

The determinants of ministers' profile and portfolio
allocation: a cross-national analysis.

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-First Draft-

Abstract

1- Introduction

When a new government is being defined, the party members, analysts and citizens bet to see who will be appointed by the president in the government, and their portfolio allocation. The intuitions of these political actors mostly are based on speculations about some ministers' characteristics or their bonds of friendship with the president or PM, since there are little systematic analyses in ministers' profiles, which can help to do find out these political situations. Our understanding about which profiles are relevant to be nominated into a cabinet, or the portfolio allocation, remain fairly limited especially in cross-national analyses.

Research on political elites has long examined social backgrounds, routes to power and political ambition among representatives in a legislative branch (Siavelis and Morgenstern 2008, Murray 2010, Franceschet and Piscopo 2009, Schwinndt-Bayer 2011), however there are few systematic studies on executives, studying ministers' profiles (Austen-Smith and Banks 1990, Blondel and Thiébault1 1991, Almeida et al. 2003, Dowding and Dumont 2009). Most of these previous ministers' studies are descriptive analysis -done with aggregate data- and they adopt a single-case approach. The only cross-sectional analyses about ministers' background and routes to political office are made by De Winter (1991) and Escobar-Lemon and Taylor-Robinson (2008 and 2009). De Winter's study is a descriptive research where he does not establish a explanatory relationship among factors. In addition, their data is outdated, since author gathers this information in eighties, and as some researchers have admitted, women ministers were too few to analyse their portfolio allocation. Last study is focused in US and Latin America, and they did not include parliamentary variables like seniority. Further, preceding research has neglected the effect of different types of ministers' recruitment. This distinction is relevant since the type of recruitment might impact on ministers' profiles and subsequent portfolio assignment. Overall, for these reasons, the mains questions of this analysis are: Which factors are relevant to determine the portfolio allocation? Are gender differences between females' minister profiles and men's minister profiles? And, are differences ministers' profiles across types of recruitment?. That is, firstly, it explores the determinants of ministers' profiles in relevant portfolios, paying attention on gender difference between ministers' profile; secondly, it examines whether type of recruitment affect ministers' profiles in their

portfolio allocation. This article seeks to fill this gap by examining individual data in parliamentary and presidential systems in 23 advanced industrial democracies.

Profiles and their portfolio allocation are important not just as a way to distribute rewards, but they allow ministers in those portfolios certain amount of latitude to make policy (Austen 1990). Indeed, holding a portfolio may give the minister a veto over any policy in the area (O'Malley 2006). Other scholars alert that some policy areas were fundamental to campaign, a president may want to fill some cabinet post with persons with policy expertise who are also trusted confidants who share similar visions for the policy area (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009). Further, Presidents and prime ministers may use cabinet appointments to send a clear signal about what social groups they wish to prioritise or which issues they will give more prominence during their mandate. Taking all together, portfolio allocation is a key fact to analyse in executive literature.

The remainder of the article is organised as follows. The first section and reviews the literature on minister's profile and portfolio allocation and draws several hypotheses. The second section describes the method, variables and data used in this study. The third section presents the empirical evidence. The last section discusses the main findings and concludes.

2- Individual factors affecting government portfolio allocation

Which types of requirements are important to get a relevant portfolio? The social and political background of ministers might affect the portfolio allocation in the government. I have distinguished two groups of factors which are likely to affect: sociodemographic and political. Sociodemographic characteristics are those which are related with the private sphere and they cannot be easily modified: gender, children. Political characteristics, on the contrary, are linked more with the public sphere and can be changed straightforwardly. These are analysed on the basis of three indicators: Previous background, political background and the link of both.

2.1. Sociodemographic characteristics which affect portfolio allocation

Literature on gender and cabinets offers factors that explain the less presence of women in cabinets (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, Krook and O'Brien 2012 and

Claveria 2013), however the understanding about how these women are distributed into portfolios is rather limited (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2005, 2009, Krook and O'Brien 2012). Previous studies have admitted that women ministers were too few to analyse their portfolio allocation (in Blondel and Thiébaud 1991). However, the work of Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) offers reasons to explain that the incorporation of new groups in cabinet is problematic. They expose that women will only be appointed to cabinet when male politicians perceive a potential political cost to continuing to not incorporate women, and women will receive the less relevant portfolios. Top political posts are scarce resource and the "in group", in this case men, will not want to share this resource with other groups, women. Also analyses show that female ministers look like men in background and credentials (education), however they tend to be "policy outsiders", that is, they have less seniority and have held less party office positions (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009, Borrelli 2002). Therefore, one can expect that women are less likely to be appointed into relevant/inner portfolios. Thus:

H1a: Presidents or Prime Ministers are expected to appoint men and women to different types of ministries. Women are more likely to be appointed less relevant portfolios than men.

