

“Las carreras políticas de los europarlamentarios españoles (1986-2007)” *

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por

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1. Introduction

In contrast with other elite studies, the Spanish European Parliamentary elite has been object of scarce attention from the political science literature. Apart from a book chapter by Antonia Martínez (2000)¹, no other contributions have appeared since then related to this topic. Probably, the causes are the second-order character of European Parliament (EP) elections and the remoteness members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are perceived by people. However, as the EP has become a prime locus of power in the European Union, and as more and more decisions affecting EU citizens have to count with this institution's approval (Maurer 2003; Rittberger 2003)², the study of MEPs as a political elite has attracted a growing interest (some previous works on this subject are Cotta 1984, Westlake 1993, Scarrow 1997, Norris 1999, Scully and Farrell 2003, Pasquinucci and Verzichelli 2004, Verzichelli and Edinger 2005)³.

¹* Este trabajo ha sido elaborado en el marco del proyecto ELIPARSIS (“Elites políticas, partidos y sistemas de partidos en España, 1868-2004”), financiado con cargo al Plan Nacional de Investigación y Desarrollo (BSO 2003 - 07384 - CICYT). Una primera versión del mismo se presentó en Helsinki en el marco de la reunión anual del ECPR (mayo de 2007) bajo el título “Career pattern for Spanish MPEs (1987-2004)”.

¹ Antonia Martínez (2000) “Los eurodiputados españoles, 1986-1999”, in Antonia Martínez y Mónica Mendez (eds.) *Las elecciones al Parlamento Europeo en 1999*. Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch. Pp. 267-289.

² Maurer, Andreas (2003) “The Legislative Powers and Impact of the European Parliament”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, Num. 2, pp. 227-247.

Rittberger, Berthold (2003) “*The Creation and Empowerment of the European Parliament*”, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 41, Num. 2, pp. 203-225.

³ Cotta, Maurizio (1984) “Direct Election of the European Parliament: A Supranational Political Elite in the Making?”, in K. Reif (ed.) *European Elections 1979 and 1984: Conclusions and Perspectives from Empirical Research*. Berlin: Quorum. Pp. 122-127.

Westlake, M. (1993) *Britain's emerging Euro-elite? The British in the Directly-elected European Parliament, 1979-1992*. Dartmouth: Aldershot.

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This paper deals with the career patterns of the Spanish members of the European Parliament (SMEPs). Verzichelli and Edinger (2005, 257-258) justify the need for the study of MEPs' political careers in the context of the hypothesis of the emergence of a 'supranational elite' at the EU level. Regarding MEPs, career patterns showing more EU oriented profiles (issue specialisation and long career durations) would constitute a primary evidence of this fact, being at the same time a sign of the institutional maturity of the EP as a true supranational body.

This process is not independent from what happens at the national level. SMEPs' careers may offer a hint about how national political class' the role of the EP within the EU institutional complex. This perception has been traditionally that of a secondary political *locus* compared with national arenas. Because of its low public visibility (reflected in the lower turnout rates in EP elections compared with national elections) and its limited decisional power *vis à vis* national and other EU institutions (i.e., the European Council), the EP has been considered as a second-class destination by individual politicians. They would rather prefer less other more relevant positions than the EP, mainly those that imply executive powers (national and regional governmental positions) or at the national parliament. These preferences are also motivated by the advantages in terms of political capital associated to national positions.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

SMEPs' career and recruitment patterns may be seen as a mixed result of individuals' and parties' decisions – particularly in the Spanish 'closed list' electoral system, where candidate nominations are highly centralised within party structures. Moreover, individual decisions may be considered subsidiary compared with partisan ones. An individual can decide whether to enter and, mainly, to continue or not as a MEP after party bodies have decided to include him/her in the electoral list. Having decided these bodies to include a candidate in the list, he/she has the option of accepting or not, depending on his/her personal valuation of the benefits and costs this decision may entail (whatever the unit of measurement of such costs and benefits: money, time, future career possibilities, etc.).

Regarding parties' decisions, these are guided by an instrumental logic. Parties are interested, first of all, in gaining offices, in order to increase their institutional presence, political influence, and social visibility. Then, decisions over recruitment and career are directed to increase parties' possibilities to gain such offices. With this aim, party leadership would try that candidates contribute positively to the party's chance of gaining such offices, for example, nominating visible and popular individuals. Besides, candidates must show a certain degree of suitability to the positions to occupy. This suitability is usually related to some degree of general political competence (this is difficult to define, but it may include rhetorical and communication skills, public presence, a medium-high level of literacy, maybe intelligence). However, for certain offices a more specialised background is required, above all if policy or political results depend on such specialisation. Secondly – and the point we emphasise in this paper – parties' decisions over recruitment may be tools for managing internal renewal and conflict. In this sense, offices are a fundamental part of the party's system of rewards. Offices may be utilised to reward or punish party members for their performance or their fidelity to the party's decisional core, or to compensate losers in case of

reorganization (in order to avoid internal split-offs). It is expected that most valuable positions are assigned to those party members belonging to the organizational core, while less valuable positions remain for those peripheral members, either opponents to party leadership, or those who, not being opponents, are not part of the party's core (i.e., former leaders whose political time has come to an end, or members that for different reasons must pass into reserve). In addition, less valuable positions may be used as 'training fields' for promising party members. Finally, recruitment also reflects other aspects of parties' behaviour, such as normative or ideological predispositions. In this respect, the question of gender (under)representation occupies a significant position.

Thus, political careers of SMEPs should be understood not only from the point of view of the empowerment of the EP, or the career opportunities it offers to individual politicians, but also from the perspective of parties' strategies and the way they perceive the role of the EP for their purposes. Regarding these different points of view, this paper aims to shed light over a series of questions. Firstly, there is an interest to uncover differential patterns of recruitment between SMEPs and their national counterparts along time (we will refer here to MPs at the national Congress of the Deputies). The identification of specificities in SMEPs may constitute the first hint about the different perspective parties approach recruitment at the EP level. The second main question is to examine the evolution along time of the career patterns of the SMEPs. As it has been stated above, career patterns are a consequence, not only of personal decisions, but also of party decisions. The presence of certain patterns and the absence of others may shed light on how parties perceive the EP and the functionality they attribute to this chamber. In this sense, it is interesting here to check Verzichelli and Edinger's (2005) hypothesis on the rising of a 'supranational elite' within the EU, and, if so, whether it is related to the growing role of the EP in the EU institutional system or it is mainly dependent on party's internal logics.

The paper is organised as follows. Firstly, recruitment patterns are examined by looking at different socio-demographical characteristics of SMEPs. The background variables we examine are: gender, age, territory, education, non-political profession, and EU related background. These variables are considered across the two majority parties⁴ and along time (PSOE and PP/AP⁵). SMEPs' recruitment patterns are compared with those of their counterparts in the Spanish parliament (Congress of Deputies). The objective is to identify differences that allow us to ascertain the specific nature of SMEPs.

After examining recruitment patterns, the paper deals with career patterns. Here, three career stages are considered: political career before entering the EP (which is also an element of recruitment); career within the EP; and career after leaving the EP. Through looking at the relationship among these three steps it is possible to ascertain the significance of being a MEP within the context of more extensive political careers. In this sense, we have elaborated a typology of career patterns where to classify SMEPs.

⁴ Due to the diversity of parties and coalitions competing in the different EP elections, the detailed analysis of the patterns in these parties becomes extremely difficult. However, data on "minority parties" are offered.

⁵ In January of 1989, former AP (Popular Alliance) was relaunched as PP (Popular Party). The renewal process ended in 1990, when José María Aznar was appointed president of the party.

The last part of the paper is devoted to recapitulate the major findings, paying attention above all to the functionality of the EP for parties' strategies, and the EP hypothesis of the rising of a supranational elite.

2. Recruitment patterns of the SMEPs (1986-2007)

2.1. General aspects and dynamics

Before analysing the recruitment patterns of the SMEPs in this paragraph we outline the basic historic and institutional features affecting their selection, and their dynamics along years.

In 1986, just after the entry of Spain in the ECC, and during the II EP elective legislature (1984-1989) the Spanish Parliament chose the first Spanish members of the European Parliament. These first SMEPs conserved their parliamentary seats until the first EP by-election, in 1987, when the electoral law established the incompatibility of national and regional parliamentary positions and those in EP. Since then, EP elections have taken place in Spain at the same time that in other EU countries (1989, 1994, 1999, and 2004). Table 2 shows the information about distribution of Spanish representatives along the five legislatures Spain has been represented in the European Parliament. We also include the data concerning the first indirectly-elected SMEPs.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

SMEPs are elected in a unique national constituency, from closed party lists, and according to the D'Hondt formula. This has mostly benefited the two majority parties. e PSOE and PP, occupying along the years a 78.5 percent of the seats, ranging from a 70 percent in 1989 to an 88.9 in 2004. Regarding minority parties, the single constituency system has made nationalist and regionalist forces – usually benefited by electoral law in national parliament – to concur within electoral coalitions, in order to increase their probabilities. Meanwhile, those minority parties with national character IU (a federation including the Spanish Communist Party, PCE) and, in 1987 and 1989, the CDS, – and which usually were damaged by the national electoral system – obtain in EP elections a representation more adjusted to their real electoral size.

When looking at the general dynamics in the composition of Spanish EP representatives (see table 3), we can see two periods, separated by the 'landmark' 1994 election. The first period, is characterized by the dominance of the PSOE and by a low rate of renewal among SMEPs (in 1987, only 21 out of 60 were newcomers, and in 1989 newcomers added up to only 16 out of 60). This low rate of renewal is indeed much lower in the PSOE, (a 7.1 percent in 1987, and an 11.1 percent in 1989). The second period starts with the PP's electoral triumph in 1994, its first ever electoral victory at the national level, which resulted from a process of intense party renovation started in 1989 (just before the 1989 EP election), which run parallel to the decay of the PSOE during the nineties. The PP would renew its majority in 1999. In 1994, the percentage of newcomers suddenly increases until the 59.4 percent, due in part to the change in the size of the national constituency (from 60 seats to 64), but also fuelled by

partisan internal dynamics. In this sense, the PP's percentage of newcomers climbs to a 75 percent (21 out of 28 SMEPs, four times those in 1989), but also PSOE's newcomers experience an important increase (from a 11.1 percent in 1989, to a 31.8 percent. In the following elections the rate of renewal maintains around the 50 percent, being slightly higher for the PP (see table 3). Finally, in 2004, the PSOE gains ground, mainly benefited from the electoral victory in the general election that had taken place a couple of months ago, obtaining the same number of seats that their main opponent. At that election, the PSOE reached its maximum rate of renewal until today. As we will see in the following sections, this general dynamics will reflect in the recruitment and career patterns of SMEPs.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

2.2. Gender

Table 4 show the distribution by gender of SMEPs and Congress MPs. The main feature to be underlined is that women have been always underrepresented among SMEPs. Nevertheless, there has been a progressive incorporation of female members mainly since 1994. This is the year with the highest turnover rate since 1986: 38 out of 64, a 59.3 percent, are newcomers and, from those, 15 are women (a 39.5 percent of all newcomers, and a 23.4 of all SMEPs). However, women have hardly ever represented more than a third of the SMEPs (a 34 percent in 1999). Nevertheless, compared with national MPs (Congress of Deputies), the degree of feminization is clearly higher among SMEPs, where percentages has been always greater except in 2004, when, for the first time, the percentage of female national MPs surpasses that of SMEPs.

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Regarding parties, the highest proportion of female SMEPs corresponds to the PSOE, although the percentage was fairly low until 1994. In that year, the percentage of woman among the PSOE's ranks jumps from the 18.5 percent (five out of 27) to the 36.4 (eight out of 14). This is explained by the fact that in 1994, to the five female SMEPs who continued from 1989 (a 100 percent), three more female newcomers joined (a 33.3 percent of all newcomers, the highest percentage until then). In contrast, the continuity of PSOE male MEPs was much lower (10 out of 22). The percentage of PSOE female MEPs grew in the following legislatures, reaching in 2004 almost a parity situation (45.8 percent, 11 out of 24).

The trend is different for the PP, where women almost played no role until 1994 (only one female SMEP since 1986)⁶ when their number multiplied by eight (a 28.6 percent of all PP SMEPs), all of them newcomers. The highest number and proportion of PP female SMEPs is reached in 1999 (37 percent, 10 out of 27), although it did not surpassed that of the PSOE. In 2004, this percentage descends to 29.2.

The distribution of SMEPs by gender is indirectly related to the above mentioned instrumental logic of parties. Taking into account gender distribution in

⁶ Carmen Llorca Villaplana.

order to complete electoral lists reflects, first of all, a party's ideological substratum regarding its commitment with principles such as equality. Also, it may constitute a sign directed to potential voters in order to get the support of those favourable to the implementation of such a principle. Nevertheless, taking into account the secondary character of EP elections, this 'feminization' of the EP sends a contradictory message about how parties consider the issue of female representation. This is clearer in the PSOE, where internal statutes explicitly regulate female representation quotas. In 1988, the PSOE XXXI Congress established that by 1994, at least a 25 percent of all the internal offices and positions in electoral lists should be occupied by women (Jerez 1997, 118).⁷ In 1997, during the XXXIV Congress, this parity policy was reinforced, as no gender should have neither less than a 40 percent nor more than a 60 percent both in internal party offices and in electoral lists. In this later case, the expected positions to be gained should be taken into account (Martínez 2000, 279). In contrast, the PP has been reluctant to introduce any parity or positive discrimination policy regarding candidatures and internal offices. However, despite the inexistence of formal regulations, this does not mean that the PP does not pay attention to the electoral importance of the electoral role of women. Precisely, in 1999, the PP nominated a woman, Loyola de Palacio, until then minister in the first Aznar cabinet, as head of the EP list. That year, the PSOE made a similar decision, appointing Rosa Díez as its EP number one.

