

*Political determinants of regional ministerial careers in Spain*

**Juan Rodríguez-Teruel**  
Universitat de València  
[jrteruel@uv.es](mailto:jrteruel@uv.es)

**Astrid Barrio**  
Universitat de València  
[Astrid.Barrio@uv.es](mailto:Astrid.Barrio@uv.es)

**Oscar Barberà**  
Universitat de València  
[O.Barbera@uv.es](mailto:O.Barbera@uv.es)

WORK (STILL) IN PROGRESS

CITE CAREFULLY

Prepared for delivery at the panel  
“Elites políticas y gobernanza multinivel en la Europa del siglo XXI”

X Congreso Español de Ciencia Política y de la Administración  
University of Murcia, September 7-9, 2011.

## ***1. Introduction***<sup>1</sup>

The study of government stability has been a prolific research avenue during the last two decades. However, most of these studies have focused mainly on national governments and paying little attention to the regional level. Given the importance that regionalization has had since the 1980s in the European political agenda, this is indeed a loophole in the literature. In the last three decades, some of the main Western European countries experienced decentralization processes that have given to their regions high political and financial powers. Spain is, in this sense, one of the most representative cases of the consequences that regionalization may generate for the entire political system.

The analysis of the regional cabinet elite allows identifying the influence of region-specific phenomena in the life of the governments. Among these, scholars have identified three relevant phenomena. First, the consolidation of these new institutions has given them a specific and increasing political value within national politics. This may have encouraged the professionalization of regional elites in those regions where there is a higher level of resources or a stronger regional identity (Stolz 2001; Moncrief, 1994). Second, and partly related to the first one, the expansion of the structure of opportunities has led to the establishment of new patterns of circulation across political levels. The most significant effect is the emergence of politicians with multi-level careers, which seems to be replacing former officers with national-focused careers (Stolz, 2003; Botella et al., 2010). Finally, some academics have paid attention to the *presidentialisation* of politics (Poguntke and Webb 2005). It might not be just a national phenomenon since the particular conditions of regional politics provide a large extent to regional leaders to strengthen their powers vis à vis other actors at the regional as well as the national levels. In this sense, evidences from the Italian case show how regional governments can easily promote the dominance of the regional prime ministers on their cabinets (Massella, 2009). Spanish regional prime ministers have also been given a predominant position in regional politics (Alda et al., 2005).

All these phenomena are directly related to government and ministerial stability in regional cabinets. Professionalization, *presidentialisation* and multi-level careers may promote or limit the continuity of individuals in the government, regardless of other factors linked to the survival of the national ministerial elite already discussed.

The impact of these phenomena on the stability of the regional ministerial elite has deep consequences in the governance of regional institutions, such as the performance of regional executive governments. Previous works devoted to government studies have emphasized, from several approaches, the importance of governmental and ministerial stability on the effectiveness of policy coordination, and of ministerial control on the design and implementations of public policy (Alderman, 1995; Huber and Lupia, 2001, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004; Indridason and Kam 2008). In multilevel settings, differences in terms of political stability (and experience) between governments of different levels may contribute to the predominance of one over the others in the process of governance.

---

<sup>1</sup> This research has been funded by Project SEJ2009-14381-C03-02, from *Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia*, and Project SEJ-4032, from *Junta de Andalucía*.

Our paper is a work in process, based on evidence from the Spanish case, aiming to contribute to the understanding of regional cabinet politics. In this first-stage paper we will focus on the patterns of stability patterns of Spanish regional governments.

## ***2. Some questions about the stability of regional ministers***

Scholars studying the dynamics of cabinet life observe different dimensions of the continuity of leaders at the executive: the stability of cabinets, the reasons of leaving office, the tenure of each portfolio and, finally, the extent of the whole ministerial career. This paper focuses on the last one: why some regional ministers stay in cabinet longer than others? The logic of ministerial survival at the regional executives allows understanding better the prime minister decisions in ministerial appointments and cabinet management. In this paper, we start by checking if some of the traditional explanations for cabinet and ministerial survival (at the national level) apply also to the regional level.

We start with a descriptive question: how much turnover do we find within regional cabinet ministers in Spain? We answer it by using three types of indicators: the replacement rate, the duration and the survival function. The replacement rate is based in the proportion of entrances and exits of ministers in each change of government. The duration is the most straightforward way of observing how much time expend every individual in the ministerial career. Finally, a Kaplan-Meier survival function shows the probability of ‘surviving’ longer as a minister at every given time.

The second aim is explaining why ministerial careers are longer than others. More precisely: What is the likelihood that a ministerial career will end at any point in time since the first minister’s appointment, given how long he has lasted thus far? In this paper, our concern deals the impact of political factors linked to the party system, the regional institutions and the cabinet features. Previous works have identified several factors explaining the choice of ministers and their substitution. Among those factors, we must outline the individual characteristics of the ministers; the main characteristics of the governments; and the constraints that the prime minister has in hiring and firing regional ministers (Berlinski et al., 2007 or Dowding and Dumont, 2009, amongst others). Several of these factors are used both to explain the stability of governments and ministers. From this perspective, it exists a link between the individual perspective and the cabinet one. For instance, at the start of each new government, presidents who remain in power can choose between to accumulate experience in government by maintaining the old minister in office, or to introduce *fresh blood* in cabinet to boost the government's actions. So the continuity of prime ministers and that of parties in government it is a fundamental factor that determines the pace of renewal of the ministerial personnel. If the rotation of governments and prime ministers is high, we could expect that the renovation of the ministers will be so too. On the contrary, the continuity of political parties and prime ministers decrease the turnover rate. However, it should be noted that some contradictions might arise between the two types of explanation (the aggregate and the individual one), since the continuity of government and ministers respond to different logics (Alderman, 1995, Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2004).

