Eadem sed Aliter: Religious Voting in Portugal and Spain

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Paper presented at the VII Congress,
Spanish Association of Political Science,
Madrid, 21-23 September, 2005

This paper discusses religiosity and voting in Portugal and Spain. It aims at disentangling some puzzles regarding party competition in two Catholic countries *par excellence*. Does a common Catholic culture lead to commonalities in the ways religiosity links up with political behaviour? From the perspective of the relationship between religiosity and party choice, in what ways are Spain and Portugal different? More generally, in observing the interweaving of religiosity and political behaviour in two Catholic countries, what are the lessons to be drown for the understanding of religious voting in European democracies? The cases of Portugal and Spain are particularly illuminating. Both countries share a long and turbulent past of political upheavals associated with religion; the somewhat parallel history of religion in Portugal and Spain is certainly full of dramatic events (Linz 1993: 1). In both countries, the outburst of authoritarian ruling in the 1930s was grounded – among other things – in a deeply entrenched conflict around clericalism. And, in both, the architects of the new democratic regimes in the 1970s faced a long list of unresolved religious issues with the potential of shattering the new democratic order into pieces. After the longest period of democratic stability in the Iberian Peninsula, and in a context of a seemingly unstoppable process of secularisation, is still religiosity a factor that shapes the electoral fortunes of major political parties?

We organise the paper as follows. In the first place, some paradoxes coming from the theoretical treatment assigned to religion in most standard accounts of voting are considered. If religiosity is on the verge of disappearing due to the secularisation process, how the persistence of the religious factor in many western European countries can be explained? Secondly, the religious maps of Spain and Portugal are sketched. Thirdly, the specification of the model is briefly discussed. Fourthly, the results of the "full" model composed for the four surveys are examined. This is meant to discuss the magnitude of the *direct* effects of religiosity on the vote. Fifthly, we move to the discussion of the *indirect* effects, considering in this section the bearing of religious value orientations on ideological identities. Sixthly, an explanation for the differences between the two cases is presented. Lastly, we conclude.

Religious *cleavage* versus religious *voting*

The attention paid to the religious cleavage has been uneven, to say the least. Of course, the "State-Church cleavage" was among the few Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 50 ff.) privileged as the ones becoming frozen after the crystallisation of mass politics in the inter-war years. But after their seminal work, the religious cleavage has merited only sporadic interest, and even then, it has largely been the object of sweeping generalisations that have done little to clarify issues of causality (Knutsen 1995: 463). To begin with, it has received far less attention than the class cleavage. In

contrast to the alleged ubiquity of class conflicts, the religious cleavage has often wrongly been assumed to be limited to the few cases in which confessional parties occasionally compete with class-based parties, and/or in which serious conflicts have sometimes broken out for religious reasons lato sensu. But this obviously is far from true: in many countries, religious conflicts exist in the absence of confessional parties. Moreover, the scarce attention addressed to the religious cleavage contradicted its apparent relevance in many comparative analyses undertaken in the 1970s (Converse 1974: 733-734; Lijphart 1971: 7-8; 1980: 287; Rose and Urwin 1969: 12).

The standard accounts of the religious cleavage in the New Politics of the 1980s and afterwards revolved around the framework of "decay": if for some the religious cleavage has, as a minimum, been dramatically reduced, for others the presence of religious factors in the voting choice has vaporised. As stated for instance by Franklin, Mackie, et al. (1992: 40), "the decline in the political saliency of religion should certainly have hurt the electoral prospect of religious parties, and may also have hurt right wing parties in general". This decline reaches the apex in many empirical analyses of voting behaviour, where religious variables are simply not taken into consideration and thus not included in any of their otherwise extremely sophisticated statistical models aiming at explaining voters' choices.

Thanks to the rise of theories pointing to the weakening of social cleavages in Western Europe, the intensifying processes of partisan dealignments, and their combined effects on electoral change (Dalton, Flanagan, and Beck 1984), the analysis of religiosity gained again new momentum in the mid-1990s (Dalton 1996: 331). Paradoxically, the new interest in religious voting emerged from the confirmation of the limits of the secularization argument. For one, secularization seems to adopt context-specific meanings, implying distinctive social and political processes in different countries. Likewise, the rise of new form of religious fundamentalism, and the resurgence of political conflicts around a number of "religious-issues" compose a scenario where religious divisions retain a potential for divisions at the level of politics.

We claim in this paper that, in spite of the alleged decline of the religious cleavage, in many Western European countries there is a *religious voting*. Religiosity is surely lessening its political significance and has consequently much lower impact on voting. Party leaders, building strategically on the outcomes of secularisation and social change processes, as well as on increasing levels of education and information, have decided to maximise their electoral appeals by downplaying the conflictive ladders of religious divisions. In most countries dominated by only one denomination, leaders of both confessional and secular parties have come to accept neither to incorporate religious conflicts back into the political agenda, nor to mobilise voters with religious or anti-religious flags in electoral contests. Yet, religiosity appears as a relevant variable for explaining voting in a number of

countries (Calvo and Montero 2002; Kotler-Berkowitz 2002). This variable has different doses of explanatory power and shows also distinctive relationships with other independent variables, depending upon the contingent combination of the social, cultural, and political features of a given country. But it does matter. In other words, despite the fact that society might be less religious as a whole, those that remain religious are growing politically committed, developing intense preferences in a broad spectrum of issue connected with social and political life. Moreover, in some other countries a growing number of indicators point at a renewed radicalisation of those segments of society that resist secularization. To the extent that these two different religious situations can impinge on voting choices, the case for further attention to religious voting is clearly a pressing one.