Regarding the fact of having children, one could consider that the parenthood and the burden of childcare might affect political position. Some studies in legislative areas, most in Latin American contexts, show that female legislative politicians are less likely to be married and less likely to have children when compared to male politicians (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, Murray 2010, Schwindt-Bayer 2011). Society remains deeply gendered, with women undertaking most domestic work, including childcare. So, one might expect that female ministers with children have less time to build their professional career, lower engage in public and political life or they accumulate less seniority. In this vein, motherhood might reduce opportunities to achieve a relevant ministerial position.

H1b: Female ministers have fewer children than male ministers.

H1c: Indeed, female ministers with children are more likely to be appointed into less relevant portfolios than male ministers with children.

2.2 Political characteristics which affect portfolio allocation

Previous background

With regards to educational level, ministers' degree is considered to matter in the type of portfolio which ministers are appointed, since education may shape ministers' skills, knowledge, and their performance in cabinet. The majority of ministers have been to university or to a college of higher education (Blondel and Thiébaud 1991, Kerby 2009, O'Malley 2006). Both female and male ministers look rather similar in their educational levels (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009a, Borrelli 2002). However, the literature have not disentangled if some portfolios require more educational level than others, or which fields of education are required for a particular position in the cabinet. So, one may expect that in relevant portfolios due to their high profile or their high technisim, President or Prime Ministers will appoint ministers with higher education. More precisely, one could think that particular field of study are more influent than others, since ome relevant portfolios may need a specific knowledge, mostly in finance, or economic background. Ministers with this field of education may are more likely to be appointed in relevant portfolios.

Previous occupation follow the same logic, members who are recruited from outside politics are often viewed as specialist with little attention for the party political dimension (Blondel and Thiébaud 1991). Further, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) also conclude that ministers with a primary occupation in business were consistently more likely to be appointed to head ministers in masculine domain. One could expect that ministers who are from outside politics, are selected based on their expertise in a particular policy area rather than on their past political experience, and the most specialized portfolios are also a relevant ones (such as finance, economy...). Thus:

H2a: Ministers with higher education credential are more likely to be appointed in relevant or inner portfolios.

H2b: Ministers with economic background are more likely to be appointed in relevant portfolios than others

H2c: Ministers who came from outside politics are more likely to be appointed into relevant portfolios.

Political Background

Scholars have considered political background important to regard ministerial positions since the skills and abilities acquired within the previous political career might be transferred into the cabinet. Political background can be divided into three different blocs: experience in political office, seniority and experience in party office.

First experience in elected office, as De Winter (1991) said, “positions in local, regional government and parliamentary positions or previous ministerial experiences help toward a ministerial career”. Some authors have defined the parliament as “the most socialisation agent to ministers”. Thus, in most countries parliament is a training school where politicians acquire knowledge and skills and are often made to specialise in specific fields (Judge 1981:243). So, one could expect that experience in political office offer skills and connections in order to be appointed into a relevant portfolio. Probably, experience in parliament is more important than others electoral areas as regional or local, however, these last also are routes toward parliament. Admittedly, there are large variations across countries.

Second, other factor that scholars have considered in political items is seniority, defined as the number of years in political office. Those who had been in an elected office for many years could arguably be regarded as being in a sense more “accomplished” politics than those who had been in the position for short periods. As De Winter (1991) shows it may also be that a long parliamentary tenure before reaching the government is sign of relative failure, but it is also an indicator that the politician concerned is a “true” parliamentarian and is first and foremost a parliamentarian. The same logic of experience in political office is applied to seniority, that is, non seniority ministers may be regarded as not being experienced, and probably they not have institutional power (especially if they do not belong to the leadership circles of their party) to be in relevant portfolios.