Following this, we must observe the influence of the political and institutional context. First, there is an element of institutional design that should have a direct impact on regional ministerial duration: the possibility of calling for early elections. This tool enables regional prime ministers to terminate governments strategically, creating a strong impact on expected ministerial survival (Strom and Swindle, 2000; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2009). Although all Spanish regions have followed more or less the same institutional pattern (regarding the prime ministerial power's, the duration of legislatures and so on), the power of early dissolution was established only to some regions with *enhanced* autonomy (Catalonia, Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia). Under this situation, we should observe a shorter ministerial duration in ministers from regions with early dissolution powers than in the other ones (H1).

Secondly, the general features of the regional party system vary greatly within the Spanish regions (Oñate, 2010). In some of them, the political competition is limited to the opposition between PP and PSOE, while in others is extended to third parties. In this context, party predominance might encourage ministerial stability within cabinets (H2). On the other hand, one of the most singular features of decentralization in Spain is the existence of strong Non State Wide Parties (NSWP), which is relevant both in the national and the regional political arenas. However, not all of those NSWP have the same political relevance (Barrio et al., 2009). Some of them have been in the regional government for long time, while others have only achieved parliamentary representation. For these parties, regional governments are strategically more relevant than access to national institutions. Once in government, they have some incentives to keep their ministers with a low turnover: their party leaders will give priority to stay at the regional cabinet instead of attempting to access to the national parliament. Moreover, these parties don't have the possibility of using regional executives as a springboard to the national cabinet. So we expect ministers from these parties to have longer ministerial careers, i.e. lower hazard ratios (H3). On the other hand, some individuals may decide to leave their party if it allows them to keep their portfolio. Move to a different party is a tool to survive in government after a party change in the cabinet. So we expect lower hazard ratios amongst those who were appointed with two different parties (H4).

Finally, government stability depends on the features of each government (Herman and Taylor, 1971). They influence the temporal expectations of their ministers. We should, therefore, wait longer duration in majority governments than in minority ones (H5). We will also expect more stability in those regions with more presidential stability (H6). As long as a prime minister continues as the leader of a cabinet, ministers have more chances to continue in the cabinet. If the contrary would happen, it might mean that many ministers would survive their prime ministers, which is something very unlikely in the Spanish regional politics. However, in the first legislative terms, several party crises affected the cabinet stability. This situation leads to some votes of no confidence and also to some replacement of the prime ministers forced by their parties. After the mid-1990s, this kind of political conflict was reduced, and the regional prime ministers become stronger vis-à-vis their parties. We can expect so that those ministers leaving the cabinet after 1995 (so in the IV term or later) should have lower hazard of ending their careers abruptly than those who left the cabinet in previous terms (H7).

### ***3. Data***

Our data come from a dataset on Spanish regional ministers, comprising 1305 cases of cabinet members from the first cabinet appointed after their first regional election (between 1980 and 1983) to 31st August 2011. These correspond to all members of regional cabinets, including regional prime ministers and cabinet ministers without portfolio. We did not consider the previous non-elected governments that were appointed in the moment of discussing the constitutional design of Spanish decentralization.

The dataset is structure by individuals: each case correspond to an individual and contains the total duration of his complete ministerial career, as well as aggregate data for the governments where he/she was appointed. Here there is a problem with time-varying covariates. Since we are interested in the whole ministerial careers, we cannot use institutional factors that might change along the career. This is a problem to overcome in the future of this research.

### ***4. The Spanish case***

#### ***4.1. The institutional setting***

Spain started to decentralise in parallel with the transition to democracy and established criteria for its implementation in the 1978 Constitution. Seventeen autonomous communities were created with a common institutional model: an assembly with legislative powers, an executive branch and a president elected by the assembly. The 1978 Constitution established two types of regions based on the degree of autonomy, for which a reduced group of communities (Catalonia, the Basque Country, Galicia and Andalusia) enjoy a greater degree of competencies and political attributions than the res. As we said before, these one obtained the faculty to call for early elections. However over time the differences between both groups have diminished and all communities have the same levels of autonomy, and even some of them have got also the right to call for early elections (although they haven't use it yet). Not all communities have elections at the same time. The first elections were held in the Basque Country and Catalonia in 1980. In 1983 autonomous elections were held for the regions with common self-government pattern. The result has led to a heightened level of political and territorial pluralism, with diverse models of electoral behaviour. The executive structure has followed the same pattern that at the national level: cabinet system, with a strong prime minister, constructive vote of no confidence and collective responsibility to the parliament.

The different paces of access to regional autonomy have led to differences between the regional executives of each community (Table 1). Most Spanish regions have started recently their eighth term, while regions with enhanced autonomy have reached their eighth or ninth legislatures. Those were, as we have already said, regions with early

dissolution powers. Recent statute reforms have extended those powers to Aragón, the Balearic Islands and the Valencian Community.

In this paper, we define cabinet as the period between any elections, replacement of prime ministers, or changes in party composition of the cabinet. Most government changes have occurred due to change of term. On the other hand, some communities have experienced changes on the regional prime minister or on their party composition during the term. There are only few regions where this has not happened: Extremadura, Madrid and Murcia.