2.3. Education

In general, according to table 5, as it is expected in political elites, SMEPs are highly educated (a 92 percent have earned, at least, a university degree). In comparison with the educational background of their counterparts in the Congress, it is remarkable the highest proportion of SMEPs with PhD degrees in most of the legislatures. This is compensated by the fact that national Congress has a higher proportion of simply graduates.

TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Regarding the two majority parties, during the first legislatures both parties present an inverse relationship between their respective proportions of SMEPs with undergraduate degrees and PhD degrees. From 1986 to 1989, more than a half of the PP (AP at that time) had earned a PhD degree, while in the PSOE the proportion never reached the 20 percent. In contrast, PSOE MEPs with undergraduate degrees were more than two thirds during these years, while in AP they did not surpass the 50 percent. However, since 1994 both parties came close to each other regarding educational backgrounds. To be more precise, the PP came closer to the PSOE, with a sudden decrease in 1994 of the percentage of PP MEPs with PhD degrees, and a steady increase of undergraduates (12 out of the 21 PP newcomers had only undergraduate degrees). Regarding other educational backgrounds, it is also interesting how secondary degree holders are almost absent among PP MEPs (except in 1994), while in the PSOE there

⁷ Jerez, Miguel (1997) "La élite parlamentaria", en Manuel Ramírez (ed.) *El Parlamento a debate*. Madrid: Trotta, pp. 118-119

has always been a small proportion along all legislatures. In contrast, the presence of SMEPs with postgraduate degrees different from PhD is higher among PP MEPs (also in a small proportion), while in the PSOE it is almost absent (except in 2004).

Finally, different patterns between the two majority parties also appear when compared with their counterparts in national Congress. PSOE MEPs have shown similar proportions of PhD holders and undergraduates than their counterparts (except in 1994 and 1999, where the proportion of PhD holders among SMEPs increase). The contrast is even more evident between PP MEPs and MPs. From great differences in 1986, 1987, and 1989, there is a clear approximation between 1994 and 1999 among educational background in both chambers, moving away once more in 2004.

2.4. Professional profile

Professional background gives us a clue about the ‘quality’ of representatives regarding their skills and training before entering politics. Table 6 shows the distribution of professions by legislature within parties. Education sector has been traditionally the main background of PSOE MEPs, although it has decreased steadily since 1994. At that time, political party employees started to increase their importance within PSOE ranks, and in 2004 they outnumber (58.3 percent) the rest of professions, mainly due to the fact that the continuity of SMEPs in this category was higher. PP MEPs show a slightly different pattern. Here, education professionals and high level civil servants were the main centres of extraction until 1989 (the sum of both ranged between the 58.8 percent in 1987 and the 66.6 percent in 1986 and 1989). However, as for the PSOE, in 1994 party employees increased their participation, being the second most important professional category together with high level civil servants. In contrast with the PSOE, this increase in the percentage of party employees is due to the fact that, in 1994, 6 out of 21 PP SMEPs belonged to that professional category. In 2004, party employee is the most frequent profession among PP MEPs (33.3 per cent), followed by high level civil servants and education professionals.

TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

As a first conclusion, it seems to be a trend during the last legislatures in both PSOE and PP to entrust representation in EP to former party employees. This trend is greater in PSOE than in the PP. This could indicate a sign of political professionalism in SMEPs, in contrast to the presumed ‘amateurism’ of other backgrounds. However, when taking into account political experience (see below) there is not significant difference among former party employees and other professions.

Regarding other professional categories, it is clear that SMEPs “do not represent” the working class: only 3 individuals were manual workers or service employees along all the period considered. On the other hand, managers and businessmen have also a low representation within SMEPs. However, their weight is slightly higher in PP than in PSOE. Nevertheless, they usually are more important in the minority party category. Finally, the practice of law has been always considered a natural source of professional politicians and of SMEPs in particular (Martínez 2000).

However, data show that, as a profession, lawyers constitute a secondary professional category compared with others, although they are more important among PP MEPs. A different question is that many representatives have an educational background in law. In fact, 78 SMEPs (a 40.8 percent) have a law degree. Nevertheless, this background lose track in the 2004, where only a 25 percent of the newcomers have the degree.

Table 6 also compares professional background of SMEPs and members of the Spanish Congress. In general terms, the distribution of professions among national MPs along legislatures has been more stable than in SMEPs. The two main categories have been, alternatively, either 'education sector' or 'party employees' (both maintain, approximately, proportions between the 23 and the 28 percent along legislatures). These categories also predominate among SMEPs, but their pattern of evolution is much less stable, being SMEPs coming from the educational sector a clear majority during the first terms (in 1987 they represented a 40 percent) although in constant descent. The third category in the Congress is 'managers and businessmen', always within a range between 10 and 20 percent, while among SMEPs the third category is 'high level civil servants'. Regarding parties, the two main professions in PSOE MPs are education and party employees too. However, in contrast with SMEPs, the distribution of PSOE national MPs by professional background is quite regular and stable, and they are more evenly distributed along years, with no category over the 40 percent. The two major professional categories among PP national MPs have been – with the exception of the 1982 legislature – 'managers and businessmen' and 'party employees'. This fact is also in contrast to the distribution among SMEPs, where, although more important than in the PSOE, the category of businessmen was outnumbered by high level civil servants and education sector employees, and, from 1994 onwards, by the former and party employees.

In sum, it appears that both majority parties took a similar approach concerning SMEPs' professional backgrounds. Until 1994, the PP sent highly professionally prepared individuals, coming from upper positions at the state bureaucracy and higher education sector. From 1994 onwards, the conservative party changed the pattern, looking for a more 'politicised' profile of its SMEPs, a trend that reaches its peak in 2004, when the most numerous professional category is that of former party employees. In its turn, the PSOE has been even more prone to recruit party employees as legislatures went by, while during the first legislatures (as in the Congress of the Deputies) it widely used SMEPs coming from the education sector. However, the quality of the latter are quite diluted in comparison with those of the PP. In the case of the PSOE, university professors (most of them with no tenure) mixed with other types of teachers from lower educational levels.

2.5. Age

Age distributions by party and legislature are shown in table 7. In general, there has been a steady increase of the mean age of SMEPs, from 48.1 in 1986 to 51.4 in 2004. Regarding the distribution by groups of age (table 8), it is evident that the younger cohorts have decreased their presence while the proportion of aged SMEPs (more than 55) has grown mainly during the last two legislatures. Looking at parties, the PSOE and the PP have followed opposed trends. In the beginning, PP MEPs used to be older than those of the PSOE. However, along legislatures, the mean age of PSOE

MEPs has steadily increased (mainly due to the low rate of turnover) while that of the PP has decreased. It is significant the sudden reduction of the cohort between 36 and 45 in the PSOE in 1994 (due to the absence of newcomers in this category), while in contrast, the proportion of younger cohorts (up to 45) increased in the PP in that legislature at the same time that those over 65 progressively disappeared. In this latter case, the renewal that PP MEPs experienced in 1994 also implied their rejuvenation. In both parties, during the last two legislatures, the proportion of those over 45 constitutes the great majority (more than a 75 percent).

TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE

Finally, tables 7 and 8 compare SMEPs and national MPs' ages. From the data, it comes up that SMEPs are older than their national counterparts. However, national MPs also have tended to grow older, and differences between the mean age of SMEPs and MPs have decreased from 6.1 years in 1986 to 3.6 in 2004 (although the minimum mean difference was reached in 1994, with only 2.6 years). In this sense, the proportion of national MPs over 45 has steadily increased from the 37 percent in 1982 to the 63 percent in 2004, although it has been far below that of SMEPs. Regarding parties, PSOE MEPs and MPs have followed a parallel trend of progressive ageing (although SMEPs are always older than MPs). In contrast, the PP showed a clearly divergent trend between 1986 and 1989. Being generally older than those of the PSOE, PP MPs tended to reduce their mean age while that of SMEPs increased. For example, the proportion in 1989 of PP MEPs over 45 was a 93 percent, while that of MPs was only 50 percent. This is not only a consequence of the relaunching of the PP during 1989, for in 1986 the proportion of MPs over 45 was also a 54 percent. This divergent trend becomes parallel from 1994 onwards, as the proportion of older PP members increase in both chambers (being always the proportion of SMEPs higher than that of MPs).

TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE

In sum, majority parties show different patterns of recruitment regarding age. The PSOE tended to recruit younger SMEPs in the beginning, while the low turnover and generational renewal provoked a steady ageing of its SMEPs. In its turn, the PP tended to recruit older SMEPs until 1994, when an important generational change takes place within the ranks of the conservative party. Nevertheless, the meaning of this trend is not understandable in isolation from other variables, especially those of political experience.

3. Career patterns of SMEPs.

Career patterns of SMEPs are considered here the result of the combination of three stages: the previous political experience of SMEPs, that is, the political trajectory they have before entering in the EP; the trajectory within EP; and the trajectory after exiting the EP. The only way to ascertain how is perceived the EP by the national political class (and parties) is taking into account these three steps. Contrasting within EP SMEPs careers with what they did before, and what they do after leaving the

Eurochamber gives us an approximate idea of the value the European level has in political careers.

3.1. Previous political experience

The career pattern before entering the EP is, evidently, a factor influencing recruitment patterns, so it will be analysed here as the rest of the background characteristics, being compared with national MPs previous political background.

Here we consider ‘political experience’ mainly regarding previous paid public offices occupied by SMEPs. This measure ignores other possible manifestations of political experience, such as high level (and paid) party offices (not just bureaucratic ones). This means that political experience is better measured here for big parties’ SMEPs – those with access to governmental positions and which occupy a great deal of the seats in elective bodies – than for SMEPs in small parties. However, we have chosen this measure of political experience for the available data on previous paid public offices usually included the times of entry and exit from the position, while this kind of information was scarce for party offices.

Table 9 compares previous political experience between SMEPs and national MPs using the number of governmental levels where they have occupied, at least, one position.⁸ What appears is that SMEPs usually have more experience than their counterparts in the Congress, no matter the party they belong to. Regarding those without experience, their proportion has been always lower among SMEPs, although the difference has been decreasing since 1994 – in 2004 the percentage of MPs without experience was lower than those in the EP. For those with some experience, SMEPs have usually occupied more offices than their counterparts. The proportion of SMEPs with two or more offices in their personal curriculum is always greater than for national MPs.

TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE

Regarding parties, the general observed trend is that the proportion of non-experienced SMEPs is in all parties less than a third of the total, except in 1994 for the PP (that year, non-experienced newcomers represented a 28.6 percent of all PP MEPs) and minority parties, and in 2004 for minority parties. In contrast, for the two majority parties, non experienced national MPs have been the main category until 2004, although their proportion has been progressively reduced along time. In the PSOE, the proportion of MEPs without experience have tended to increase since the first election (1987) reaching almost a 30 percent in the last two legislatures. Meanwhile, the majority in the experienced group have balanced from those who have been at one level to those at two or more. Moreover, the proportion of those who have passed through more than two levels of government has constantly grown. Concerning PP MEPs, the pattern is not so clear. Very experienced SMEPs (those with more than two levels) are the majority proportion until 1994 (around the 60 percent). This proportion is reduced by a half in 1994, while the amount of non-experienced reached its higher level both in relative and

⁸ Six levels are considered here to this effect: local, regional parliament, regional government, national Parliament, central Administration, and national Government.

in absolute terms (also a sign of the ‘change of cycle’ character of the 1994 election for the PP). In 1999 the highest proportion is occupied by PP MEPs who had been at only one governmental level. In 2004, the distribution is almost identical to that of the PSOE. Finally, regarding minority parties, most of the seats tend to be occupied by non-experienced and very experienced MEPs.

Table 10 shows the distribution of previous political positions by type of position. What immediately appears is the predominance of national parliamentary backgrounds. During the studied period, almost two thirds (a 62.7 percent) of the SMEPs have been either deputies or senators at the national parliament. This is in contrast with national MPs previous political background, where the larger category ever is local politics (with a mean of 31.8 percent). SMEPs with national parliamentary background were massively predominant in the beginning, although in 1994 they experienced a significant decrease. The importance of national parliament as a source of SMEPs has been greater for the PSOE than for the PP. Except in 2004, more than a half of the PSOE MEPs had been deputies or senators. In contrast, although MPs had represented more than three quarters of the PP MEPs until 1994, from 1994 onwards they experienced a considerable reduction, descending in 1999 to the 26 percent, and slightly recovering in 2004 (42 percent).

TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE

Regarding local and regional politics, they have progressively increased in importance among SMEPs. Local background is especially important for minority parties since 1994, although it has slightly decreased in 2004. Local politicians also have been frequent among PSOE MEPs, reaching their highest proportion in 2004. However, the importance of this category is greater among PSOE national MPs, whose proportion has steadily grown along years, and that in 2004 represented a 42.7 percent. Meanwhile, local politics has been scarce among PP MEPs’ curricula. This is also in contrast with PP national MPs, where local politics has been the main background. Concerning regional background, regional MPs have been an important source of SMEPs for minority parties, and more moderately for the PP, especially in the 2004 legislature. Also PSOE MEPs with this kind of background have increased their presence during the last two legislatures, although they hardly amount to a third in 2004. In contrast, SMEPs with regional government experience represent around a 25 percent within PSOE seats since 1989.