Third, related to party office, cabinet government is also considered party government, since one could find a fair number of “party representatives” in cabinets. Therefore, the holding of a position in the national party hierarchy may constitute a determining factor in order to obtain a ministerial post. Thus, not surprisingly, party leadership positions may be a important factor for ministers to achieve relevant portfolios, since they are the parties’ decision-holder, and also can influence in the allocation of ministers in

portfolios. However, one could expect that this variable is not equally across gender, since most party leaders and top-level cadres are men (Shedova 1997, Niven 1998), for female ministers could be more difficult access to relevant portfolios by party office. Thus:

H3a: Ministers who have experience in elected office are more likely to be appointed into a relevant portfolio.

H3b: The more years in political position the more likely to get a relevant portfolio.

H3c: Ministers that have held party office are more likely to be appointed into a relevant portfolio.

H3c1: Female ministers are less likely to be appointed in a relevant portfolio from party office.

The link between previous background and political background

It is interesting to see whether ministers who had previously acquired some skills in education, job or political office are likely to return to that of their specialisation. One could expect that those who have had such a specialisation career or an appointment before in these are may obtain a relevant portfolio. President or Prime minister can see relevant portfolios as crucial portfolios in their government, so they will tend to appoint specialized minister in order to guarantee a higher quality of policies. Previous studies do not confirm this statement, De Winter (1991) shows that experience related to the policy purview of ministry is not a significant predictor of type of appointment. However, author alerts that this result can be explained because a large fraction of the ministers in their dataset have experience (79%), and there is not variation at all.

H4: Ministers to have policy experience will be appointed into a relevant portfolio.

3- Institutional factors affecting government portfolio allocation

As well as individual characteristics (both sociodemographic and political), which are developed above, I have to take into account for this analysis institutional factors, since individual characteristics are nested into a particular institutional system. These different institutional factors might change the importance of the certain political and sociodemographic characteristics in a ministerial appointment in each context.

Previous literature in cross-national comparison is practically non-existent. As Dowding (2009:4) has shown “Most of these [previous] studies are single-country as complete cross-country comparative work on features common across selection and des-selection of ministers has still to be done”. Few previous cross-country comparative literatures is reached separately for presidential systems (Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson 2009) and parliamentary systems (De Winter 1991). Further, they do not compare between these two systems of government. Preceding research has neglected the effect of different types of ministers’ recruitment, which strongly correlate to systems of government. That is, most presidential systems are considered specialist systems, conversely, most of parliamentary systems are treated as generalist, although a substantial part are specialist. This distinction is relevant since the type of recruitment might impact on ministers’ profiles and subsequent portfolio assignment. One could argue that depending on the type of recruitment ministers will be required different characteristics to be appointed into relevant portfolio. Under specialist systems, ministers are selected based on their expertise in a particular policy area rather than on their past political experience. Many ministers might be selected from outside the ranks of parliament, that is it, there are a greater permeability to political outsiders. This might benefit to those ministers more educated and with a strong link between expertise and portfolio allocation, and less seniority, since they select ministers based on specialization more than political experience. Also this may boost women since most party leaders and top-level cadres are men (Shedova 1997, Niven 1998). Instead, under generalist systems, ministers tend to have a long-standing political background, and are usually selected from inside the ranks of parliament (Davis 1997). For this reason, I expect that ministers appointed in relevant posts have more political background , that is, they have held party office, and they have more seniority in political arena. The level of education in these generalist systems may be less important, and ministers probably will be less linked between their background and the area of their ministry. Furthermore, provided that office-holders at the cabinet level are recruited to a large extent through personal networks (see Kopecký, Mair and Spirova 2012), I expect that ministers in generalist systems might have more political connections than in specialist systems. These systems might have fewer women in important positions since relevant parliamentary positions or party office post, which might be stepping stones to the cabinet, are usually occupied by men (Valiente et al. 2005). This leads me to post:

H5: Specialist and Generalist systems prioritize different personal and political characteristics when a president or prime ministers appoint to relevant portfolio.

4- Defining the relevance of different portfolios.