#### ***4.2. The regional ministerial elite***

From the beginning of the autonomy, most Spanish regional cabinets had their sizes close to the national cabinet dimensions, and markedly lower than the size of the European ones. The cabinet structure fluctuates between 10 and 15 departments (with few exceptions below), approaching the 16 ministries that usually constitute the national cabinet.

During these thirty years, most communities have had three or four regional presidents, although in some of them their political instability has led them to more frequent replacements. That is the case, for example, of the Canary Islands, where there have been seven presidents (Table 1). The turnover rate of regional prime ministers is not necessarily related to the replacement pace of their ministers. The number of regional ministers has fluctuated between 54 in La Rioja to 101 in Catalonia. Taking as a reference the Spanish national ministerial elite during the same years (1982-2011), Spain has had three presidents and 120 ministers (Rodríguez, 2011). Eight communities are approaching this figure, with 80 regional ministers or more.

The growth of the regional ministerial elite might be to some extent tied to the evolution of the decentralization process over the last years. However, there is no such pattern. On the contrary, while some regions have increased the number of ministers, others have tended to freeze it or even to reduce it (Table 2). Thus, changes in the size of the Spanish regional elite do not seem to have obeyed to governmental efficiency criterions, instead they give the impression to follow the political needs of the regional prime minister and (or) the parties that have been in power. This has been possible by the high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the regional prime minister when comes to expand or reduce the number of his cabinet. The exception is the VIII term (corresponding to the 2011 election in most of the regions), when the deep economical crisis leads regional governments to reduce their size in order to show their commitment to the criterion of budget reduction.

This fluctuation in the number of ministers has been boosted by changes in the party composition of the cabinet during the last decades (Table 3). Only two regions did not yet experienced a change of parties in government until the current legislative term. Both Castilla-La Mancha and Extremadura have only had absolute majorities, while Andalusia had the coalition government between the PSOE and the PA between 1996 and 2004. However, the main feature linked to the party composition of the Spanish regional governments is that although there is a clear majority of PSOE and PP regional ministers, third parties do matter in some regions, mainly the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Navarre, the Basque Country or Aragon. This marks a real difference from the national

ministerial elite where only ministers from the main State Wide Parties (SWP) have been in power. In certain regions, these third parties almost represent between one third and half of the ministers of that period. In general terms, these regional ministers often come from NSWP, and only from time to time they belong to other minor SWP parties (like IU or the CDS).

## **5. Results**

### **5.1. An overview on turnover and duration**

The ministerial elite of the Spanish regions has a high rate of turnover and discontinuity. With each new term, more than half of the regional ministers appointed had no previous experience in government (Table 4). The ministerial turnover ranges from 68% (Term II) to 55% (Term IV). This also means that of all regional ministers beginning a new term, only one third is going to continue the next one, and almost all will have left power after two terms. There are no such big differences that can allow us to trace different patterns. On the other hand, a slight reduction of the turnover seems plausible because while during the first terms the rate above 60 %, from the fifth terms drops mostly below this amount. However, this slight decrease in the turnover rates does not necessarily imply greater continuity. The few individuals who remain in cabinet or return back to them come from the immediate term, and we hardly find individuals accumulating experience from older legislatures.

The discontinuity of the ministerial elite is a common phenomenon in all Spanish regions. The ministerial turnover disaggregated by autonomous communities shows the fluctuations that are hidden behind the cumulated data (Table 5). Most regions have a tendency to renew the majority of their cabinet in each term, regardless of the continuity or not of the same party and president in office, and despite the government type. In some cases, the turnover rate in one term is 100%, due to an electoral defeat of the incumbent party, which means the arrival of new parties to the cabinet. In some legislative, a high turnover rate is the product of a vote of no confidence that changes the entire government. That happened in several regions during the second and third terms. Finally, it is quite common to find regional prime ministers having high turnover rates when they achieve the absolute majority of seats in their region. The best example of this is Castilla-La Mancha from 1983 to 2004, where the regional prime minister (José Bono, PSOE) always had majority cabinets, and the turnover rate was always above 50%. Castilla-La Mancha only changed its president during the sixth Legislature, when Bono became minister of the national government of Rodríguez Zapatero. Thus, despite the remarkable political stability registered during the Bono times, each term experienced high rates of cabinet reshuffle.

The evolution of the turnover rates shows a smooth decrease over time, although very linked to the electoral evolution of every region. Considering the 138 terms of all regions combined, only in 35 the ministerial turnover rate has been below the 50% of the cabinet, half of them in the last three legislative terms. We find some of the most stable terms in Madrid, La Rioja or Murcia (only 11% of new members in the current term). However, the continuity trend registered during four terms in La Rioja has not

prevented the government of being completely renewed twice. Again, after taking into account the evolution of regional ministers over time, there is no such a clear pattern that suggests an increase or a reduction in ministerial turnover in Spain. While the VIII term experienced pretty much continuity (six regions with less than 50% of new members), the electoral defeat of the PSOE led to the highest number of regions with a total renewal of its cabinets after the election.

A clearer view can be found by observing the survival rates by terms (figure 1). Those ministers that were appointed during the II and III terms had less chances of continuing in the cabinet after the second year than those who came later. On the contrary, after the term IV, ministers entering into the cabinet tend to have more chances to stay the first years than those who were appointed in previous years. These differences are clearer if we distinguish between those who left the cabinet before 1995 and those after 1995. The increasing of the differences after the second year suggests that some of the variation between survival rates could be related to reshuffles in the second half of the cabinet.