Regarding national administration background, it has been very important only for the PP until 1994, recovering its role in 2004, where this category is the third source of ‘experienced’ MEPs for the PP (29 percent). Finally, former ministers only have importance among PP MEPs, especially during the 1987 and 1989 legislatures. Nevertheless, despite ex ministers have represented one of the more scarce backgrounds (logically as these positions are scarce too), parties have assigned a qualitative importance to candidates within this category. Thus, in 4 out of the 5 EP elections both PP and PSOE have nominated former ministers as number 1 in the electoral lists.⁹

⁹ The PSOE nominated Fernando Morán (minister of Foreign Affairs since 1982 until 1985) in 1987, 1989, and 1994. In 2004, the head of list was the former minister of Industry, as well former PSOE Prime Minister candidate Josep Borrell. The PP (at that time AP) appointed Manuel Fraga, Franco’s minister and funder of AP, recently resigned from the party’s presidency, in 1987; in 1989, the head of list was Marcelino Oreja, minister of Foreign Affairs during the UCD government; in 1999, it was the turn of

However, the previous measures of political experience offer only a partial picture of this factor, mainly centred in its qualitative aspects. Regarding quantitative elements, time spent in political offices is a good indicator. Unfortunately, we only have these data for SMEPs. Table 11 summarizes this information. Patterns appear here more clearly than for the previous measures of political experience. Firstly, non experienced SMEPs increase along the years, reaching their highest proportion in 1994 (34 percent) while slightly descending during the following legislatures. Regarding parties, the increasing trend of non-experienced is patent for the PSOE, and above all for the PP, where this type of SMEPs greatly increased in 1994. At that year, a 33 percent of all PP MEPs were newcomers without previous political experience.

TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE

For those PSOE MEPs with some prior experience, there is a clear pattern along time. While the percentages of those less experienced (between one and 10 years) progressively decrease along legislatures, the percentage of those with more than 10 years of previous political experience increases, reaching in 2004 a 58 percent. For PP MEPs the pattern is not so apparent. Those between one and five years of experience have continuously decreased along years: from a 71.4 percent in 1986 to hardly a 4.2 percent in 2004. In contrast, those between 5 and 10 years have slowly grown from an 8.3 percent in 1987 to a 25 percent in 2004. Finally, as for the PSOE, those PP MEPs with more than 10 years of previous political experience, have continuously increased since 1986 (except a little decrease in 1986) being in 2004 the most numerous category (a 46.3 percent), mainly due to the flow of very experienced newcomers into the EP that year.

Another measure of prior political experience is party leadership (offices in party executive committees at local/provincial, regional, or national levels). As table 12 shows, in general, a majority of SMEPs have occupied some leadership position in parties (about two thirds). Indeed, as legislatures go by, the proportion of former party executives has increased. At the same time, we see how a majority belong to national executive committees¹⁰. Parties' regional branches also provide an important proportion of the SMEPs with party leadership background, and their proportion has even grown along legislatures. Finally, SMEPs with local leadership background have been a minority, and even they have continuously decreased.

TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE

Regarding the two majority parties, PSOE presents a particular distribution compared to the other parties. Firstly, we see how most of the PSOE MEPs with previous party leadership positions came from regional and local branches. Thus, in 2004 the most numerous group among PSOE MEPs (a 41.7 percent) had occupied regional leadership positions. Nevertheless, they have progressively decreased (especially those from the local level), while those with national party background have

Loyola de Palacio, until then minister of Agriculture in the first PP government; and in 2004, the head of list was Jaime Mayor Oreja, former minister of Interior, also wit MR. Aznar.

¹⁰ Here, parties with a regional focus (i.e. nationalists parties) are also considered national parties.

continuously grown since 1987. Those without party leadership experience have also decreased along legislatures, from a 38.9 percent in 1986 to a 20.8 in 2004. In contrast, PP MEPs with party leadership background have mainly belonged to the national executive committee, while the regional level had an insignificant presence until 1994. From this year on, PP MEPs with regional party background dramatically increased their proportion, being the main party leadership subgroup in 1999, mainly due to the continuity from previous legislatures. Prior local party leadership has been also traditionally insignificant (its greater percentage was a 7.4 percent in 1999). Finally, PP MEPs without previous party position have also progressively decreased (although they experienced a slight increase in 1994) from a 50 percent in 1986 to a 33.3 percent in 2004.

Another measure of political experience we consider is previous EU related background. Here we include not only prior political positions directly linked to EU affairs (EU Commissioner, directive offices in European parties, EU or European parties bureaucrats, national offices related to the EU, national party offices related to EU, and other EU institutions offices, i.e. Committee of Regions, etc.) but other indirectly linked, such as offices in other European level institutions (OTAN, OSCE, Council of Europe, etc.). Table 13 shows the corresponding information. Firstly, it appears evident that SMEPs frequently do not have any past EU experience (an average of the 77.6 percent). Nevertheless, data also show that, as legislatures go by, the proportion of those with certain EU related background has continuously increased, being a 40.7 percent in 2004. In this sense, both majority parties stick to the same track, with a continuous growth of the proportion of SMEPs with previous EU related background.

TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE

It may be concluded from the former that SMEPs (mainly in the beginning) had not much to do with EU until they occupied their seats in the EP. Nevertheless, this is due to the limited scope of the preceding measure. We can figure out that those SMEPs who previously belonged to national parliamentary European Community or International Affairs committees have had some contact with EU level politics or policies. This kind of background has been added up to the other categories of EU background. The results are shown in the table 14.

TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE

Looking at these data, our former analysis changes, although the pattern is very similar. Firstly, as expected, the number of those SMEPs with some kind of EU related experience increases when including members of parliamentary commissions. Regarding all parties, the relationship between SMEPs with prior EU background and those without it, in relative terms, is quite stable until 2004, where both groups reach the same percentages. The PSOE has tended to include ex national parliament committee members in their lists, which greatly increases the numbers of SMEPs with EU background. In 1999 both categories were even, and in 2004 EU experienced PSOE MEPs outnumbered those without this kind of background. In contrast, the trend in the

PP is almost the same that the described above, which means that members of parliament committees hardly have nurtured this party's ranks. Finally, the addition of members of parliamentary committees also makes a difference for minority parties, especially in 2004, where EU experienced SMEPs also outnumber the rest in a proportion of 2 out of 3.

Finally, it is interesting to examine the quality of past political trajectories, in order to establish the meaning of being an SMEP in a politician's career. In this sense, we have identify a typology of five different trajectories: no prior political experience, stable political career (which implies that in the moment of entering the EP there is not mobility with respect to the time they entered in politics); rising political career (the position they leave when entering the EP is higher than the first position they occupied); declining (the position before EP is lower than any position they have before); and government descending, which is a particular case of the declining category. Table 15 shows the results.

TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE

A majority of the SMEPs (except in 1994 and 2004) show a stable career pattern. At the same time, the number of those without experience, as it has been mentioned above, has progressively increased. Besides, the proportion of rising and declining trajectories is quite stable along years (ranging the former between the 15 and the 21 percent, and the latter between the 3 and the 9 percent). Finally, the presence of SMEPs descending from government has been a little more oscillating. Regarding parties, the percentage of those PSOE MEPs with a stable political career has decreased along years, from the 67.6 percent in 1986 to the 30.4 percent in 2004. This is in clear contrast with those PSOE MEPs without prior political experience. The percentage of those with a declining political career has been quite stable, while those with a rising political career experienced a sudden decline in 1999 (from a 28.6 percent in 1994 they dropped to a 8.7 percent in 1999) although in 2004 they seem to recover. Finally, the presence of former ministers has increased in the last two legislatures. Regarding the PP, the first contrast with PSOE MEPs is the higher presence of former ministers. This percentage is lower in 1999, when the PP was in government. Other differences with the PSOE is the lower proportion of SMEPs with stable or rising careers between 1986 and 1999, and the higher proportion of non experienced SMEPs.

3.2. Duration of SMEPs within EP

In order to complete the picture on career patterns, it is necessary to pay attention to the duration of SMEPs within the EP. Here, only SMEPs who entered before the 2004 election are selected. Table 16 offers the basic information about duration in years. First of all, it appears that *SMEPs endure an average of 7.1 years*. Nevertheless, the distribution is clearly skewed to the lower side of the continuum, as *the percentile 25 and 50 of the population remain in office only 5 years*. Furthermore, *a 25 percent of the SMEPs have endured more than 10 years in office*. Regarding parties, we can see how PSOE MEPs tend to last more than other parties' SMEPs. Besides, while PSOE's median and mode are very close to the mean (8 years), in the PP they are quite below that figure (five years), which indicates that this party's distribution is clearly skewed to the lower side (SMEPs with durations below the mean are more numerous).

TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE

Table 17 shows the same information but in terms of number of mandates (that is, the number of times SMEPs have been chosen to occupy seats in EP). Here the picture differs slightly from the former, due to the shorter duration of first two mandates (1986 and 1987), where the PSOE obtained the majority of seats. That is why this party greatly increases their mean of mandates compared with the PP (which obviously does not correspond with duration measured in years).

TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE

In order to get a more complete image, we have divided the SMEPs into three categories: those with a low duration (a regular term in office, up to five years), intermediate durations (between five and 10 years in EP); and those with higher durations (more than 10 years). Looking at the duration distribution, the proportion of low duration SMEPs is greater in minority parties (30 out of 47). Here, electoral dynamics may be at work (i.e., the lower electoral potential of small parties). Regarding the two majority parties, we see that the proportion of less durable SMEPs is greater in the PP (30 out of 47), and that those with longer within EP trajectories are more numerous in absolute and relative terms among PSOE MEPs (17 out of 63 have endured more than 10 years, while in the PP they are 12 out of 64).

To get the complete picture, it is necessary to look at the distribution of duration by terms. Table 18 is another form to show the internal dynamics within parties and the successive periods of internal renovation. The proportion of more EP experienced PSOE SMEPs reduces drastically from a 45.5 percent in 1994 to a 25 percent in 1999. The proportion decreases also in 2004 (20.8 percent). The percentage of experienced PP SMEPs (more than 7seven years) was much lower in 1994 and 1999 (due to the generational renewal in 1994), but it greatly increased in 2004 to a third of all PP SMEPs.

TABLE 18 ABOUT HERE

These differences in durations among SMEPs may be due to the moment when SMEPs entered in EP.¹¹ Table 19¹² represents the survival of individuals by term of entry in the EP. Looking at the general pattern, it is confirmed that those who entered earlier are more likely to show higher durations. This applies to SMEPs who entered first, in 1986, from which a 3.3 percent (that is, 2 individuals), are still in office in 2004,

¹¹ Relationship is weak but statistically significant: Cramers' V = 0.256, sig. 0.004.

¹² Differences in N between table 3 and table 19 are due to the different cases they count. Table 3 takes into account SMEPs not substitutes continuing from the former year or not continuing. It entails that, for example, if a SMEP exited in 1989 but returns in 1999, in 1999 it counts as "enter". In contrast, table 19 counts SMEPs at their last moment in EP (when they definitely exit from EP or, in 2004, those who continue in the former legislature. It does not take into account new entries in 2004, because these cases would distort our measures of duration, as they have just started their careers). Most of the differences are due to three situations: 1) SMEPs who entered as members of a party, but in later legislatures they move into another (counted in one party in table 3, and in other in table 19); 2) SMEPs who entered as substitutes (not counted in table 3, but counted in table 19); 3) SMEPs who exited momentarily from EP, but later returned (counted in table 3, but not counted in table 19).

and the same applies to 2 of the SMEPs who entered in 1987. Also, there is a difference in the rhythms of exit depending on the year of entry. In general terms, SMEPs entering in 1986 and in 1987 were exposed to a lower risk in their first term than those who entered, for example, in 1989 or 1999. The risk for 1986 and 1987 SMEPs is also moderate during their third term (1989 and 1994), where a 55 and a 42 percent, respectively, still were in office. The situation is worst for those who resisted three terms, as less than a 25 percent kept their seat in the fourth term. We can see how this rhythm of decay accelerates for the SMEPs who entered in 1994 and 1999. For those entering in 1994, only a 24.3 percent arrives to their third term (they are re-elected in 2004). The process of decay has been quicker for the 1999 cohort, where only a 32.5 percent resisted a second term.

TABLE 19 ABOUT HERE

More interesting is the different cohort patterns shown by parties. Regarding the PSOE, those MEPs who entered in 1986 (the largest cohort) follow the general trend we have just described. Their survival rate is quite high in 1987 and 1989, but they drastically reduced their presence in 1994 (a 52.4 percent). It must also be underlined the higher rate of survival of the 1999 PSOE MEPs (a 63.6 percent resisted in 2004).

We can see a similar pattern among 1986 PP MEPs, with an even more drastic reduction in 1994. In the 1994 EP election, the PP obtained the majority of seats. This was accompanied by an important renewal within this party's ranks: at that moment entered a 44 percent of all the PP MEPs until then (20 out of 45, including substitutes). Ten years later, a 35 percent of the PP MEPs who entered in 1994 was still in the EP. In contrast, the 1999 PP MEPs cohort experienced the highest 'mortality', as in 2004 only a 26.3 percent kept their seat.

Finally, SMEPs from minority parties are more exposed to exit from the EP, a thing which is, on the other hand, quite logic according to their electoral capacity and to the heterogeneous nature of this category. However, the highest survival is observed in the beginning (those who entered in 1986 and 1987), where a few of them (4 out of 22) stood for more than three terms within the EP.

Along with cohorts, there may be other explanatory factors for SMEPs duration patterns. Exploratory analysis of background factors shows that neither *gender*, nor *education*, nor *profession*, nor *previous political background* (including *prior EU related background*) explains SMEPs career lengths. Only *age at the time of entry for the first time in EP* shows a slight but significant relationship with duration, both measured as a continuous¹³ and as a categorical variable¹⁴. Another significant relationship appears between duration and *offices occupied within EP*¹⁵. However, when splitting the population by parties, three more significant relationships appear: for PP MEPs, *previous EU related background* and *last non-political profession*; and *previous political experience (in years)* for minority parties.

¹³ Pearson's correlation = -.147, p=.052.

¹⁴ Cramer's V = .281, p=.000.

¹⁵ Cramer's V = .417, p=.000.

A closer inspection of the two main explanatory variables will help to shed light on duration patterns. When segmenting *within EU experience* by parties, the relationship between this variable and duration within EP maintains only for PP and minority parties MEPs. In both cases, those who have occupied any office within EP (President or Vice-President of the EP, EP groups, or EP committees) show longer careers.