Previous literature on cabinets has not created a general typology to classify different portfolios. As I said above, not all the ministries are equally important in the government, for instance, some portfolios have more power to make policies or apply veto in some general cabinet decisions. Scholars have lacked satisfactory measurement of this variation. Literature has identified five different ways of comparing executive office portfolios. Whereas, both (cabinet and gender) literatures have used general one 1) inner and outer portfolios. Gender literature has define specifically two typologies in order to analyse difference between men and women 2) feminine, masculine and neutral portfolios and 3) prestige portfolios. Cabinet literature has offered two more classifications to disentangle the parties' power in coalition governments d) specialized and politicized portfolios and f) Salience portfolios

The first classification is based on the US cabinet. "Inner" portfolios constitute the president's closest advisors and have regular access to him (such as defence, treasury, justice, home office and foreign affairs), while "outer" portfolios deal with specialized areas and may not even have regular access to the president (Cohen 1988). The second typology is based on substantive areas. Cabinet portfolios can be categorized as having a stereotypically "feminine", "masculine", or "neutral" policy domain (when they do not fit clearly into either of the first two groups). This classification is based on whether the policies under a ministry deal with aspects which have traditionally been viewed as related to the public sphere (masculine) or to the private sphere (feminine). Third, Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor Robinson (2005) use a different classification, based on the prestige of portfolio (high, medium and low). They determined "prestige" according to a ministry's resources (budget, personnel) and expected public attention. The low-prestige ministries include (i.e. culture, children, family culture, science and technology, sports, tourism, women's affaires, ministers without portfolio), some medium prestige ministries (i.e. health, education, agriculture, construction, public works, environment, natural resources, justice, labour, transportation, communication and development) and high prestige embrace (i.e. defence, finance, economy, foreing affairs, Government/interior, Public Security). Forth,

De Winter (1991) distinguish two different type of portfolio: Specialized and political portfolios. Firsts ones are those portfolios related with the economy –finance, economy...- since these ministries tend to have more specialized ministers than the rest. Conversely, political portfolios are those ministries more linked with general politics whose ministers are parliamentarians with a large background in politics, and in general, considerably less specialised –i.e. trade, public works, regional affaires, agriculture, post and telegraphs, research and technology. Fifth, Warwick and Druckman (2006) conduct a survey made by experts about portfolio salience in each of 14 wester/easter European governments, that have had at least some experience with coalition governments. The distinguishing feature of these surveys is that respondents were asked to provide cardinal ratings for portfolios that had appeared in the coalition governments. Saliency is defined as the capacity to affect the electoral prospects of party that holds them. They define “saliency portfolios” as the portfolios with more saliency than the average, and they are: prime minister, defense, interior, foreign affairs, agriculture and finance.

In this current study I adopt the inner approach to analyse different determinants for different reasons. First, inner portfolios represent the traditional “core” of government, namely the large departments which are found in every cabinet and in every country and which have existed for a very long time (Defence, Finance, Economy, foreign Affaires, Government/Interior, Justice and Vice-president). This fact facilitates the cross-national analysis, since the portfolios and its importance may vary across context, and by analysing the core of government it facilitates the comparison. Second, inner/outer classification is similar to prestige and saliency typology. On the one hand, the difference between the two classification is that inner/outer classify Justice and Vice-president posts as inner portfolios and Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009) position they in medium-prestige. On the other hand, saliency typology has numerous advantages since it is a country-specific survey and allow s cross-national comparison. However, it has been created in coalition logic, comparing between parties and only taking into account coalition governments. In addition, this classification also is very similar to inner/outer typology, since the only difference is that saliency classification includes agriculture as a salient portfolio, and not includes vicepresident or justice or economy, which are embraced as inner portfolios.

The distribution by masculine/feminine type, have a greater difference with inner/outer. As Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson have shown this classification

have problems. It mixes two different ideas, since assimilate masculine area as prestige area. It is true that feminine portfolios traditionally have been considered as low prestige portfolio and masculine portfolios are high ones. However, there are some post which are masculine, but they have a low prestige or medium prestige like science and technology, agriculture, enterprise, labour... Although, it is interesting to note that most of the low-prestige ministries are included in the feminine domain but all high-prestige ministries fall into the masculine domain (i.e. defence, finance).

5- Data and methods

To study ministers' profiles and portfolio allocation I have created an original dataset including information on ministers' profiles and routes to political office (before appointed in cabinet), and portfolios (once appointed). The primary data for this study consist of biographical information on the individual ministers. I obtained this information from biographic sketches from national parliaments, governments' official websites, newspaper reports and from *Who's who in politics*. Moreover, I collected the different portfolios which ministers have held from *Kessing World New Archive*. Most of these variables are coded following the reference codebook of the study Selection and Deselection of Political Elites (SEDEPE). The dataset includes 425 individuals who have held the rank of cabinet ministers in 23 advanced industrial democracies in the period of 2004-2011. Female ministers are 126 out of 425, so women represent the 28.7%.

