 show that place-based identity at the municipality, region and Spain scales are all positively and significantly associated with populist attitudes, with coefficients of similar magnitude, whereas place-based identity at the EU level shows a much weaker positive association. When the four measures are entered simultaneously (Model 5), the coefficients of all place-based identity items are roughly halved but remain positive and significant, except for the effect of EU attachment, which reverses and becomes negative. This pattern suggests that feelings of closeness to subnational and national communities share substantial variance and tap into a common dimension of community attachment or place-based identity that is positively related to populism, whereas EU attachment behaves as a distinct dimension of place-based identity. Accordingly, our results generally support our first hypothesis, indicating that higher levels of place-based identity correlate with higher levels of populist attitudes.

Moving to the test of our second hypothesis, Figure 1 presents the marginal effects of each place-based identity measure on populist attitudes by settlement type, and Table A1 (Appendix) reports the formal tests of the differences between these effects. According to these results, the effects of attachment to the municipality, the region and Spain are positive and statistically significant across all settlement types, whereas the effect of EU attachment only reaches statistical significance among rural residents. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the effects of all four measures are larger in rural areas, and the formal comparison presented in Table A1 confirms that this rural advantage is statistically significant for attachment to the region, to the country and the European Union, while for municipal attachment the difference is positive but fails to reach standard levels of statistical significance. Additionally, the effects in towns never differ from those of urban areas, whereas rural effects are significantly larger than those in towns for all four measures of attachment. Thus, rurality appears to amplify the political relevance of place-based identity as a qualitatively distinct context, rather than as the extreme of an urban-rural continuum.

Finally, the results for EU attachment deserve emphasis: identification with Europe is not related to populist attitudes in urban areas and towns, but in rural areas its effect is positive and comparable in magnitude to that of other attachments. This pattern is in line with the results of Model 5 (Table 1) for EU attachment and suggests that in rural contexts what

matters is the strength of territorial attachment as such, rather than the specific territorial object of identification.

Figure 1. Average Marginal Effects of territorial attachment by settlement type



Taken together, these results provide substantial support for Hypothesis 2. The political translation of place-based identity into populist attitudes is systematically amplified in rural settings, an amplification that is statistically significant for regional, national and European attachment, and directionally consistent, though not significant, for municipal attachment.

Conclusions

This article argued that place-based identity constitutes one of the identity-based mechanisms through which territorial belonging becomes politically consequential. Using individual fixed-effects models on six waves of a Spanish panel survey, we have shown that within-individual increases in identification with the municipality, the autonomous community, Spain and the EU are associated with stronger populist attitudes, and that these associations are roughly twice as large among rural residents.

Beyond confirming our hypotheses, the results reveal two additional patterns. First, rurality appears to operate as a threshold rather than a gradient: effects in towns never differ from those in urban areas, whereas genuinely rural settings consistently amplify the political translation of place-based identity. Second, in rural contexts even identification with the EU, which is unrelated to populist attitudes elsewhere, becomes politically consequential, suggesting that what matters there is the strength of territorial attachment as such, rather than the specific object of identification.

Taken together, these findings indicate that the territorialization of contemporary politics depends not simply on where people live, but on how strongly territorial belonging becomes part of who they are, and that this translation is most intense in places that narratives of decline and peripheralization have made most receptive to a conflict between the community (“the people”) and distant elites. Future research should examine the mechanisms underlying this amplification and test whether it extends to other national contexts.

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Appendix

Table A1. Differences in the effect of territorial place-based identity across settlement types

Comparison	Municipality	Region	Spain	EU
Towns-Urban	−.0023 (.0014)	−.0004 (.0014)	−.0002 (.0014)	.0007 (.0014)
Rural-Urban	.0017 (.0015)	.0032* (.0015)	.0038* (.0015)	.0040* (.0016)
Rural-Towns	.0040** (.0014)	.0037* (.0015)	.0040** (.0014)	.0033* (.0015)
Joint F (2df)	3.94*	3.35*	4.45*	3.50*

Note: Each column reports estimates from a separate fixed-effects panel model with full controls and region and wave fixed effects. Cells show differences in marginal effects (standard errors in parentheses). The joint F-test evaluates the null that both interaction terms are zero. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$.