The survival rate of regional ministers is also higher than the national ones (figure 2). Their compared chances of leaving the government become closer at years four and eight, what suggests an equal probability of staying at the end of legislative terms. But the probability of staying increases for the regional ministers across the term. For instance, after three years in cabinet, a national minister has 1,6 more chances than a regional minister of being fired (59,6% against 37,3%).

This high turnover in regional ministers makes them very hard to stay more than four years, most of them being appointed for just one term, and not necessarily the whole period. Regional ministers stay in government during four years on average. The ministerial duration has significant differences across regions (Table 6 and figure 3). In general we can identify three groups of regions according to their patterns of duration. On the one hand, in some autonomous communities regional ministers remain in government more than one term, and close to five years (Extremadura, Madrid, Valencian Community and Navarre). At the opposite side, in other regions the duration drops to three years (Canarias or Cantabria). These regions with shorter ministerial tenures have in common, among other things, crisis of parties in the cabinet and changes of government due to votes of no confidence. In many communities there is a significant minority of individuals who have been less than a year in government. These "one-year ministers" represent the 10% of all the Spanish regional ministerial elite, but in some regions this amount may double or more (Cantabria, Castilla la Mancha and Aragon).

Four years in power does not cover the minimum time to control the complete process of a policy (Rose, 1975: 20). So, from these figures we may conclude that the Spanish regional ministers have low effective ministerial governance, because a general short tenure gives them limited control of the whole policy process (Bergman et al., 2003: 204). According to this, Spain could be placed within those countries where there is a greater role for the bureaucratic elite in the direction of the policy process. However, these figures are paradoxical if we consider that regional governments have been recently created and, as a result, were born with a high degree of politicization. It could be argued that, to some extent, the lack of regional powers (during the first years of decentralization, in most of the regions) made unnecessary a high continuity of regional ministers.



The short tenure also points out the political dominance of the regional prime minister. Ministers tend to be men "one-president men" and only a minority stays in government with two different presidents (table 7). Undoubtedly, the long tenure of some regional prime ministers makes it difficult for the regional ministers to stay time enough to know a new boss. Besides, strategic choices can also play an important role. Regional prime minister's dominance can be based on their authority to decide reshuffles and, thus, to rule over government and party at the same time. In this sense, a change of the regional prime minister is the most critical moment for the survival of regional ministers, even if the same party stays in government. Several examples of that can be found in Madrid with Alberto Ruiz Gallardón and Esperanza Aguirre, both from the PP. This factor contributes dramatically to reinforce the phenomenon of the *presidentialisation* of Spanish regional politics.

As a counterpoint to their short tenure, there is a pattern of high ministerial specialization amongst regional cabinets. Most of regional ministers stay mainly in a single department and the level of ministerial mobility is low (Table 7). Only one out of five regional ministers had two or more tenures. This mobility rate is among the lowest of the countries where data is available (Bakema, 1991). On the other hand, ministerial careers at the regional level are mainly developed in a continuous presence in cabinet. Discontinued careers (ministers leaving the cabinet and returning to it later) are almost an exception (7%). One-post non-interrupted careers are the basic trend of the regional cabinet elite, following a similar path of those members of national cabinets (Rodríguez, 2011).

From this perspective, it seems that Spanish regional prime ministers are willing to appoint new members every time they need to renew a portfolio or decide to reshuffle governments. It is not clear what are the consequences of changing from portfolio for the duration of the ministerial tenure: while ministers with two or more portfolios stay longer at the cabinet (which is an unsurprisingly effect), there are no differences in the survival rate of each ministry tenure between one-post ministers and the rest (figure 4). On the contrary, those who come back to the cabinet later not only stay longer at the cabinet (again an unsurprisingly effect) but also have more time to rule each portfolio (on average; see figure 4). We can conclude from this that successful ministers in one portfolio (where they stayed longer than average) form the privileged pool where prime ministers may look for "secure" options for future appointments.

## ***5.2. The political factors on ministerial survival***

In the previous section, we have seen that there is a great variation within the general patterns of duration. Our second question ask why some regional ministers last longer than others. We have carried out a regression model using Cox proportional-hazards in order to know what political factors make increase or decrease the hazard of ending the ministerial career.

The results of our hazard model are statistically significant and show the validity of most of our predictors to understand better the survival of individuals along their ministerial careers. Moreover, since our dataset contains the whole regional ministerial elite appointed up to now (i.e., the complete universe of population), we can consider useful the meaning of all the variables, including those with weaker significance, at least for the understanding of the specific Spanish case.

First, as our H1 stated, ministers of regions where prime ministers are able to call for an early election have a hazard rate 9% higher than those who were appointed in regions without this institutional tool. Although there have not been too many early calls for election, the few decided by prime ministers has lead to some abrupt ends of incipient ministerial careers. If we observe the three early parliamentary dissolution (before the last year of the term) decided during this time (Andalusia 1996, Basque Country 1999 and Catalonia 2006), we'll find a extended turnover of the new cabinets in the Andalusian and the Catalan cases, although the same main parties remained in power.