The analysis focuses on advanced industrial democracies from North America, Europe and Australasia, thus allowing to expand previous recent research which has mainly focused on the US and Latin America. The countries and years that have been analysed are: Australia (2007-2010), Austria (2007-2011), Belgium (2007-2008), Canada (2006-2008), Denmark (2007-2009), Finland (2007-2010), France (2007-2010), Germany (2005-2009), Greece (2007-2011), Iceland (2007-2009), Ireland (2007-2008), Italy (2008-2011), Japan (2007-2007), Luxembourg (2004-2009), Netherlands (2007-2010), New Zealand (2005-2008), Norway (2005-2009), Portugal (2005-2009), Spain (2008-2011), Sweden (2004-2006), Switzerland (2008-2009), United States of America (2004-2009) and United Kingdom (2007-2010).

To properly answer the two main questions presented in the article namely, which ministers' profiles characteristics affect their portfolio allocation; and whether

institutional factors affect ministers' profile, I will firstly identify how these profiles may affect the allocation of ministries focusing to the distinction between female and male ministers. I will therefore examine whether ministers' profile is driven by institutional country characteristics.

Dependent variables:

The dependent variable is defined in the following way:

-Inner and outer portfolios: Following Cohen (1988), I coded as "inner" ministries that are the core of government, such as: finance/treasury/budget, economy, justice, foreign affairs, defence and interior. All others ministries are coded as "outer" portfolios.

How portfolios have been classified? In most countries the portfolios are not single portfolios, but they are combined with different portfolios (for example, in it could be possible to find Education and Science and technology). The criteria I adopted to deal with this complexity is to identify the core post, normally being the first in the row. The advantage of select inner/outer classification is that, normally, inner post are not combined with others ministerial areas.

Independent variables:

-Education: Categorical variable that captures ministers' educational attainment (primary and secondary education, tertiary education, and post tertiary education (MA/PhD)).

-Fields of study: The categories included engineering, economics, social sciences and law.

-Occupation: This variable operationalizes ministers' professional background before they assumed their cabinet position. It is divided into three categories: private sector, university professor and politician following Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009a).

- Political experience: This variable codes whether a minister has previously held a political position, either elective or appointed, at any tier of government.

-Seniority: This numerical variable is defined as the numbers of years that a minister has been in a political office or institution (at any level): national level, regional level and local level.

-Party Ideology: This is a categorical variable capturing ministers' party affiliation: right-wing party (1), centre party (2) or left-wing party (3).

-Type of recruitment: It distinguishes 'generalist' systems (0) and 'specialist' systems (1).¹ This classification has been created following Davis' (1997) and Siaroff's (2000) indexes.

-Political connection: It classifies whether a minister has family ties or friendship with important politicians (mostly kinship ties) (1) or not (0).

-Party office: It measures the highest position within the party reached before ministerial appointment: party officer (national executive body) or party member.

-Expertise in the field of their portfolio: This dichotomous variable is constructed following Escobar-Lemmon and Taylor-Robinson (2009a). Expertise in the field of portfolio means that ministers have education or previous political/work experience in this specific area.

-Children: This is also a dichotomous variable, which capture if minister have child/children or not, independently if children is biological or adopted.

-Age: It is a numerical variable that detail the age of minister, taking into account the year which they born and the year of mandate.

6- Empirical findings

[table 1 about here]

¹ 10 countries of the sample are generalist systems, whereas 12 countries are included in the specialist systems (Davis 1997). All presidential and semi-presidential systems are classified as specialist. Generalist: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand. Specialist: Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, USA.

Is there a relationship between cabinet members' profile and portfolio allocation? Table 1 presents evidence of the determinants of appointments to "inner" ministries using a logistic regression. The first model includes all the constitutive variables to account for inner ministers' profile. The second and third model incorporate interaction terms to get the difference between male and female ministers who are appointed in an inner ministry.