Regarding *age at the time of entry*, the significant relationship applies to the two major parties. For PP SMEPs between 36 and 45 years old are less prone to have medium length careers, and more likely to stay within EP more than ten years. The same applies to PSOE SMEPs of the same age group. Nevertheless, in this case, from the different tests applied (Chi-Square, Cramer's V, and Lambda) only Chi-Square offers a signification below 0.05, and this is not completely reliable for some cells have not enough cases. The same occurs for those PSOE SMEPs between 45 and 55, who are more likely to have medium length careers, and less likely to embark in long duration stages in EP.

As we have mentioned above, duration seems to be related to the year of entry in the EP. So we have tried to control the former variables for this latter, in order to make clear the explanatory relationship. Taking into account that as more variables are introduced, the reliability of tests is reduced, the following remarks must be considered not definitive. Thus, regarding *offices within EP*, significant results are obtained for 1986 PSOE and 1994 PP MEPs. Regarding the former, occupying some office within EP contributes positively to longer careers (more than 10 years). In contrast, those with up to 5 years careers are more likely not to have occupied any office within EP at all. In the case of PP SMEPs in 1994, the same statement applies.

When considering *age at the time of entry* for the first time, it is significant in the case of PP SMEPs who entered in 1986. In this case, PP MEPs with an age between 36 and 45 are more prone to stay longer within EP, while those between 46 and 55 tended to have medium length careers (5 to 10 years long).

From this data, we have elaborated a simple binary logistic regression model, including the three explanatory variables (cohort, age at the time of entry for the first time, and offices within EP), and controlling by party (PSOE, PP/AP, and minority parties). The dependent variable is dichotomous (more than 10 years of duration, less than ten years). The results are summarized in Table 20.

TABLE 20 ABOUT HERE

This model shows that, in order to explain long durations (more than 10 years) it is important to take into account whether the SMEP had occupied an office within the EP. This includes offices in EP Groups (spokesman, president, vice-president, other office), institutional positions within EP (President, Vice-President, and Board Members of the EP), and relevant positions in EP Committees (President and Vice-President). Besides, those SMEPs between 36 and 45 years old show a greater probability of having longer durations within EP. Finally, SMEPs pertaining to majority parties have also greater chances of lasting more than 10 years.

3.3. Trajectories after the EP

The picture of SMEPs' careers is completed when looking at what they do after leaving the EP. Here, the main question is whether the EP is valued as an intermediate step in a longer political career, or it is only a 'cul-de-sac' for politicians.

What appears when looking at the table 21, is that *for the great majority of SMEPs (104 out of the 149 who have exited until 2007, a 69.8 percent), the EP constitutes the end of their political career.* By legislatures, 1999 seems to have a higher rate of retirements (74 per cent). Then, being SMEP does not seem to be a sign of a future prosperous political career, but on the contrary, for most of the SMEPs it is a last step.

TABLE 21 ABOUT HERE

Regarding the characteristics of the 'exiters', the only factor that explains continuity in politics or definitive retirement is a pure demographic factor, age. *Younger exiting SMEPs (below 45 years old) are more likely to stay in politics than older ones (more than 60 years old).* Neither previous political experience (including the years in EP), nor previous political positions, nor leadership positions in parties, etc., none of them are significantly related to continuity in politics.

For those few SMEPs who continue (remember, less than a third of those who exit, 45 individuals in total) table 21 also shows the heterogeneous character of later destinations. A 37.7 percent continues in national parliament (22.2 percent as Senators and 15.5 as Deputies). The next larger categories are 'party offices' (11.1 percent) and 'local politics' (8.8 percent). Only one individual (Ana Palacio) abandoned EP to become minister. Finally, regarding the EP as a starting point for a future EU career, only three SMEPs did so. Two of them became Commissioners during five years, and then continued in national politics (Marcelino Oreja) or exited definitively (the late Loyola de Palacio), and the third became President of the European Court of Auditors (Manuel Fabra Vallés), and in 2007 is still has a position in that body. All of them are PP members.

Regarding the *duration of the subsequent political career, the average duration is 7 years.* From those who continue, half of them stay in politics less than 6 years, and a third only 3 years. Besides, those whose last term was 1986 or 1987 (see table 22) present higher durations; in contrast, a majority of those with shorter durations after EP are concentrated at the end of the 1999 term (this is obvious, since the time span is shorter for the 'exiters' at the end of this term). However, there is a clear 'anomaly' in 1994, as a majority of those who exited at the end of that term have remained in politics more than 7 years, being all active in 2007. Regarding parties, there are no substantive differences along years, except for the PP in 1994 (where all of those who exited had long later careers) and for the PSOE in 1989, where most of those who exited had shorter later careers than expected.

TABLE 22 ABOUT HERE

Regarding the rest of the career, table 23 shows the distribution of offices in different government levels¹⁶ occupied after leaving the EP. Most of them (27) stayed only in one level (60 percent), and a 30 percent (14) had occupied positions in two or more. It is interesting to underline the successful career of those PP MEPs that respectively exited at the end of the 1987 and 1994 terms.

TABLE 23 ABOUT HERE

Finally, regarding career trajectories, they are very diverse (see table 24), although the most common (7 SMEPs, a 15.6 percent of those who continue in politics) is entering in national parliament and then exiting from politics.

TABLE 24 ABOUT HERE

3.4. A typology of SMEPs' career patterns.

Career patterns are, in the end, diverse and complex. The different backgrounds and previous trajectories, added to the different careers within EP, plus the different trajectories after leaving the Eurochamber, call for a necessary simplifying account. In order to do so, we have elaborated a simple but exhaustive typology of eight possible career patterns (see table 25). This typology divides each period (career before entering in the EP, career within EP, and political career after) in two categories: short and long durations. In career before and after, short periods are those between 0 and five years of political experience, and long those above five years. Within EP, short experience is considered that below the mean (7.1 years), and long experience that above that figure.

TABLE 25 ABOUT HERE

This typology is clearly a simplification of the reality, but it allows us to show an immediate and direct picture of the development of SMEPs' political careers. The objective is emphasise EP specialisation, which here is associated to a certain duration within each of the career stages (more than five years before and after EP, more than seven years – the mean duration – in EP).

¹⁶ Along with the six levels previously considered (local, regional parliament, regional government, national parliament, central administration, and national government), later positions in EU institutions and party offices have been included.

The typology distinguishes eight different situations, arisen from the combination of the 3 periods and the two categories dividing each period ($2^3 = 8$). The first four patterns imply a weak EU specialisation. Firstly, there is an ‘ephemeral’ career pattern, which comprises those with a general short political career. Due to the codification we adopt, this ‘shortest’ career could endure a maximum of 17 years. Nevertheless, it involves the lowest level of political specialisation, and real durations are much lower (see table 26). The second pattern is called ‘training’: EP experience precedes an ulterior large career outside this institution. The following pattern is ‘retirement’, where EP experience follows a previously long political career, and the trajectory after EP is short (or inexistent). The final ‘unspecialised’ pattern is that of ‘bridge’, where EP experience is only a provisional step between two long periods of national political career.

TABLE 26 ABOUT HERE

The other four career patterns reflect EP specialisation. The first is called simply ‘specialisation’ for the longest period in a SMEP’s political career takes place within EP. The second is called ‘specialisation and successful later national career’, for along with specialisation within EP, SMEPs take profit from this experience through an extended political career after exiting EP. ‘Recycling’ refer to those SMEPs who come from previous extensive national careers, and that decide to specialise in EP, without returning to the national arena, or, if they do, with short later careers. Finally, the last pattern represents the longest possible career, which entails specialisation after a long previous trajectory, and also a long career after exiting the EP.

Table 26 show the results for these career patterns in SMEPs classified by year of entry in the EP and parties (data refer only to those who have exited by 2007). Data confirm the diversity of career patterns: all of them are represented but the ‘super-career’ one. The most important along time have been, in this order: the ‘retirement’ (24.6 percent), the ‘recycling’ (23.1 percent), and the ‘ephemeral’ (22.4 percent) career patterns. *Comparing specialisation (larger within EP careers) with non specialist profiles, their percentages including all the terms are 37.3 and 62.7 respectively.*

The pattern of ‘retirement’ is the most frequent. Along years, it has been more frequent among those SMEPs who entered in 1986, 1987, and 1999. By parties, a 22.9 percent of all PSOE MEPs who are out of the EP by 2007 (11 out of 48) belong to this category (five of them entered in 1986). The percentage of PP/AP ‘retirers’ is slightly lower (20.0 percent, nine out of 45) and, in contrast with the PSOE, the highest number of ‘retirers’ belong to the 1999 cohort (six out of nine)¹⁷. In the case of minority parties, ‘retirement’ is the most important option (a 31.7 percent, 13 out of 41 belong to this category).

¹⁷ Nevertheless, this is an artefact, due to the short time span elapsed since they left EP. Thus, from these SMEPs, only those who definitely abandon politics (five SMEPs) have ‘pure’ retirement careers.

The second most important career pattern is *'recycling'* (23.1 percent, 31 out of 134). Along with retirement, individuals with longer prior political experience have the opportunity to specialise in EP and continue their political career within this institution. For PSOE SMEPs this is the major option (35.4 percent, 17 out of 48, 11 entering in 1986). In contrast, recycling has not been so frequent among PP SMEPs. Only a 13.3 percent (six out of 45) have this career pattern.

After retirement and recycling, the next most important career pattern is the *'ephemeral'* one. Particularly, this is of little importance among PSOE MEPs (8.3 percent, four out of 48). In contrast, the *'ephemeral'* is the most important career pattern among PP MEPs (a 28.9 percent, 13 out of 45). More than a half of them –seven– entered in 1999. A majority of the SMEPs of minority parties also present this *'ephemeral'* pattern (31.7 percent, 13 out of 41).

The percentage of SMEPs who came from a short previous political experience and that decided to follow their career within the EP (*specialists*) is lower compared with the others, a 12.7 percent (17 out of 134). The percentage in both majority parties is quite similar (16.7 percent and a 15.6 percent among PSOE and PP MEPs, respectively), while it is low (4.9 percent) in minority parties, due to their shorter durations within EP.

The former career paths (retirement, recycling, ephemeral, and specialisation) entail short after EP careers. Adding them all up, they represent an 82.8 percent (111 out of 134) of all SMEPs who have exited by 2007. *This means that the EP usually is a 'one-way street' for those who start a political career within it.* As we have seen, a great majority of them do not continue in politics after leaving the EP (a 73.1 percent, 91 out of 111). Regarding parties, all of those PSOE MEPs with a *'retirement'* career pattern did not continue in politics after leaving the EP. The same occurs to those PP MEPs with an *'ephemeral'* career pattern. Those SMEPs who have longer careers after leaving the EP, have concentrated in the *'training'* (10.4 percent, 14 out of 134) and *'bridge'* (5.2 percent) career patterns. Only 2 SMEPs achieved to have a successful later career in national politics after their EP specialisation (a 1.5 percent).¹⁸

The percentage of *'trainees'* is a little higher in the PSOE (seven in total, 14.6 percent) than in the PP (five SMEPs, 11.1 per cent). In minority parties SMEPs with this career path has been much scarcer. *'Bridge'* career patterns (those who their stage in the EP constitute only an intermediate period between long national careers) is much more frequent among PP MEPs (four out of 45, an 8.9 percent). Within the PSOE, only one SMEP had this career pattern.

Looking at possible explanatory factors – remember we consider all SMEPs who have exited by 2007 – there is a weak statistically significant association between career patterns and the last non political profession.¹⁹ For example, the *'bridge'* pattern is much more likely among full time party employees. A possible interpretation is that, in certain cases, the EP is admitted to be a *'waiting room'* for party officials until they find a position in national politics. This is confirmed by the also statistically significant

¹⁸ These SMEPs are: Miguel Arias Cañete (PP) (who ended up as Minister of Agriculture from 2000 to 2004) and Jon Gangoiti (PNV).

¹⁹ Cramers' V = .269, P = .050

association between career patterns and prior party leadership position.²⁰ Thus, all of the SMEPs with ‘bridge’ career patterns previously had occupied a national party leadership position. In contrast, the ‘training’ pattern is more common among those who occupied a local party leadership position. Back to professions, it is also remarkable that the ‘ephemeral’ career pattern is much more likely for ‘lawyers’ and ‘managers and businessmen’, which is also understandable since these professions usually are quite profitable for individuals who exert them, so they can bear the costs of leaving the EP (or a political career in general) better than other professional categories. The age at the time of entry in the EP also present a statistically significant relationship with career patterns.²¹ Ephemeral careers are more likely among those SMEPs below 35 years old (the sunk costs are lower), while retirement is for those who at the time of entry in the EP are 55 years old or older. In its turn, specialisation is more likely among SMEPs between 46 and 55 years old – for them the sunk costs of a political career are quite large, and they are still too young for retirement. Finally, the age at the time of exit from the EP is also significantly related to career patterns.²² Thus, ephemeral and training patterns are more frequent among those SMEPs who at the time of leaving the EP are between 30 and 45 years old. Those with a specialist profile, are more likely to be between 56 and 65 years old when they exit from the EP (so for continuing a political career in the national arena they are quite old). And those who retire are more frequent among older (more than 65 years old).

4. The instrumental character of the EP and the rise of a supranational political elite

This paper started from the assumption that the recruitment and career patterns of SMEPs were important in order to understand the perception of the Spanish political class about the role of the EP. We contended that those patterns depended both on individuals’ and – mainly – parties’ decisions. On the other hand, we agreed with other authors that studying SMEPs’ political careers it is a useful way to test the hypothesis of the rising of a ‘supranational’ elite.

Regarding recruitment patterns, the comparison between SMEPs and national MPs shows that to some extent parties consider them differently. Firstly, regarding gender, women have always been more represented (in relative terms) by SMEPs than by national MPs. This trend has been present in the two majority parties, above all since 1994. However, in 2004 the EP and national Congress are even in terms of gender representation. Here, differences (above all during the last years) are due to different institutional elements (party regulations) affecting the process of recruitment. The PSOE has fully incorporated a parity rule when recruiting their candidates, while the PP has been reluctant to do so.