The dynamics of the party system affects the extent of the ministerial career. In those regions where there has been a dominant party the hazard rate of ending ministerial careers is 16% lower than in those regions without such a party dominance (H2). Thirdly, being member of a NSWP also decreases the likelihood of ending the ministerial career in 13% (H3). Since the top leaders of these organization use to be appointed when the parties come into the cabinet, without any hope to be promoted to national cabinets, at least this ministers will last at the cabinet as long as possible. Fourth, in some cases, ministers change from party in order to have more chances of keeping their position in cabinet (or coming back to the executive if they left it in the past). Those ministers that moved from one party to another have a 57% lower hazard rate. However, they only can take advantage of the party membership change during the first eight years, and particularly during the second term. This political risky operation only allows staying one more legislative term. After eight years, both groups share the same type of survival curve (figure 4).

On the other hand, ministers appointed in majority cabinets have a lower hazard ratio compared to those joining minority cabinets (H5). We have excluded 209 cases where ministers stayed in both types of cabinet. This finding follow the same pattern than previous studies on cabinet survival has also found and insists again on the importance of party stability (in this case, by a majority support in the parliament) for a longer and successful ministerial career. But prime ministerial stability is even more important: a high turnover of prime ministers affects dramatically the durability of their ministers (H6). In particular, the likelihood of ending the ministerial career is 35% higher in regions with high turnover at the top of the cabinet. The impact of this predictor takes place mainly between the fourth and the seventh years, so in the second term of the ministerial careers. Ministers hardly survive their cabinet bosses in Spanish regional cabinets. In part, this explanation is linked to the period of leaving the cabinet. During the last terms, ministers have increased their expectancy, generally speaking, of continuing their ministerial careers at the regional level. Those ministers that left the government before 1995 have 91% higher hazard rate of ending their careers at the cabinet compared to those who left after 1995 (H7). As we stated before, the variations across terms not only are relevant but also it seems to arise a certain trend to foster ministerial stability and durability, by increasing their survival rate (figure 1).

We also employed the variable of sex, in order to control its impact. Clearly, women still have a more fragile career, since their hazard rate increases 28% compared to men.

## ***6. Conclusions***

Our paper wanted to address the stability of the regional ministerial elite in Spain. The regional level has been untended so far by the reserach on governments. This have been devoted exclusively to the analysis of national cabinets. However, some works have start to focus on regional government and elites from a multilevel approach. This one observe the regional institutions to identify what similarities and disimilarities appear between executives at different levels.

Our concern on ministerial stability attempted to check the impact of political factors on the ministerila careers of regional cabinet members. We have taken ministerial turnover and duration as indicators of stability, in order to measure the degree of continuity of regional ministers in Spain. Then we have applied a hazard model of political factors.

First, we found a high degree of renovation and replacement of regional ministers, over the 50% of ministers in each legislative term. Most regional ministers do not last more than one term. It is a common phenomenon in all regions, although there are variations among them. High turnover means that the ministerial duration is limited to four years on average. Over half of the ministers last less than foru years, and one in ten remains barely a year in the cabinet. It is important to highlight two periods in the evolution of the ministerial duration: first terms it had a sustained increase, but in the last two terms the duration has been substantially reduced.

Presidentialisation and professionalisation might explain the high turnover and the evolution of duration. The consolidation of decentralized institutions has contributed to the professionalization of the regional elites. The professionalism leaded to an increase in the duration of regional ministers in the early legislatures. However, over the years this phenomenon has come into conflict with the effects of reinforcement of the regional chiefs executives. Presidentialisation has given greater leeway to regional president to use the policy of cabinet appointments according to their political convenciencia. This may be the cause of the stagnation and the decline in the ministerial duration in recent legislatures. Traits of presidentialisation seem to be manifested both in a very low ministerial mobility and absence of return to cabinet after it.

In the explanatory section, we have observed the impact of our predictors on the likelihood of the ministerial careers survival. The majority governments and the membership in regional parties in cabinet also appears as a relevant factor to reduce the length of the ministerial careers. Conversely, the degree of selfgovernment (operationalized by the possession of the right to call for early elections) has not shown a clear impact on duration. It does not mean that this factor has not any influence, but rather that presidents have not almost made use of this tool, so it is hardly a factor that could lead to substantial differences.