Model 1 illustrates that, regarding sociodemographic characteristics, as suggested in H1a, the variable 'female' is negative and statistically significant. This means that being a female minister is an important factor which reduces the likelihood to be appointed into an inner portfolio compared to male ministers. Second, the variable 'Children' is also negative and statistically significant. That is, those ministers who have children are less likely to obtain a relevant post in cabinet than those who do not have any children.

Concerning previous background, table 1 shows that educational level and field of study matter. Having a postgraduate degree is positive and statistically relevant. So, those individuals that have a postgraduate degree are more likely to be appointed to an inner cabinet than ministers who have not reached this educational level. Contrary to previous hypothesis, the variable 'law' has a positive and significant effect. Therefore, those individuals having a specialized education in law are more frequently selected as ministers in an inner portfolio than individuals that have other fields of study. The variable 'previous occupation' is not statistically significant, meaning that previous occupation does not affect when a president or prime minister appoints to inner post.

Related to political background, analysis reveals that 'previous political experience' is not statistically significant. Conversely to hypothesis, having political experience in previous ministers or in parliament is not a factor that affects for appointment. However, seniority, which is defined as the number of years in any political level, is positive and significant. Those ministers, who have long trajectory in political position, that is, more time in any political level, are more likely to be appointed in inner portfolios. Furthermore, the results suggest that ministers who hold/have held party office are more likely to get into "inner" ministries than ministers who are not occupy these positions. These results could allow me accept H2.b and H2c, whereas rejecting H2a. Table 1 shows the effect of political connections which does not

have the expected direction; it reveals that those who have less political connection are more likely to be ministers in inner ministries, however is not statistically significant. The link between previous background and political background confirms H3c that inner portfolios are filled by ministers with previous expertise in this area, however outer ministries are occupied by ministers who are not expertise in this area.

In Model 2 the interaction Children*sex is included. Previous results were telling us that being a minister with children reduces the opportunity to be appointed into a inner cabinet. Some nuances have been considered related to gender. The interactive term is negative and statistically significant for female ministers with children, that is, they decrease the opportunity to be in a relevant portfolio. However, the interactive term for male is positive and non-significant, what it shows that the effect of having children in male ministers is not relevant. Thus, having children is not affecting equally to men and to women in order to get a relevant portfolio. In the third and last model is included another interaction, in this case, 'Partyoffice*sex'. Previous models have shown that to have held a party office is an important factor to be appointed in inner portfolio, however, this interaction term is showing that this effect is not homogeneous across sex. Thus, for men is positive and statistically relevant to had have a position in party office. However, for women it not has the same effect, is negative and is not statistically significant. Overall, these results could allow me to accept H1c and H3c.

[Table 2 about here]

In order to assess the effects of the type of recruitment in profile's ministers, marginal effects are designed. This is the unique indicator which allows comparing two different groups. Thus, table 2 offers the probability of being appointed into inner cabinet for each type of recruitment: generalist and specialist.

These findings prove that, overall, the likelihood of different sociodemographic and political factors are rather similar between across systems. The most important factor to determine in which portfolio ministers are appointed, in both systems, is the variable sex. Female ministers have 30% less likelihood to be appointed in inner cabinet

than male. So, contrary to our expectations, specialist systems do not benefit more female ministers than generalist system. The second key factor is having a specialization in law for both types of recruitment. Ministers, who have a specialization in this field of study, increases in 22% the probabilities to be appointed in inner portfolio. So, it seems that specialist systems do not promote others fields of study as economy for these relevant portfolios. The third factor that matters for the appointment in inner portfolio is the level of educational attainment. Those ministers that have a postgraduate education have 19% more probabilities to be appointed into inner portfolio. Generalist systems boost in the same way than specialist system formal education for their inner ministers. The matching between background's minister and their ministry destination is also a relevant factor. Ministers with experience in their portfolios are appointed in 17% more than those who are not experience in their portfolios. Having held a party office is determinant factor to appoint in inner portfolio. Ministers who have held a party office have 10% more probabilities to be in inner portfolio than those who have not held any position in party office. Contrary to our expectations, this factor is important than generalist as specialist systems. However, being a political outsider is not a relevant factor, neither generalist nor specialist systems. Political insiders are generally more likely than outsiders to be appointed to an inner ministry, the opposite to our suggestions, the routes to achieve inner position are the same for both type of recruitment.