SMEPs and national MPs also differ in their educational background. Although – as it is expected from political elites in contemporary democratic countries – both SMEPs and national MPs are highly educated, the presence of PhD holders among the former is clearly higher than in the national parliament. Regarding parties, these differences were especially significant in the PP during the first three terms (1986 to

²⁰ Cramers’ V = .324, P = .001

²¹ Cramers’ V = .277, P = .030.

²² Cramers’ V = .346, P = .000

1989), where more than a half of the PP MEPs had earned a PhD. There are also differences in terms of professions, but not with regard to which are the main professional sources of recruitment – for both SMEPs and national MPs, these are the education sector and party employees – but concerning the magnitude and the evolution of these categories along years. Regarding parties, the PSOE reproduces the general pattern, and the PP excludes ‘managers and businessmen’ from their SMEPs, a category (together with party employees) that was this party’s MPs’ main professional background until 2004. The age of SMEPs also differ from that of national MPs. Although differences have decreased along years, SMEPs are usually older than their national counterparts. Finally, SMEPs have been usually more politically experienced than national MPs. In this sense, in both majority parties, non experienced MPs outnumbered those with experience until 2004, while this category has increased among SMEPs in the two majority parties along years. Besides, both majority parties have tended to recruit along years more party employees to occupy positions in the EP, although they have been proportionally less than in the national parliament.

Being SMEPs and national MPs elected by similar systems (closed lists) in both chambers and, in consequence, being the control exerted by parties over the process of nomination also similar, the different patterns of recruitment observed in SMEPs and national MPs suggest that parties assign different functions to any of these chambers. Despite its secondary role, in general, the EP has been perceived by Spanish parties as requiring more able or prepared members. Here, a ‘logic of suitability’ or competence seems to be at work. *Spanish majority parties may consider that the positions in EP require more skilled individuals, maybe due to the higher technical content of the issues EP deals with and the international profile of this chamber.* On the other hand, the change in the professional pattern in both parties since 1994 (the rising of party employees as the main professional categories) may be a response to the highest ‘politization’ and the empowerment of the EP since the Maastricht Treaty. Besides, SMEPs qualifications have also evolved from ‘general ones’ (high educational level, intellectual professions) to more specific qualifications (a higher proportion of SMEPs with prior EU related experience).

However, we think that the recruitment of SMEPs cannot be reduced only to the logic of competence. Sending older and more experienced individuals to the EP may not be a question only of sending the most prepared. SMEPs’ recruitment and career patterns also reflect other party internal logics. Firstly, there is the fact that *becoming a SMEP usually means that there is no turning back to national politics* and, if so, the career is quite short. A 69.8 percent of all SMEPs (a 69.2 percent of the PSOE MEPs, and a 70.6 percent of the PP MEPs) did not have any political experience after exiting the EP. Thus, it is not preposterous to assert that the Spanish parties use the EP mainly as an instrument to manage generational renewal and internal stability. Here, it is apparent the secondary character assigned to these chamber by Spanish parties. The EP would offer, thus, the possibility to compensate to those members party leaders consider should left core party positions.

Regarding generational renewal, this is a necessary task all parties perform. Older party members, although more experienced, are also more likely to suffer from political erosion, being less attractive for the public in electoral terms. Besides, they may constitute an obstacle for less experienced but promising politicians. In this sense, a 47.2 percent of all PSOE MEPs were more than 45 years old at the time of entry, and

for the PP this percentage is a 71 percent. Besides, a 61 percent of PSOE MEPs and a 50 percent of those of the PP in all legislatures had more than five years of prior political experience. Finally, a 65.6 percent of PSOE MEPs and a 55 percent of PP SMEPs *came from declining or stable (also interpretable as deadlocked) previous political careers*. So, the EP may be conceived as an instrument through which parties deal with the renewal of older, more experienced, and politically stalemated members. This is confirmed by the fact that, for national MPs (Deputies) it is more likely to end up in the EP if they are former national party leaders, former ministers, they have occupied a political position in national administration²³, or they have occupied political positions in three or more governmental levels. In exchange to those who accept move aside from the party's front-line, the EP constitutes a way of compensation (a second-order political position).

This instrumentality of the EP appears when looking at the evolution of the PP/AP's recruitment patterns. In December 1986, after a succession of electoral defeats, AP experienced an internal crisis which led to the resignation of its president, Manuel Fraga, and the change in the party core. In the next EP election (June 1987) the electoral list was headed by Manuel Fraga. In that term, all of the AP MEPs who had previously occupied party leadership positions (a 47.1 percent) did it at the national level. Nevertheless, most of them (six out of eight) had continued from the 1986 indirect election, so here EP as a renewal mechanism did not work too much, maybe because the new leaders did not achieve a complete party takeover. In this sense, the internal crisis of AP continued and ended up in the party's re-launching in January 1989 as Popular Party (PP). This re-launching entailed a complete renewal of the party's leadership core, and the entry of younger leaders. In the EP elections of June 1989, we can observe how the percentage of former national leaders grew to the 53.3 percent of all PP MEPs (a 60 percent of all new entries, 3 out of 5 were former national leaders). In the 1994 EP election, when the process of internal party renewal had been completed, the percentage of former national party leaders in EP decreased to a 28.3, although in absolute numbers they were more than before, including newcomers. Thus, as the new leadership took control, they could put into motion this mechanism of internal renewal. The percentage of former national party leaders maintained in 1999, precisely when the PP was in government, while that of regional leaders increased. After the electoral defeat in March 2004, the percentage of former national party leaders among PP MEPs increased again to a 41.7 percent. It is interesting to point out how a 54.5 percent of all PP newcomers in 2004 (six out of 11) were national party leaders (including the head of the list, Jaime Mayor Oreja), this party's greatest ever figure. It is interesting to underline that patterns in those who previously occupied positions in national administration follow a similar pattern (many of them were also party national leaders).

The PP's renewal also was reflected in the 1994 election by the high rate of newcomers without previous political experienced that entered at that time. Being national (and more valued) national positions occupied by central members, and being 'skimmed' old leaders during the previous years, a great proportion of the PP electoral list was formed by non-experienced politicians.

The evolution of PSOE MEPs also may reflect the internal evolution of this party. We have seen how the rate of renewal in this party has been much lower along years than that in the PP (that is, SMEPs have been more durable and stable). Besides,

²³ All of these relationships are statistically significant.

newcomers have been much less experienced than those of the PP. From 1986 to 1999, only five PSOE SMEPs had previously occupied any national party leadership position. This may be associated to the higher party internal stability while the PSOE was in government. Precisely, the trend seems to change in the 1999 legislature, just after the PSOE left national government, when the proportion of PSOE MEPs who had occupied any national leadership position before grew to a third (eight out of 24) (half of them were newcomers). In contrast, the proportion of PSOE MEPs who had occupied leadership positions in party's regional or local branches was always greater during the years the PSOE was in government. Also, in 2004, they are a 50 percent of all PSOE MEPs (and two thirds of the newcomers). However, the data do not allow us to assert this is an instrument to maintain internal stability within the party, or simply a form of rewarding regional and local leaders.

Nevertheless, yet an almost definitive exile from national politics, the EP also offer the opportunity of pursuing a long career within this institution. This is also part of the effectiveness of the EP as an instrument for managing internal renewal and maintaining stability. Becoming an SMEP does not always mean to be sacked from politics. We have shown how the main career pattern is 'retirement', but it mainly appears in older SMEPs. 'Ephemeral' careers are also frequent, but they are conditioned by the fact that SMEPs may choose other non successful political careers (see, for example, the larger proportion in this category of lawyers and businessmen), or they have a non political profile (more than a half of the SMEPs with this career pattern – 19 out of 30 – had no prior political experience).

Thus, specialisation within the EP (developing a career within the EP) has been a major alternative for SMEPs. For those SMEPs with long national background recycling is the only opportunity to stay professionally in politics. It is interesting how PSOE SMEPs with longer prior political trajectories opted to become EP specialists. Furthermore, specialisation is also an attractive (although secondary) option for those with short previous political careers. In general, from all the SMEPs who have exited by 2007, a 37.3 percent opted to pursue long careers within the EP.²⁴ This option was already clear for those SMEPs who entered in 1986: a 51.6 percent of the PSOE MEPs (16 out of 31) and a 55.6 percent of those of the PP (AP at that time) (five out of nine) developed long career within the EP.

Thus, we can conclude that the making of a Spanish supranational elite has not depended only on the empowerment of the EP, but also on parties' internal logics. This empowerment may have influenced the background of the SMEPs (more politized, more experienced in EU affairs). However, EP specialisation may be also a consequence of party internal logics which ended up in the EP as a one way career path to manage party renewal. In this sense, specialisation was a compulsory path for almost everyone who wanted to continue in politics. A contrafactual situation that would help to confirm our reasoning is that of what if SMEPs could return to national politics more easily than they actually do. Another alternative is to compare the Spanish MEPs with those of other countries.

TABLES

²⁴ This percentage is lowered by the fact that all of those SMEPs who entered in 1999 and had exited by 2007 do not developed specialisation career patterns (their duration within EP is lower than 7 years).

Table 1. Electoral turnout in Spain (percentages): European Parliament vs. National Parliament (Congress of Deputies).

Year	EP	Year	Congress
1987	68,54	1986	70,49
1989	54,71	1989	69,74
1994	59,58	1993	76,44
1999	64,38	1996	78,06
2004	45,14	2004	75,66

Table 2. Results of EP election in Spain (seats obtained by parties in EP)

	1986	1987	1989	1994	1999	2004	All
PSOE	36	28	27	22	24	24	161
AP/PP	12	17	15	28	27	24	123
CDS	0	7	5	0	0	0	12
PC/IU	0	3	4	9	4	1	21
CiU	2	3	2	3	3	1	14
PNV	2	0	1	1	1	1	6
EA	0	1	1	0	1	0	3
HB/EH	0	1	1	0	1	0	3
PA	0	0	1	0	1	0	2
Verdes	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
EE	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
A.E.R.-M	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
PL	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
UM	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
PDP	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
UCD	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
BNG	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
ERC	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
CC	0	0	0	1	1	0	2
IC-Verds	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Minority parties (excluding PSOE and AP/PP)</i>	12	15	18	14	13	6	78
TOTAL	60	60	60	64	64	54	362

Note: The data do not include substitutes. * 1986 MEPs were indirectly elected by the Spanish national parliament (Congress and Senate) among their members.

PSOE: Socialist Party; AP/PP: Popular Alliance/Popular Party; CDS: Social and Democratic Centre; PC/IU: Communist Party/United Left; CiU: Convergence and Union (Catalonian Nationalist); PNV: Nationalist Basque Party; EA: Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Nationalists); HB/EH: Herri Batasuna/Euskal Herritarrok (Basque Nationalists); PA: Andalusianist Party (Andalusian Regionalists); Verdes: Green party ; EE: Euzkadiko Ezkerra (Basque nationalists); A.E.R.-M: Electoral Alliance Ruiz-Mateos; PL: Liberal Party; UM: Unió Mallorquina (Mallorca Union); PDP: Democrat Popular Party; UCD: Union of Democratic Centre; BNG: Galician Nationalist Block; CC: Canary Coalition (Canary Islands Regionalists); IC-Els Verds: Iniciativa per Catalunya-Els Verds

Table 3. General dynamics (newcomers and continuity)

			Enters	Continues	Total
PSOE	1986	Count	36	0	36

		Percentage	100,0	0,0	100,0
	1987	Count	2	26	28
		Percentage	7,1	92,9	100,0
	1989	Count	3	24	27
		Percentage	11,1	88,9	100,0
	1994	Count	7	15	22
		Percentage	31,8	68,2	100,0
	1999	Count	11	13	24
		Percentage	45,8	54,2	100,0
	2004	Count	12	12	24
		Percentage	50,0	50,0	100,0
PP/AP	1986	Count	12	0	12
		Percentage	100,0	0,0	100,0
	1987	Count	5	12	17
		Percentage	29,4	70,6	100,0
	1989	Count	5	10	15
		Percentage	33,3	66,7	100,0
	1994	Count	21	7	28
		Percentage	75,0	25,0	100,0
	1999	Count	14	13	27
		Percentage	51,9	48,1	100,0
	2004	Count	11	13	24
		Percentage	45,8	54,2	100,0
Minority parties	1986	Count	12	0	12
		Percentage	100,0	0,0	100,0
	1987	Count	14	1	15
		Percentage	93,3	6,7	100,0
	1989	Count	8	10	18
		Percentage	44,4	55,6	100,0
	1994	Count	10	4	14
		Percentage	71,4	28,6	100,0
	1999	Count	6	7	13
		Percentage	46,2	53,8	100,0
	2004	Count	5	1	6
		Percentage	83,3	16,7	100,0
All	1986	Count	60	0	60
		Percentage	100,0	0,0	100,0
	1987	Count	21	39	60
		Percentage	35,0	65,0	100,0
	1989	Count	16	44	60
		Percentage	26,7	73,3	100,0
	1994	Count	38	26	64
		Percentage	59,4	40,6	100,0
	1999	Count	31	33	64
		Percentage	48,4	51,6	100,0
	2004	Count	28	26	54
		Percentage	51,9	48,1	100,0
	TOTAL	Count	194	168	362
		Percentage	53,6	46,4	100,0

Table 4: Gender distribution: Spanish MEPs vs. Congress MPs (percentages)

	Year of election	Women	Men	N	Year of election	Women	Men	N
PSOE	1986	11,1	88,9	36	1982	7,0	93,0	201
	1987	10,7	89,3	28	1986	7,1	92,9	183
	1989	18,5	81,5	27	1989	17,1	82,9	175

	1994	36,4	63,6	22	1993	17,6	82,4	159
	1999	41,7	58,3	24	1996	27,7	72,3	141
	2004	45,8	54,2	24	2004	46,3	53,7	164
PP/AP	1986	8,3	91,7	12	1982	1,9	98,1	105
	1987	5,9	94,1	17	1986	7,3	92,7	96
	1989	6,7	93,3	15	1989	9,7	90,3	103
	1994	28,6	71,4	28	1993	15,2	84,8	138
	1999	37,0	63,0	27	1996	14,4	85,6	153
	2004	29,2	70,8	24	2004	27,7	72,3	148
Minority parties	1986		100,0	12	1982	2,3	97,7	44
	1987	13,3	86,7	15	1986	4,2	95,8	71
	1989	16,7	83,3	18	1989	6,9	93,1	72
	1994	35,7	64,3	14	1993	11,3	88,7	53
	1999	15,4	84,6	13	1996	25,9	74,1	54
	2004		100,0	6	2004	21,1	78,9	38
All	1986	8,3	91,7	60	1982	4,9	95,1	350
	1987	10,0	90,0	60	1986	6,6	93,4	350
	1989	15,0	85,0	60	1989	12,9	87,1	350
	1994	32,8	67,2	64	1993	15,7	84,3	350
	1999	34,4	65,6	64	1996	21,6	78,4	348
	2004	33,3	66,7	54	2004	35,7	64,3	350
	Total	22,4	77,6	362		16,2	83,8	2098

Note: National Congress composition corresponds to the immediately previous legislature to the EP Election, except 1989, where the EP Election took place a few months before the parliamentary national election. Substitutes are excluded (the same applies for the rest of the tables).