## REFERENCES

- Alda, M., A. González Gómez, L. López Nieto, J.A. Ramos y M. Temprano (2005): Governments, Departments, Presidents and Ministers of Spanish Autonomous Communities, 1980-20, paper presentad at ECPR Joint Sessions, Granada, 14-19 April
- Alderman, R.K. (1995): “A defence of frequent ministerial turnover”, *Public Administration*, 73
- Bakema, W.E. (1991): “The Ministerial Career” en J. Blondel y J.L. Thiébault, ed., *The profession of government minister in Western Europe*, Londres, Macmillan
- Barrio, A., M. Baras, O’Barberà and J. Rodríguez (2009): “Non-statewide parties and multi-level governance: the case of Spain (1977-2008)”, paper presentad at ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, September
- Bergman, T., W.C. Müller, K. Strom and M. Blomgren (2003): “Democratic delegation and accountability: crossnational patterns” in K. Strom, W.C. Müller y T. Bergman, eds. (2003): *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press
- Berlinski, S., T. Dewan y K. Dowding (2007): “The Length of Ministerial Tenure in the United Kingdom, 1945–97”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 37, 245-262
- Botella, J., J. Rodríguez, O. Barberà and A. Barrio (2010): “A new political elite in western Europe? Political careers of regional prime ministers in new decentralized countries”, *French Politics*, Vol. 8, 1, 42–61
- Deschouwer, K. (2009): “Coalition Formation and Congruence in a Multi-layered Setting: Belgium 1995-2008”, *Regional & Federal Studies*, Vol. 19, No 1, 13 - 35
- Dowding, K. y P. Dumont (2009): “Structural and strategic factors affectibg the hiring and firing of ministers”, en K. Dowding y P. Dumont, ed., *The selection of ministers. Hiring and firing*, London, Routledge
- Taylor, M. y V.M. Herman (1971): “Party Systems and Government Stability”, *American Political Science Review*, vol. LXXV, 1
- Huber, J.D. y A. Lupia (2001): “Cabinet Instability and Delegation in Parliamentary Democracies”, *American Journal of Political Science*, vol. 45, no 1
- Huber, J.H. y C. Martínez-Gallardo (2008): “Replacing Cabinet Ministers: Patterns of Ministerial Stability in Parliamentary Democracies”, *American Political Science Review*, 102/2, 169- 180
- Indridason, I. y K. Cam (2008): “Cabinet Reshuffles and Ministerial Drift”, *British Journal of Political Science*, 38, 621-656
- Massella, F. (2009): *Governi monocratici. La svolta presidenziale nelle regioni italiane*. Bologna: Il Mulino
- Moncrief, G.F. (1994) “Professionalization and Careerism in Canadian Provincial Assemblies: Comparison to U.S. State Legislatures”. *Legislative Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 19, No 1. 33-48.
- Oñate, P. (2010): “La heterogeneidad espacial del comportamiento electoral y la solidez de las especificidades de los sistemas de partidos en la España multinivel” in F. Pallarés

(ed.), *Elecciones, comportamiento político y gobierno en la España multinivel*, Valencia, Tirant lo Blanch

Poguntke, T. y P. Webb, eds., *The Presidentialization of Politics. A comparative study of Modern Democracies*, Oxford, Oxford University Press

Rodríguez, J. (2011): *Los ministros de la España democrática. Reclutamiento político y carrera ministerial de Suárez a Zapatero (1976-2010)*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales.

Rose, R. (1976): *The Dynamics of Public Policy*, London: Sage

Schleiter, P. and E. Morgan-Jones (2009): "Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers and the Termination of East and West European Cabinets", paper presentad at ECPR General Conference, Potsdam, September

Stolz, K. (2001) "The Political Class and Regional Institution-Building: A Conceptual Framework", *Regional & Federal Studies*, 11: 1, 80-100

Stolz, K. (2003) "Moving up, moving down: Political careers across territorial levels", *European Journal of Political Research*, 42

Strøm, K. and S. M. Swindle (2002). "Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution", *American Political Science Review*, Vol 96, No. 3, 575-591

Thorlakson, L. (2007): "An institutional explanation of party system congruence: Evidence from six federations", *European Journal of Political Researc*, Vol. 46: 69–95

## TABLES

**Table 1. Regional Executives in Spain: terms, cabinets and ministers**

	Terms	Regional PM	Regional ministers	Gov. <sup>1</sup>	Early elections <sup>2</sup>
Andalusia	8	4	83	8	Yes
Aragón	8	7	77	10	Yes
Asturias	8	6	81	10	No
Balearic Islands	8	5	98	12	Yes
Canary Islands	8	7	98	13	No
Cantabria	8	7	80	10	No
Castilla la Mancha	8	3	77	9	No
Castilla León	8	6	55	10	No
Catalonia	9	4	101	11	Yes
Extremadura	8	3	55	8	No
Galicia	8	5	99	9	Yes
Madrid	8	3	59	8	No
Murcia	8	4	64	8	No
Navarre	8	5	64	10	No
La Rioja	8	4	54	10	No
Basque Country	9	4	88	12	Yes
Comunidad Valenciana	8	5	72	10	Yes

**Notas:** 1. Governments are maintained in absence of elections, changes of prime minister or changes in the party composition of the cabinet. 2. Aragón, Balearic Islands and Valencia obtained these powers during the last years, and have not been used yet.

**Table 2. Regional cabinet members by legislative term and region**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	IX	(n)
Andalusia	17	13	13	13	15	20	18	28	-	83
Aragón	9	13	23	8	13	14	14	10	-	77
Asturias	14	13	14	10	15	11	16	10	-	81
Balearic Islands	14	13	22	21	18	16	21	8	-	98
Canary Islands	15	17	19	20	15	16	13	9	-	98
Cantabria	19	22	13	10	12	11	12	9	-	80
Castilla Mancha	15	12	16	17	17	25	18	8	-	77
Castilla León	15	9	8	10	12	11	13	10	-	55
Catalonia	17	17	16	23	18	22	28	17	12	101
Extremadura	11	15	13	11	13	15	13	8	-	55
Galicia	21	27	14	17	19	23	14	11	-	99
Madrid	13	10	10	8	14	14	18	9	-	59
Murcia	17	14	19	11	12	14	15	9	-	64
Navarre	9	10	11	20	10	14	13	9	-	64
La Rioja	13	22	11	8	9	11	13	9	-	54
Basque Country	11	20	21	20	16	12	14	12	11	88
Com Valenciana	13	12	16	15	15	13	16	12	-	72
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>243</i>	<i>259</i>	<i>259</i>	<i>242</i>	<i>243</i>	<i>262</i>	<i>269</i>	<i>187</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>1305</i>