7- Conclusions

It has been observed in this article that Presidents or Prime Ministers appoint ministers, far from being this just a random decision, I have argued that the choice to present some candidates is the result of some sociodemographic and political factor. In this paper I have addressed the determinants of relevant portfolios from a cross-national perspective. Relying on a dependent variable, which captures the degree of importance among portfolios, I test the effect of some sociological and political factors which may account for differences in the appointment of cabinet at the national level. Empirical evidence supports some of the hypotheses suggested.

With regards to sociodemographic factors as gender reduce the likelihood to be appointed in relevant portfolios, that is female minister are less likely to be appointed into an inner portfolio compared to male ministers. Having children only affect

negatively to female ministers in order to obtain a relevant portfolio. Concerning previous background, the analyses show that both educational level and field of study matter. Those ministers that have a postgraduate degree are more likely to be appointed to an inner, and those ministers that have been specialized in a law. Regarding previous background, these are also significant and reflect the continuing relevance of some political principals. The results illustrate that, contrary to previous literature, having political experience in previous ministers or in parliament is not a determinant factor to appoint minister in relevant ministry. However, seniority is important to decide the position of ministers in cabinet. Those ministers, who have long trajectory in political position, are more likely to be appointed in inner portfolios. Thus, the results suggest that the simple experience in office is not relevant, the important factor is the years performing in these positions. The findings suggest that ministers who hold/have held party office are more likely to get into “inner” ministries than ministers who are not occupy these positions. In addition, inner portfolios are filled by ministers with previous expertise in this area, however outer ministries are occupied by ministers who are not expertise.

The findings about whether type of recruitment affects ministers’ profiles in their portfolio allocation prove that, the likelihood all sociodemographic and political factors are rather similar between across systems, rejecting H5. Thus, Specialist and Generalist systems prioritize similar personal and political characteristics when a president or prime ministers appoint to relevant portfolio.

Finally, greater understanding of the way that portfolio allocation operates will require further study. There are grounds to believe that this gender-biased allocation of relevant portfolios affects subsequent careers. Portfolios vary in their degree of parliamentary contact, the amount of media attention they receive, the relative authority within the cabinet, and the career opportunities they may eventually create (i.e. the extent to which they can be used as a stepping stone to other relevant offices). Hitherto, the literature has not explored ministers’ post-career. This omission is critical since portfolio allocation might provide different political or work opportunities in latter career.

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Table 1: The determinants of appointments to Inner and Outer ministries (logistic regression)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Sociodemographic			
Female	1.738(.349)***		
Children	0.333(.117)***		
Children*sex	-	1.558(.582)**	
Education			
Graduate degree	0.619(.555)		
Post-graduate degree	1.093(.558)**		
Fields of education			
Economics	-0.323(.476)		
Social Science	0.026(.423)		
Law	1.033(.435)***		
Occupation			
Private Sector	-0.808(.554)		
Experience			
Ministry and Parliament	0.154(.293)		
Seniority	0.027(.014)*		
Party organization			
Party Office	0.611(.293)**		
Partyoffice*sex			0.769(.261)**
Link	1.001(.286)***		
Control			
Age	0.014(.0176)		
Political Connection	-0.469(.351)		
Constant	0.933(.582)**	13.500(34.0)	0.832(1.086)
Observations	337	337	203
Prob>chi2	0	0	0,0166
Pseudo R2	0,22	0,219	0,107

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.

DV: Inner portfolio (value 1)

Table 2: Marginal effect
of independent variable
by type of recruitment.

	Generalist	Specialist
Sociodemographic		
Female	-0.307(.053)***	-0.305(.054)***
Children	-0.059(.020)**	-0.058(.010)**
Education		
Graduate degree	0.107(.098)	0.107(.098)
Post-graduate degree	0.193(.098)*	0.192(.096)*
Fields of education		
Economics	-0.056(.084)	-0.056(.084)
Social Science	0.005(.075)	0.005(.075)
Law	0.227(.074)**	0.226(.073)**
Occupation		
Private Sector	-0.149(.098)	-0.149(.098)
Experience		
Ministry and Parliament	0.026(.052)	0.026(.052)
Seniority	0.004(.002)*	0.004(.002)*
Party organization		
Party Office	0.108(.052)**	0.108(.052)**
Link	0.178(.048)***	0.177(.047)***
Control		
Political Connection	-0.083(.062)	-0.083(.062)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.