Table 5. Education level: SMEPs vs. national MPs (Congress) (percentages)

	SMEPs								National MPs (Congress)								
	Year	Prim	Sec.	Grad.	Post	PhD	No data	N	Year	Prim	Sec	Grad.*	Postg	PhD	No educ	No data	N
PSOE	1986	2,8	5,6	69,4		16,7	5,6	36	1982	2,5	6,5	64,7	1,0	19,4	0,5	5,5	201
	1987	3,6	7,1	67,9		17,9	3,6	28	1986	1,6	8,7	67,2	1,6	18,6		2,2	183

	1989		7,4	70,4		18,5	3,7	27	1989	2,3	10,3	69,7	2,3	15,4			175
	1994		18,2	50,0		31,8		22	1993	3,1	11,3	67,3	1,9	14,5		1,9	159
	1999		12,5	58,3		29,2		24	1996	0,7	13,5	63,1	1,4	18,4		2,8	141
	2004		12,5	58,3	8,3	20,8		24	2004		9,1	63,4	4,9	19,5		3,0	164
PP/AP	1986			50,0		50,0		12	1982		1,9	68,6	1,0	20,0		8,6	105
	1987			35,3	5,9	58,8		17	1986		4,2	66,7	3,1	19,8		6,3	96
	1989			40,0		60,0		15	1989		6,8	69,9	5,8	15,5		1,9	103
	1994		7,1	53,6	10,7	28,6		28	1993		6,5	70,3	7,2	14,5		1,4	138
	1999			70,4	11,1	18,5		27	1996		8,5	68,0	8,5	13,1		2,0	153
	2004			58,3	12,5	29,2		24	2004		4,1	70,3	14,9	9,5		1,4	148
Minority parties	1986			66,7		33,3		12	1982		2,3	61,4	6,8	25,0		4,5	44
	1987			53,3	6,7	40,0		15	1986		7,0	71,8	4,2	12,7		4,2	71
	1989			61,1	11,1	27,8		18	1989	1,4	8,3	65,3	4,2	15,3		5,6	72
	1994		14,3	57,1		28,6		14	1993	1,9	11,3	56,6	9,4	17,0		3,8	53
	1999		15,4	46,2	15,4	23,1		13	1996	3,7	5,6	70,4	5,6	13,0		1,9	54
	2004			33,3	16,7	50,0		6	2004		10,5	68,4	7,9	10,5		2,6	38
All	1986	1,7	3,3	65,0		26,7	3,3	60	1982	1,4	4,6	65,4	1,7	20,3	0,3	6,3	350
	1987	1,7	3,3	55,0	3,3	35,0	1,7	60	1986	0,9	7,1	68,0	2,6	17,7		3,7	350
	1989		3,3	60,0	3,3	31,7	1,7	60	1989	1,4	8,9	68,9	3,7	15,4		1,7	350
	1994		12,5	53,1	4,7	29,7		64	1993	1,7	9,4	66,9	5,1	14,9		2,0	350
	1999		7,8	60,9	7,8	23,4		64	1996	0,9	10,1	66,4	5,2	15,2		2,3	348
	2004		5,6	55,6	11,1	27,8		54	2004		7,1	66,9	9,4	14,3		2,3	350
	Total	0,6	6,1	58,3	5,0	29,0	1,1	362	Total	1,0	7,9	67,1	4,6	16,3	0,0	3,1	2098

Note: Note: Prim.: Primary; Sec.: Secondary; Grad.: Graduate; Post.: Postgraduate or Masters; PhD: Doctoral degree. * Undergraduates in Congress include those MPs with military education (Military Academy).

Table 6. Professional background: SMEPs vs. National MPs (Congress)

		SMEPs							National MPs (Congress)						
		1986	1987	1989	1994	1999	2004	Total	1982	1986	1989	1993	1996	2004	Total

PSOE	Full time party employee	13,9	10,7	18,5	27,3	33,3	58,3	25,5	24,6	26,2	24,7	30,2	27,3	23,8	26,0
	High level civil servant	8,3	14,3	14,8	9,1	12,5	8,3	11,2	7,5	8,2	6,9	5,0	7,9	5,5	6,9
	Education sector	44,4	50,0	44,4	40,9	33,3	20,8	39,8	34,2	35,0	37,4	32,1	32,4	32,3	34,0
	Lawyers			3,7	4,5	4,2	4,2	2,5	5,0	4,9	5,7	4,4	4,3	7,3	5,3
	Other public sector employees	11,1	10,7	7,4	13,6	16,7	8,3	11,2	5,5	7,1	5,2	8,2	11,5	16,5	8,7
	Engineers and other professionals	13,9	7,1	7,4				5,6	11,6	8,7	10,3	8,2	7,9	9,1	9,4
	Managers and businessmen	5,6	3,6	3,7				2,5	9,5	7,7	6,3	8,2	7,2	4,3	7,3
	Workers and employees	2,8	3,6		4,5			1,9	2,0	2,2	3,4	3,8	1,4	1,2	2,4
	N	36	28	27	22	24	24	161	199	183	174	159	139	164	1018
	PP/AP	Full time party employee		11,8	6,7	25,0	22,2	33,3	19,5	13,3	21,9	25,2	21,0	21,9	31,1
High level civil servant		33,3	23,5	33,3	35,7	29,6	20,8	29,3	14,3	10,4	10,7	9,4	9,9	6,8	9,9
Education sector		33,3	35,3	33,3	17,9	7,4	20,8	22,0	17,3	16,7	16,5	15,9	16,6	14,9	16,2
Lawyers		16,7	5,9	6,7	7,1	18,5	4,2	9,8	10,2	9,4	12,6	15,9	15,2	14,2	13,4
Other public sector employees					3,6	3,7	4,2	2,4	2,0	1,0	2,9	4,3	6,0	6,8	4,2
Engineers and other professionals		8,3	5,9	13,3	7,1	11,1	16,7	10,6	6,1	6,3	8,7	8,7	8,6	11,5	8,6
Managers and businessmen		8,3	17,6	6,7	3,6	7,4		6,5	36,7	33,3	21,4	22,5	20,5	14,9	23,7
Workers and employees										1,0	1,9	2,2	1,3		1,1
N		12	17	15	28	27	24	123	98	96	103	138	151	148	734
Minority parties		Full time party employee	8,3	33,3	33,3	28,6	15,4	16,7	24,4	30,2	25,7	27,1	30,2	29,6	28,9
	High level civil servant	8,3	13,3	5,6	7,1	7,7		7,7	11,6	7,1	2,9	3,8	1,9	5,3	5,2
	Education sector	25,0	26,7	22,2	21,4	23,1	66,7	26,9	16,3	22,9	21,4	22,6	31,5	21,1	22,9
	Lawyers	8,3	6,7	16,7				6,4	7,0	11,4	12,9	11,3	11,1	10,5	11,0
	Other public sector employees	8,3			7,1			2,6		1,4	4,3	3,8	7,4	5,3	3,7
	Engineers and other professionals	25,0	20,0	16,7	14,3	30,8		19,2	7,0	10,0	8,6	9,4	7,4	13,2	9,1
	Managers and businessmen	16,7		5,6	14,3	15,4	16,7	10,3	25,6	21,4	18,6	17,0	5,6	13,2	17,1
	Workers and employees				7,1	7,7		2,6	2,3		4,3	1,9	5,6	2,6	2,7
	N	12	15	18	14	13	6	78	43	70	70	53	54	38	328
	All	Full time party employee	10,0	16,7	20,0	26,6	25,0	42,6	23,2	22,1	24,9	25,4	26,6	25,3	27,4
High level civil servant		13,3	16,7	16,7	20,3	18,8	13,0	16,6	10,0	8,6	7,2	6,6	7,8	6,0	7,7
Education sector		38,3	40,0	35,0	26,6	20,3	25,9	30,9	27,1	27,5	28,0	24,3	25,3	23,7	26,0
Lawyers		5,0	3,3	8,3	4,7	9,4	3,7	5,8	6,8	7,4	9,2	10,0	10,2	10,6	9,0
Other public sector employees		8,3	5,0	3,3	7,8	7,8	5,6	6,4	3,8	4,3	4,3	6,0	8,4	11,1	6,3
Engineers and other professionals		15,0	10,0	11,7	6,3	10,9	7,4	10,2	9,4	8,3	9,5	8,6	8,1	10,6	9,1
Managers and businessmen		8,3	6,7	5,0	4,7	6,3	1,9	5,5	19,4	17,5	13,3	15,1	12,8	9,7	14,6
Workers and employees		1,7	1,7		3,1	1,6		1,4	1,5	1,4	3,2	2,9	2,0	0,9	2,0
Total	N	60	60	60	64	64	54	362	340	349	347	350	344	350	2080

Table 7. Age: Main descriptive statistics.

											Mean National MPs (Congress)
		N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.	Median	Mode			

PSOE	1986	36	34	61	46,2	7,6	45	50	39,1
	1987	28	35	62	47,5	7,7	46	41	42,0
	1989	27	37	63	47,9	7,1	45	43	43,6
	1994	22	32	68	49,1	7,9	48,5	48	46,4
	1999	24	36	64	50,8	7,9	53	54	46,9
	2004	24	30	69	52,6	9,4	54,5	44	46,5
PP/AP	1986	12	36	65	54,9	8,1	53,5	50	48,9
	1987	17	30	66	53,1	11,0	54	37	46,8
	1989	15	39	72	56,3	8,4	54	54	46,3
	1994	28	32	77	49,3	10,5	50	37	46,7
	1999	27	29	64	49,3	8,2	51	51	46,6
	2004	24	34	65	51,6	8,0	52,5	49	49,3
Minority parties	1986	12	34	65	51,2	11,1	54,5	60	46,2
	1987	15	33	58	46,9	6,9	49	49	45,8
	1989	18	35	60	46,9	8,3	45,5	36	46,1
	1994	14	31	65	48,9	8,8	51	49	47,2
	1999	13	40	63	55,3	5,9	57	57	46,1
	2004	6	33	56	45,7	8,4	46,5	33	47,6
All	1986	60	34	65	48,9	9,1	50	50	42,8
	1987	60	30	66	48,9	8,8	48,5	51	44,1
	1989	60	35	72	49,7	8,6	49	43	44,9
	1994	64	31	77	49,2	9,2	49	49	46,6
	1999	64	29	64	51,1	7,9	53	54	46,6
	2004	54	30	69	51,4	8,8	52,5	49	47,8

Note: Age at the beginning of the legislature. In certain cases, there is more than one mode.

Table 8. Age of SMEPs vs Congress MPs by legislature

	SMEPs							National MPs (Congress)						
	Year	Up to 35	36 to 45	46 to 55	56 to 65	More than 65	N	Year	Up to 35	36 to 45	46 to 55	56 to 65	More than 65	N
PSOE	1986	5,6	47,2	30,6	16,7		36	1982	33,5	48,2	14,7	2,5	1,0	201

	1987	3,6	42,9	32,1	21,4		28	1986	14,2	60,1	21,3	3,3	1,1	183
	1989		55,6	29,6	14,8		27	1989	9,7	57,1	28,0	4,0	1,1	175
	1994	4,5	18,2	63,6	4,5	9,1	22	1993	4,4	41,5	44,7	8,8	0,6	159
	1999		20,8	50,0	29,2		24	1996	4,3	32,6	53,9	8,5	0,7	141
	2004	4,2	20,8	33,3	37,5	4,2	24	2004	16,5	22,0	47,0	14,6		164
PP/AP	1986		8,3	50,0	41,7		12	1982	9,7	19,4	47,3	23,7		105
	1987	5,9	11,8	47,1	23,5	11,8	17	1986	10,4	35,4	30,2	22,9	1,0	96
	1989		6,7	46,7	26,7	20,0	15	1989	8,7	40,8	35,0	14,6	1,0	103
	1994	7,1	32,1	35,7	17,9	7,1	28	1993	10,9	34,8	37,0	15,9	1,4	138
	1999	7,4	22,2	51,9	18,5		27	1996	11,8	32,0	40,5	13,7	2,0	153
	2004	8,3	8,3	50,0	33,3		24	2004	4,7	29,1	45,3	17,6	3,4	148
Minorit y parties	1986	16,7	16,7	25,0	41,7		12	1982	16,3	30,2	37,2	9,3	7,0	44
	1987	6,7	40,0	46,7	6,7		15	1986	11,4	37,1	41,4	7,1	2,9	71
	1989	5,6	44,4	27,8	22,2		18	1989	8,3	34,7	43,1	13,9		72
	1994	14,3	14,3	57,1	14,3		14	1993	5,7	34,0	50,9	9,4		53
	1999		7,7	30,8	61,5		13	1996	9,3	44,4	31,5	13,0	1,9	54
	2004	16,7	33,3	33,3	16,7		6	2004	13,2	23,7	50,0	5,3	7,9	38
All	1986	6,7	33,3	33,3	26,7		60	1982	24,6	37,8	26,7	9,3	1,5	350
	1987	5,0	33,3	40,0	18,3	3,3	60	1986	12,6	48,7	27,8	9,5	1,4	350
	1989	1,7	40,0	33,3	20,0	5,0	60	1989	9,1	47,7	33,1	9,1	0,9	350
	1994	7,8	23,4	50,0	12,5	6,3	64	1993	7,1	37,7	42,6	11,7	0,9	350
	1999	3,1	18,8	46,9	31,3		64	1996	8,3	34,2	44,5	11,5	1,4	348
	2004	7,4	16,7	40,7	33,3	1,9	54	2004	11,1	25,1	46,6	14,9	2,3	350
	N	5,2	27,6	40,9	23,5	2,8	362		12,1	38,6	37,0	11,0	1,4	2098