**Table 3. Party identity of regional ministers**

	Party				Type of party	
	PSOE	PP	Third party <sup>0</sup>	Others	SWP	NSWP
Andalusia	95,0	0	5,0	0	95,0	5,0
Castilla la Mancha	89,6	10,4	0	0	100	0
Extremadura	85,5	14,5	0	0	100	0
Asturias	70,4	12,3	4,9	12,3	87,7	12,3
Murcia	53,1	46,9	0	0	100	0
Aragón	46,8	23,4	29,9	0	70,2	29,9
Com Valenciana	34,7 <sup>9</sup>	63,9 <sup>9 10</sup>	3,2 <sup>10</sup>	0	98,7 <sup>10</sup>	3,2 <sup>10</sup>
Basque Country	29,5 <sup>7</sup>	0	59,1 <sup>8</sup>	12,4 <sup>7 8</sup>	30,6 <sup>7</sup>	70,4 <sup>7 8</sup>
Madrid	33,9	66,1	0	0	100	0
La Rioja	33,3	57,4	7,4	1,9	92,6	8,0
Catalonia	18,8 <sup>1 11</sup>	0	64,4 <sup>11</sup>	22,2	18,8 <sup>1</sup>	86,6
Navarre	29,7	0 <sup>2</sup>	59,3 <sup>6</sup>	14,1 <sup>6</sup>	29,7	71,3 <sup>2</sup>
Castilla León	27,3	72,7	0	0	100	0
Balearic Islands	22,4	58,2	8,2	11,2	84,8	15,2
Canary Islands	22,4	19,4	50,0 <sup>3</sup>	9,2	51,0 <sup>3</sup>	51,0 <sup>3</sup>
Cantabria	17,5	67,2 <sup>4</sup>	8,8	10,0 <sup>4</sup>	85,9 <sup>4</sup>	21,4 <sup>4</sup>
Galicia	16,2	74,7 <sup>5</sup>	5,1	5,0 <sup>5</sup>	90,9 <sup>5</sup>	11,1 <sup>5</sup>
<b>Total</b>	<b>41,3</b>	<b>33,4</b>	<b>18,8</b>	<b>6,0</b>	<b>76,4</b>	<b>25,3</b>

NOTE: Party identity do not necessarily implies party membership because in some cases this is attributed to non party members who were designated by one party. Some rows might compute more than 100% because some 13 ministers were appointed at least twice, representing two different parties. 0. This category corresponds to: CiU (Catalonia), PNV (Basque Country), CC (Canary Islands), PAR (Aragón), BNG (Galicia), PA (Andalusia), PRC (Cantabria), PR (La Rioja), UM (Balearic Islands), UPN (Navarre), UV (Valencia) and IU (Asturias). 1. Socialist ministers in Catalonia belong to PSC, not to PSOE, but we have included them under the labels PSOE and SWP. 2. PP has never had regional ministers, because of the party coalition with UPN between 1991 and 2008. 3. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with CDS (State Wide Party, SWP) and, subsequently, with CC (NSWP). 4. Three individuals have been counted twice because they hold tenures with AP (SWP) and, subsequently, with UPCA (NSWP). 5. Two individuals have been counted twice because they hold tenures with AP (SWP) and, subsequently, with CG (NSWP). 6. Two individuals have been counted twice because they hold tenures with UPN and, subsequently, with CDN. 7. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with EE and, subsequently, with PSOE. 8. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with PNV and, subsequently, with EA. 9. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with PSOE and, subsequently, with PP. 10. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with UV (NSWP) and, subsequently, with PP (SWP). 11. An individual has been counted twice because he hold tenures with PSC-PSOE (SWP) and, subsequently, with CiU (NSWP).

**Table 4. Ministerial turnover by terms**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII
<b>I</b>	242	83	46	17	9	6	2	0
<b>II</b>	-	176	58	19	12	6	3	1
<b>III</b>	-	-	155	48	26	14	4	2
<b>IV</b>	-	-	-	158	68	36	15	9
<b>V</b>	-	-	-	-	128	48	28	5
<b>VI</b>	-	-	-	-	-	152	59	13
<b>VII</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	150	37
<b>VIII</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	120
<b>Total</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>187</b>


NOTE: Data for each term (column) show the amount of regional ministers coming from the oldest term. The 9th Terms of Catalonia and the Basque Country are not included.

**Tabla 5. Ministerial turnover by regions and legislative terms**

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	VIII	(n)
Andalusia	100	53,8	84,6	61,5	46,7	55,0	50,0	59,3	83
Aragón	100	100	82,6	62,5	100	35,7	35,7	100	77
Asturias	100	61,5	71,4	100	100	63,6	53,3	100	81
Balearic Islands	100	38,5	50	57,1	100	100	100	100	98
Basque Country	100	85,0	61,9	70,0	62,5	41,7	42,9	25,0	88
Canary Islands	100	100	78,9	80,0	66,7	75,0	81,8	55,6	98
Cantabria	100	90,5	38,5	90,0	41,7	90,9	33,3	100	80
Castilla la Mancha	100	58,3	50,0	58,8	52,9	60,0	41,2	100	77
Castilla León	100	100	75,0	50,0	58,3	54,5	30,8	30,0	55
Catalonia	100	47,1	56,3	39,1	22,2	63,6	100	47,0	101
Com Valenciana	100	33,3	50,0	100	62,5	61,5	56,3	61,5	72
Extremadura	100	53,3	30,0	54,5	23,1	60,0	58,3	100	55
Galicia	100	70,4	92,9	47,1	36,8	39,1	100	100	99
La Rioja	100	100	36,4	100	22,2	45,5	18,2	25,9	54
Madrid	100	40,0	30,0	100	50,0	92,9	44,4	33,3	59
Murcia	100	57,1	63,2	100	33,3	46,7	50,0	11,1	64
Navarre	100	40,0	100	75,0	30,0	78,6	46,2	88,9	64
<i>TOTAL</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>68,0</i>	<i>61,4</i>	<i>69,4</i>	<i>55,0</i>	<i>62,2</i>	<i>59,0</i>	<i>58,3</i>	<i>1305</i>