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Table 9. Political experience before (number of government levels where they have occupied, at least, one position): SMEPs vs. national MPs (Congress) (percentages)

	SMEPs							National MPs (Congress)						
	Year	0	1	2	3	> 3	N	Year	0	1	2	3	>3	N
PSOE	1986		63,9	33,3		2,8	36	1982	62,3	31,2	5,5	1,0	0,0	201
	1987	3,6	60,7	28,6		7,1	28	1986	48,1	36,6	12,0	3,3	0,0	183
	1989	7,4	59,3	22,2	3,7	7,4	27	1989	46,9	35,4	13,7	4,0	0,0	175
	1994	18,2	31,8	36,4	4,5	9,1	22	1993	40,9	32,1	16,4	8,8	1,9	159
	1999	29,2	25,0	25,0	20,8	0,0	24	1996	34,0	31,9	21,3	8,5	4,3	141
	2004	29,2	20,8	25,0	20,8	4,2	24	2004	34,1	37,2	18,9	7,3	2,4	164
PP/AP	1986		41,7	33,3	16,7	8,3	12	1982	56,4	23,8	8,9	9,9	1,0	105
	1987	17,6	23,5	29,4	23,5	5,9	17	1986	48,4	24,2	13,7	11,6	2,1	96
	1989	20,0	20,0	33,3	20,0	6,7	15	1989	33,3	24,5	23,5	14,7	3,9	103
	1994	39,3	28,6	25,0		7,1	28	1993	32,8	27,7	25,5	10,9	2,9	138
	1999	29,6	44,4	18,5	3,7	3,7	27	1996	35,9	30,7	24,2	5,9	3,3	153
	2004	29,2	16,7	29,2	20,8	4,2	24	2004	16,9	36,5	28,4	12,2	6,1	148
Minority parties	1986		33,3	33,3	33,3	0,0	12	1982	43,2	22,7	15,9	18,2	0,0	44
	1987	26,7	20,0	33,3	13,3	6,7	15	1986	33,8	42,3	16,9	7,0	0,0	71
	1989	27,8	16,7	44,4	5,6	5,6	18	1989	30,6	52,8	9,7	6,9	0,0	72
	1994	35,7	21,4	21,4	14,3	7,1	14	1993	20,8	49,1	24,5	3,8	1,9	53
	1999	30,8	38,5	15,4	7,7	7,7	13	1996	40,7	37,0	18,5	1,9	1,9	54
	2004	50,0	16,7	33,3		0,0	6	2004	21,1	44,7	26,3	5,3	2,6	38
All	1986		53,3	33,3	10,0	3,3	60	1982	58,1	27,9	7,8	5,8	0,3	350
	1987	13,3	40,0	30,0	10,0	6,7	60	1986	45,3	34,4	13,5	6,3	0,6	350
	1989	16,7	36,7	31,7	8,3	6,7	60	1989	39,5	35,8	15,8	7,7	1,1	350
	1994	31,3	28,1	28,1	4,7	7,8	64	1993	34,7	33,0	21,2	8,9	2,3	350
	1999	29,7	35,9	20,3	10,9	3,1	64	1996	35,9	32,2	22,1	6,3	3,4	348
	2004	31,5	18,5	27,8	18,5	3,7	54	2004	25,4	37,7	23,7	9,1	4,0	350
		20,4	35,6	28,5	10,2	5,2	362		39,8	33,5	17,4	7,4	2,0	2098

Table 10. Type of political position before (SMEPs vs. National MPs)

	Year	Local	RegP	RegG	NatP	NatA	NatG	N	Year	Local	RegP	RegG	NatP	NatA	NatG	N
PSOE	1986	19,4	5,6	13,9	100,0		2,8	36	1982	18,0	7,0	11,9	4,0	3,0	1,0	201
	1987	17,9	3,6	17,9	96,4	3,6	7,1	28	1986	20,8	8,7	13,7	6,0	11,5	9,8	183
	1989	11,1	3,7	25,9	88,9	7,4	7,4	27	1989	25,1	9,7	14,9	7,4	8,0	9,7	175
	1994	22,7	18,2	27,3	68,2	9,1	9,1	22	1993	28,9	18,2	19,5	11,3	8,2	12,6	159
	1999	20,8	25,0	20,8	50,0	12,5	8,3	24	1996	34,0	18,4	22,0	12,8	14,2	16,3	141
	2004	37,5	29,2	25,0	45,8	8,3	8,3	24	2004	42,7	22,6	23,2	9,1	6,7	2,4	164
PP/AP	1986	8,3	25,0		100,0	41,7	16,7	12	1982	21,8	1,0	4,9	18,8	23,3	5,0	105
	1987	5,9	23,5	5,9	76,5	41,2	23,5	17	1986	26,3	13,5	10,4	21,1	17,9	5,3	96
	1989	6,7	20,0	6,7	73,3	40,0	26,7	15	1989	41,2	24,3	16,5	25,2	19,4	3,9	103
	1994	14,3	14,3	14,3	35,7	17,9	7,1	28	1993	40,1	24,6	14,5	26,1	12,3	5,1	138
	1999	14,8	22,2	18,5	25,9	11,1	7,4	27	1996	38,6	22,2	15,0	20,9	9,8	3,3	153
	2004	20,8	37,5	20,8	41,7	29,2	12,5	24	2004	43,2	34,5	19,6	22,3	23,6	12,8	148
Minority parties	1986	8,3	16,7	41,7	100,0	16,7	16,7	12	1982	13,6	11,4	13,6	27,3	22,7	20,5	44
	1987	13,3	26,7	20,0	53,3	20,0	20,0	15	1986	21,1	18,3	15,5	15,5	16,9	9,9	71
	1989	16,7	27,8	22,2	55,6	11,1	11,1	18	1989	37,5	20,8	13,9	9,7	8,3	2,8	72
	1994	42,9	35,7	28,6	28,6			14	1993	52,8	30,2	22,6	9,4	1,9		53
	1999	46,2	38,5	15,4	23,1			13	1996	37,0	25,9	14,8	5,6	1,9	1,9	54
	2004	33,3	16,7		33,3			6	2004	52,6	28,9	23,7	13,2	5,3		38
All	1986	15,0	11,7	16,7	100,0	11,7	8,3	60	1982	18,6	5,7	10,1	11,3	11,5	4,7	350
	1987	13,3	15,0	15,0	80,0	18,3	15,0	60	1986	22,3	12,0	13,1	12,0	14,3	8,6	350
	1989	11,7	15,0	20,0	75,0	16,7	13,3	60	1989	32,4	16,3	15,1	13,1	11,4	6,6	350
	1994	23,4	20,3	21,9	45,3	10,9	6,3	64	1993	37,0	22,6	18,0	16,9	8,9	7,7	350
	1999	23,4	26,6	18,8	34,4	9,4	6,3	64	1996	36,5	21,3	17,8	15,2	10,3	8,3	348
	2004	29,6	31,5	20,4	42,6	16,7	9,3	54	2004	44,0	28,3	21,7	15,1	13,7	6,6	350
Total		19,3	19,9	18,8	62,7	13,8	9,7	362		31,8	17,7	16,0	14,0	11,7	7,1	2098

Note: Local: Local politics; RegP: Regional Parliament; RegG: Regional Government; NatP: National Parliament; NatA: National Administration; NatG: National government (ministers). Percentages add up more than 100 for a same individual may have occupied more than one position.

Table 11. Years of previous political experience by party and legislature
(percentages by party and legislature)

		No previous political experience	1 to 5 years	6 to 10 years	More than 10 years	N
PSOE	1986		45,5	51,5	3,0	33
	1987	3,8	34,6	50,0	11,5	26
	1989	7,7	30,8	46,2	15,4	26
	1994	19,0	19,0	28,6	33,3	21
	1999	29,2	8,3	12,5	50,0	24
	2004	29,2	4,2	8,3	58,3	24
PP/AP	1986		71,4	14,3	14,3	7
	1987	25,0	41,7	8,3	25,0	12
	1989	27,3	27,3	18,2	27,3	11
	1994	44,4	11,1	22,2	22,2	27
	1999	33,3	11,1	22,2	33,3	27
	2004	29,2	4,2	25,0	41,7	24
Minority parties	1986		16,7	66,7	16,7	12
	1987	30,8		61,5	7,7	13
	1989	31,3	6,3	62,5		16
	1994	35,7	7,1	28,6	28,6	14
	1999	33,3		41,7	25,0	12
	2004	50,0		33,3	16,7	6
All	1986		42,3	50,0	7,7	52
	1987	15,7	27,5	43,1	13,7	51
	1989	18,9	22,6	45,3	13,2	53
	1994	33,9	12,9	25,8	27,4	62
	1999	31,7	7,9	22,2	38,1	63
	2004	31,5	3,7	18,5	46,3	54
	Total	22,7	18,8	33,4	25,1	
	N	76	63	112	84	335

Table 12. Previous party leadership (percentages by party and legislature)

		Local or Provincial	Regional	National	No party leadership positions	N
PSOE	1986	19,4	33,3	8,3	38,9	36
	1987	25,0	35,7	3,6	35,7	28
	1989	22,2	29,6	14,8	33,3	27
	1994	18,2	31,8	22,7	27,3	22
	1999	12,5	25,0	33,3	29,2	24
	2004	8,3	41,7	29,2	20,8	24
PP/AP	1986		8,3	41,7	50,0	12
	1987			47,1	52,9	17
	1989	6,7		53,3	40,0	15
	1994	3,6	17,9	28,6	50,0	28
	1999	7,4	29,6	22,2	40,7	27
	2004	4,2	20,8	41,7	33,3	24
Minority parties	1986		8,3	50,0	41,7	12
	1987			60,0	40,0	15
	1989			72,2	27,8	18
	1994	7,1	14,3	50,0	28,6	14
	1999		7,7	76,9	15,4	13
	2004			50,0	50,0	6
All	1986	11,7	23,3	23,3	41,7	60
	1987	11,7	16,7	30,0	41,7	60
	1989	11,7	13,3	41,7	33,3	60
	1994	9,4	21,9	31,3	37,5	64
	1999	7,8	23,4	37,5	31,3	64
	2004	5,6	27,8	37,0	29,6	54
	Total		9,7	21,0	33,4	35,9
N		35	76	121	130	362

Table 13. Previous EU related background (percentages by party and legislature)

		No	Yes	N
PSOE	1986	88,9	11,1	36
	1987	85,7	14,3	28
	1989	81,5	18,5	27
	1994	72,7	27,3	22
	1999	62,5	37,5	24
	2004	62,5	37,5	24
PP/AP	1986	83,3	16,7	12
	1987	88,2	11,8	17
	1989	80,0	20,0	15
	1994	75,0	25,0	28
	1999	70,4	29,6	27
Minority parties	1986	91,7	8,3	12
	1987	73,3	26,7	15
	1989	88,9	11,1	18
	1994	85,7	14,3	14
	1999	100,0		13
All	2004	50,0	50,0	6
	1986	88,3	11,7	60
	1987	83,3	16,7	60
	1989	83,3	16,7	60
	1994	76,6	23,4	64
	1999	73,4	26,6	64
	2004	59,3	40,7	54
	Total	77,6	22,4	
	N	281	81	362

Note: Data refers only to those offices occupied before entering EP.

Table 14. Previous EU related background including former members of International Affairs and EU Affairs parliamentary committees (percentages by party and legislature)

		No	Yes	N
PSOE	1986	61,1	38,9	36
	1987	60,7	39,3	28
	1989	55,6	44,4	27
	1994	54,5	45,5	22
	1999	50,0	50,0	24
	2004	45,8	54,2	24
PP/AP	1986	75,0	25,0	12
	1987	82,4	17,6	17
	1989	73,3	26,7	15
	1994	71,4	28,6	28
	1999	66,7	33,3	27
	2004	58,3	41,7	24
Minority parties	1986	58,3	41,7	12
	1987	60,0	40,0	15
	1989	72,2	27,8	18
	1994	71,4	28,6	14
	1999	84,6	15,4	13
	2004	33,3	66,7	6
All	1986	63,3	36,7	60
	1987	66,7	33,3	60
	1989	65,0	35,0	60
	1994	65,6	34,4	64
	1999	64,1	35,9	64
	2004	50,0	50,0	54
	Total	62,7	37,3	
	N	227	135	362

Note: Data refers only to those offices occupied before entering EP.