NOTE: The figures show the share of individuals who had not been in previous legislatures. Shaded boxes indicate the legislatures in which there was a change of the main governing party. The IXth terms of Catalonia and the Basque Country are not included.

**Figure 1. Survival function for regional ministers by terms**





**Figure 2. Survival function for regional and national ministers**



**Table 6. Duration of regional ministerial careers**


	< 1 year	1-4 years	> 4 years	Mean duration	(n)
Extremadura	18,2	14,5	67,3	6,5	55
Madrid	6,8	30,5	62,7	5,2	59
Com Valenciana	16,7	38,9	44,4	4,9	72
Navarre	15,6	45,3	39,1	4,8	64
Andalusia	7,2	47,0	45,8	4,7	83
Basque Country	4,5	54,5	40,9	4,7	88
La Rioja	13,0	35,2	51,9	4,7	54
Castilla León	14,5	43,6	41,8	4,5	55
Catalonia	18,8	32,7	48,5	4,5	101
Castilla la Mancha	29,9	37,7	32,5	4,4	77
Aragón	23,4	37,7	39,0	4,1	77
Asturias	14,8	46,9	38,3	4,1	81
Balearic Islands	17,3	50,0	32,7	4,1	98
Murcia	17,2	42,2	40,6	4,1	64
Galicia	10,1	63,6	26,3	4,0	99
Cantabria	33,8	37,5	28,8	3,6	80
Canarias	20,4	53,1	26,5	3,2	98
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16,7</b>	<b>43,1</b>	<b>40,2</b>	<b>4,4</b>	<b>1305</b>

NOTE: We have computed the mean duration excluding incumbents (N=1022).


**Tabla 7. Features of the regional ministerial career**

	<b>One term</b>	<b>One president</b>	<b>One cabinet</b>	<b>One post</b>	<b>2 or + post</b>	<b>Dur./ portf.</b>	<b>Interr.</b>	<b>(n)</b>
Cantabria	75,0	88,8	68,8	92,5	7,5	3,0	9	80
Galicia	70,7	96,0	70,7	90,9	9,1	3,5	13	99
Asturias	80,2	90,1	75,3	90,1	9,9	3,3	3	81
Aragón	79,2	90,9	72,7	89,6	10,4	3,2	5	77
Basque Country	62,5	90,9	54,5	85,2	14,8	3,8	4	88
Balearic Islands	75,5	87,8	59,2	84,7	16,7	3,3	7	98
Canarias	79,6	78,6	67,3	84,7	15,3	2,5	3	98
Murcia	57,8	85,9	50,0	81,2	18,8	3,6	1	64
La Rioja	61,1	90,7	50,0	77,8	22,2	4,0	5	54
Navarre	62,5	85,9	56,2	77,8	22,2	3,3	6	64
Catalonia	60,4	86,1	54,5	77,2	22,8	3,4	12	101
Madrid	50,8	96,6	50,8	76,3	23,7	4,1	1	59
Andalusia	62,7	68,7	45,8	75,9	24,1	3,6	5	83
Castilla León	65,5	69,1	45,5	74,5	25,5	3,7	3	55
Extremadura	54,4	90,9	54,5	74,5	25,5	4,3	0	55
Castilla la Mancha	64,9	85,7	63,3	71,4	28,6	2,6	11	77
Com Valenciana	63,9	69,4	48,6	66,7	33,3	3,1	5	72
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>67,3</b>	<b>85,5</b>	<b>57,8</b>	<b>80,7</b>	<b>19,3</b>	<b>3,4</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>1305</b>

**Figure 3. Survival function for regional ministers by regions**



**Figure 4. Survival function for each portfolio by career continuity**



**Table 8. Cox hazard model predicting survival ratios**


	<i>exp(coef)</i>	<i>se(coef)</i>	<i>Pr(&gt; z )</i>
Calling for early elections	1.090	0.078	0.274
Party dominance	0.844	0.710	0.018 **
NSWP minister	0.867	0.548	0.795
Party switch	0.427	0.550	0.123
Majority governments	0.821	0.083	0.019 **
Presidential turnover	1.356	0.075	0.000 ***
Left before 1995	1.910	0.075	0.000 ***
Women	1.281	0.088	0.004 ***

\* <0.1 \*\* <0.05 \*\*\* <0.01

Concordance = 0.607 (se = 0.011 )  
 Rsquare = 0.12 (max = 1 )  
 Likelihood ratio test = 140.2 on 8 df, p=0  
 Wald test = 143.2 on 8 df, p=0  
 Score (logrank) test = 147.5 on 8 df, p=0

N = 1096  
 Number of events = 936  
 Missing cases 209

**Figure 5. Survival function by party identity and cabinet status**



**Figure 6. Estimated survival probability for covariate ‘presidential turnover’**