Table 15. Prior political trajectory

		No previous political experience	Stable political career	Rising political career	Declining political career	Government descending (regional or national)	N
PSOE	1986		67,6	20,6	8,8	2,9	34
	1987	3,7	59,3	25,9	7,4	3,7	27
	1989	7,7	57,7	23,1	7,7	3,8	26
	1994	19,0	47,6	28,6		4,8	21
	1999	30,4	39,1	8,7	8,7	13,0	23
	2004	30,4	30,4	17,4	8,7	13,0	23
	Total	13,6	51,9	20,8	7,1	6,5	154
PP/AP	1986		62,5	12,5	12,5	12,5	8
	1987	23,1	30,8	15,4	7,7	23,1	13
	1989	25,0	25,0	8,3	8,3	33,3	12
	1994	48,1	29,6	3,7	3,7	14,8	27
	1999	33,3	37,0	18,5	3,7	7,4	27
	2004	29,2	20,8	20,8	8,3	20,8	24
	Total	31,5	31,5	13,5	6,3	17,1	111
Minority parties	1986		58,3	8,3	8,3	25,0	12
	1987	30,8	23,1	15,4	7,7	23,1	13
	1989	29,4	29,4	17,6	5,9	17,6	17
	1994	38,5	23,1	23,1	7,7	7,7	13
	1999	30,8	38,5	23,1	7,7		13
	2004	50,0	16,7	16,7	16,7		6
	Total	28,4	32,4	17,6	8,1	13,5	74
N	1986	0,0	64,8	16,7	9,3	9,3	54
	1987	15,1	43,4	20,8	7,5	13,2	53
	1989	18,2	41,8	18,2	7,3	14,5	55
	1994	36,1	34,4	16,4	3,3	9,8	61
	1999	31,7	38,1	15,9	6,3	7,9	63
	2004	32,1	24,5	18,9	9,4	15,1	53
	Total	22,7	41,0	17,7	7,1	11,5	
N		77	139	60	24	39	339

Table 16. Within EP duration (years)

	PSOE	PP/AP	Minority parties	All
N	63	64	47	174
Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean	8,1	7,2	5,9	7,1
Median	8	5	5	5
Mode	8	5	5	5
Std. Dev.	5,3	4,0	4,1	4,6
Minimum	1	1	1	1
Maximum	21	20	18	21
Percentile (25)	4	5	2	5
Percentile (50)	8	5	5	6
Percentile (75)	12	10	8	10

Note: Data refer individual SMEPs who entered before 2004.

Table 17. Within EP duration (terms)

	PSOE	PP	Minority parties	All
N	63	64	47	174
Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean	2,5	1,9	1,5	2,0
Median	2	2	1	2
Mode	1	1	1	1
Std. Dev.	1,3	1,0	0,9	1,1
Minimum	1	1	1	1
Maximum	6	4	5	6
Percentile (25)	1	1	1	1
Percentile (50)	2	2	1	2
Percentile (75)	3	3	2	3

Note: Data refer individual SMEPs who exited before 2004.

Table 18. Distribution of durations by terms (percentages)

		Up to 5 years	6 to 7 years	8 to 10 years	More than 10 years	N
PSOE	1986	100,0				36
	1987	100,0				28
	1989	100,0				27
	1994	36,4	18,2	45,5		22
	1999	75,0		4,2	20,8	24
	2004	79,2		8,3	12,5	24
	Total	84,5	2,5	8,1	5,0	161
PP/AP	1986	100,0				12
	1987	100,0				17
	1989	100,0				15
	1994	85,7	7,1	7,1		28
	1999	92,6		3,7	3,7	27
	2004	66,7		29,2	4,2	24
	Total	88,6	1,6	8,1	1,6	123
Minority parties	1986	100,0				12
	1987	100,0				15
	1989	100,0				18
	1994	71,4	21,4	7,1		14
	1999	76,9			23,1	13
	2004	100,0				6
	Total	91,0	3,8	1,3	3,8	78
All	1986	100,0				60
	1987	100,0				60
	1989	100,0				60
	1994	65,6	14,1	20,3		64
	1999	82,8		3,1	14,1	64
	2004	75,9		16,7	7,4	54
	Total	87,3	2,5	6,6	3,6	
N	316	9	24	13	362	

Table 19. Individual SMEPs survival by term of entry

	Term of entry	1986	1987	1989	1994	1999	2004	N
PSOE	1986	100,0	72,2	58,3	27,8	11,1	5,6	36
	1987		100,0	100,0	100,0	50,0	25,0	4
	1989			100,0	33,3	33,3	0,0	3
	1994				100,0	77,8	22,2	9
	1999					100,0	63,6	11
PP/AP	1986	100,0	85,7	64,3	14,3	0,0	0,0	14
	1987		100,0	40,0	40,0	20,0	20,0	5
	1989			100,0	66,7	16,7	0,0	6
	1994				100,0	55,0	35,0	20
	1999					100,0	26,3	19
Minority parties	1986	100,0	30,0	30,0	10,0	10,0	0,0	10
	1987		100,0	66,7	25,0	16,7	0,0	12
	1989			100,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	7
	1994				100,0	62,5	0,0	8
	1999					100,0	10,0	10
All	1986	100,0	68,3	55,0	21,7	8,3	3,3	60
	1987		100,0	66,7	42,9	23,8	9,5	21
	1989			100,0	31,3	12,5	0,0	16
	1994				100,0	62,2	24,3	37
	1999					100,0	32,5	40
	N	19	15	36	29	49	26	174

Note: The data refer to individuals who exited definitively or those who remained in office in 2004 but had entered before.

Table 20. Duration in EP (binary logistic regression)

	B	Std. Error
Year of entry in EP		
1986	19,847	5577,492
1987	22,355	5577,492
1989	19,665	5577,492
1994	20,356	5577,492
Offices within EP	2,502***	0,583
Age at the time of entry in EP		
Up to 35	0,076	1,243
36 to 45	1,634*	0,785
46 to 55	0,183	0,776
Party		
PSOE	2,442**	0,934
PP	1,784*	0,885
Constant	-24,814	5577,492

Chi-square	67,944***	df=10
Nagelkerke's R Square	0,520	
Hosmer and Lemeshow's test	3,586	p=0,892 df=8

* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001

Note: Dependent variable: Duration within EP (< 10 years; > 10 years);
Categories of comparison: Year of entry in EP = 1999; Age at the time of entry
in EP = More than 55; Offices within EP = no offices; Party = Minority parties.

Table 21. Political destination immediately after exiting EP (percentages)

	Term of exit	Deputy	Senator	Local	Reg	State Adm.	Interrup	Party	Minister	EU Position	No later experience	N
PSOE	1986		40,0			10,0					50,0	10
	1987		20,0								80,0	5
	1989				15,4	7,7		15,4			61,5	13
	1994	10,0		10,0	10,0						70,0	10
	1999	14,3									85,7	14
	Total	5,8	9,6	1,9	5,8	3,8		3,8			69,2	52
PP/AP	1986										100,0	2
	1987	16,7			16,7	16,7					50,0	6
	1989	11,1								11,1	77,8	9
	1994		13,3	6,7	6,7		6,7				66,7	15
	1999		5,3	5,3					5,3	10,5	73,7	19
	Total	3,9	5,9	3,9	3,9	2,0	2,0		2,0	5,9	70,6	51
Minority parties	1986	14,3			14,3						71,4	7
	1987						25,0				75,0	4
	1989		7,1	7,1	7,1						78,6	14
	1994	25,0			25,0						50,0	4
	1999		5,9		5,9		5,9	17,6			64,7	17
	Total	4,3	4,3	2,2	8,7		4,3	6,5			69,6	46
All	1986	5,3	21,1		5,3	5,3					63,2	19
	1987	6,7	6,7		6,7	6,7	6,7				66,7	15
	1989	2,8	2,8	2,8	8,3	2,8		5,6		2,8	72,2	36
	1994	6,9	6,9	6,9	10,3		3,4				65,5	29
	1999	4,0	4,0	2,0	2,0		2,0	6,0	2,0	4,0	74,0	50
	Total	4,7	6,7	2,7	6,0	2,0	2,0	3,4	0,7	2,0	69,8	
	N	7	10	4	9	3	3	5	1	3	104	149

Note: Data refer to those SMEPs who have definitely exited. Key: Reg: Regional politics; Nat. Adm: National Administration (political offices); Interrup: Momentary interruption of political career.

Table 22. Duration in politics of former SMEPs (percentages)

		Up to 3 years	4 to 6 years	7 to 10 years	More than 10 years	N
PSOE	1986		20,0	40,0	40,0	5
	1987				100,0	1
	1989	80,0			20,0	5
	1994		66,7	33,3		3
	1999	100,0				2
	Total		37,5	18,8	18,8	25,0
PP/AP	1987		33,3		66,7	3
	1989		50,0	50,0		2
	1994			80,0	20,0 (*)	5
	1999	40,0	60,0			5
	Total		13,3	33,3	33,3	20,0
Minority parties	1986	50,0			50,0	2
	1987				100,0	1
	1989		66,7		33,3	3
	1994	50,0		50,0		2
	1999	66,7	33,3			6
	Total		42,9	28,6	7,1	21,4
All	1986	14,3	14,3	28,6	42,9	7
	1987		20,0		80,0	5
	1989	40,0	30,0	10,0	20,0	10
	1994	10,0	20,0	60,0	10,0	10
	1999	61,5	38,5			13
	Total		31,1	26,7	20,0	22,2
	N	14	12	9	10	45

Note: * There is only a case (Celia Villalobos). She exited in 1995.

Table 23. Number of administrative levels after exiting EP (percentages)

		Party offices	1	2	3	N
PSOE	1986		60,0	40,0		5
	1987				100,0	1
	1989	20,0	40,0		40,0	5
	1994		100,0			3
	1999		100,0			2
	Total	6,3	62,5	12,5	18,8	16
PP/AP	1987		66,7		33,3	3
	1989		50,0	50,0		2
	1994		20,0	40,0	40,0	5
	1999		100,0			5
		Total		60,0	20,0	20,0
Minority parties	1986		50,0		50,0	2
	1987		100,0			1
	1989		66,7	33,3		3
	1994		50,0	50,0		2
	1999	50,0	50,0			6
		Total	21,4	57,1	14,3	7,1
All	1986		57,1	28,6	14,3	7
	1987		60,0		40,0	5
	1989	10,0	50,0	20,0	20,0	10
	1994		50,0	30,0	20,0	10
	1999	23,1	76,9			13
		Total	8,9	60,0	15,6	15,6
	N	4	27	7	7	45

Table 24. Political trajectories after exiting

	Frequency	Percentage
NatP>End	7	15,6
NatP	4	8,9
Party office	3	6,7
RegP>End	2	4,4
NatA>End	2	4,4
NatP>Party>End	2	4,4
Other	25	55,6

Note: Data refer only to those who continue in politics.

RegP: Regional Parliament; NatP: National Parliament; Party: Party offices; End: Exit from politics.

Table 25. Career patterns typology

Before	Within EP	After	Career patter
S	S	S	Ephimeral
S	S	L	Training
L	S	S	Retirement
L	S	L	Bridge
S	L	S	Specialisation

S	L	L	Specialisation and rentabilization
L	L	S	Recycling
L	L	L	Super-career

Note: S = Short; L = Long

Table 26. Career patterns

	Year of entry	Ephemeral (SSS)	Train (SSL)	Retirement (LSS)	Bridge (LSL)	Specialist (SLS)	Special & succesf (SLL)	Recycling (LLS)	N
PSOE	1986	9,7 [6.5]	19,4	16,1 [16.1]	3,2	16,1 [12.9]		35,5 [25.8]	31
	1987					33,3 (33.3) [33.3]		66,7 [33.3]	3
	1989			66,7 [66.7]				33,3 [33.3]	3
	1994		14,3	14,3 [14.3]		28,6 (28.6) [28.6]		42,9 [42.9]	7
	1999	25,0 (25.0)		75,0 [75.0]					4
	Total	8,3 (2.1) [4.2]	14,6	22,9 [22.9]	2,1	16,7 (6.3) [14.6]		35,4 [27.1]	48
PP/AP	1986	33,3 [33.3]		11,1 [11.1]		22,2 [22.2]	11,1	22,2 [22.2]	9
	1987	25,0 [25.0]	25,0 (25.0)		25,0	25,0 (25.0) [25.0]			4
	1989		16,7 (16.7)		16,7	33,3 (33.3) [33.3]		33,3 [33.3]	6
	1994	16,7 (8.3) [16.7]	25,0 (16.7)	16,7 [16.7]	8,3	16,7 (16.7) [8.3]		16,7	12
	1999	50,0 (28.6) [50.0]		42,9 [35.7]	7,1				14
	Total	28,9 (11.1) [28.9]	11,1 (8.9)	20,0 [17.8]	8,9	15,6 (11.1) [13.3]	2,2	13,3 [8.9]	45
Minority parties	1986			60,0 [50.0]	10,0		10,0	20,0 [10.0]	10
	1987	20,0 (20.0) [20.0]	10,0 (10.0)	40,0 [30.0]				30,0 [30.0]	10
	1989	80,0 (80.0) [80.0]			20,0				5
	1994	25,0 (25.0) [12.5]	12,5			25,0 (25.0) [12.5]		37,5 [25.0]	8
	1999	62,5 (62.5) [37.5]		37,5 [25.0]					8
	Total	31,7 (31.7) [24.4]	4,9 (4.9)	31,7 [24.4]	4,9	4,9 (4.9) [2.4]	2,4	19,5 [14.6]	41
All	1986	12,0 [10.0]	12,0	24,0 [22.0]	4,0	14,0 [12.0]	4,0	30,0 [22.0]	50
	1987	17,6 (11.8) [17.6]	11,8 (11.8)	23,5 [17.6]	5,9	11,8 (11.8) [11.8]		29,4 [23.5]	17
	1989	28,6 (28.6) [28.6]	7,1 (7.1)	14,3 [14.3]	14,3	14,3 (14.3) [14.3]		21,4 [21.4]	14
	1994	14,8 (11.1) [11.1]	18,5 (7.4)	11,1 [11.1]	3,7	22,2 (22.2) [14.8]		29,6 [18.5]	27
	1999	50,0 (38.5) [38.5]		46,2 [38.5]	3,8				26
	Total	22,4 (14.2) [18.7]	10,4 (3.7)	24,6 [21.6]	5,2	12,7 (7.5) [10.4]	1,5	23,1 [17.2]	
	N	30	14	33	7	17	2	31	134

Note: Missing cases = 15. Data refer to those SMEPs who have left the EP. Percentages between parenthesis () refer to those SMEPs without previous political experience. Percentages between brackets [] refer to those SMEPs with no later political experience.