Religious voting implies some type of systematic association between religiosity and vote in a number of citizens. In this sense, it is roughly equivalent to class voting, or ethnic voting, or race voting. Take, for instance, the first. If we substitute *class* by the pertinent indicator of religiosity, the concept of religious voting is immediately apparent in the definition of class voting provided by Evans (2000: 401). In his terms, "at first glance, the idea of class [religious] voting appears straightforward. It refers to the tendency for voters in a particular class [denomination, or level of *religiosity*] to vote for a specific party, political candidate (or groupings of these), rather than an alternative option, compared with voters of another class or classes [denominations, or levels of religiosity]. In other words, class [religious] voting describes a pattern of association between class [religiosity] and vote". In this sense, religious voting seems intuitively to be less strong than the religious cleavage. But the repeated existence of a clear connection between some relevant empirical indicators of religiosity, on the one hand, and voting for a given party, on the other, needs to be explained by a research strategy other than the non-inclusion of religious variables in models of electoral behaviour.

Religious maps compared

Very broadly, the Portuguese are more religious than their Spanish counterparts. According with recent data from the European Social Survey (ESS), if in Spain the percentage of those belonging to a religion has descended to 75 per cent of the population, in Portugal the figure remains at an overwhelming 86 percent, the third highest in Europe.[1] This suggests that the secularization process has been met differently in the two Iberian countries, an impression that is confirmed by the

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[1] European Social Survey (2002-2003) [ESS]; Questions C9 and C10. Of course, Catholicism is by far the religion that the majority declares to belong to in both countries: 97 percent of those belonging to a religious defined themselves as Roman Catholics in Spain and Portugal alike. Only in Italy and Poland (99 percent) we find a higher proportion of Catholics. See Calvo and Montero (2005).

examination of further indicators of religiosity.[2] For instance, Table 1 reports a classification of European countries according to their average level of subjective religiosity. The contrasts are apparent: whereas Portugal belongs to the group of highly religious societies (formed by Greece, Poland, Italy, and Ireland), Spain displays levels along the lines of the more secularized societies. The indicators assembled in Table 2 further confirm that Portugal is more religious a country than Spain. Just to mention a few, note that while in 1999 82 percent of Portuguese respondents considered themselves religious, only 56 percent affirmed so in Spain. The importance of religion seems to be much more important for the lives of the Portuguese: the gap between the two countries as far as the capacity of religion to bring comfort and strength is an astonishing 27 percentage points. Lastly, remarkable differences can be found in relation to the public role attributed to the church. If on the whole Spaniards seem reluctant to define the Church as a trustworthy institution, the Portuguese trust their Church firmly, capable of satisfying the people's spiritual needs.

Tables 1 and 2

Contrasting the levels of religious practice will also contribute to set out the differences in the religious map in the two countries compared. Not only is Portugal more devout a country than Spain: it also exhibits rates of religious practice that outmarch virtually any other in Europe. Among the Catholic countries, only the Polish, Irish, and Italians go to church more frequently (Table 3). Spain, in contrast, appears at the bottom of the list of Catholic countries. It is noteworthy that, with the new picture, important dissimilarities emerge among European confessions. While a sizeable segment of the population in Catholic countries is still willing to comply with the mandates of their religion, the rates of religious practice have dramatically dropped in countries with Protestant or Lutheran majorities.

Table 3

In short, Portugal is more religious a country than Spain. The data presented in this section define Portuguese citizens as clearly more faithful and more eager to participate in religious services than their Spanish peers. To what extent does this distinctiveness lead to differences in the relationship between religiosity and electoral behaviour? In the following section we will present the results of a multivariate analysis with party choice as the dependent variable, and religiosity,

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[2] Religiosity is a multi-faceted phenomenon that consists of three easily identifiable dimensions: namely, *belonging* (also called "denomination"), *beliefs,* and *behaviour*, or, religious practice (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995). Focusing on each of the different dimensions largely depends on the particular object of research, as well as on the available data.   Note, however, that we do not agree with Knutsen (2004), who uses religious denomination to asses the impact of religiosity on party choice in eight western European countries. Denomination has been proved to be only a cultural element, incapable of stirring differences among voters that could end up with discernible voting patterns.

measured as church attendance, as the main independent factor. Whether or not this relationship adopts a similar outlook in both countries will be the prime aim of this effort.

Model specification

We have considered two general elections for each country: on the one hand, the most recent general elections in Spain (2004), and the last Portuguese legislative election with a post electoral study available (Portugal-2002) and, on the other hand, the first elections organized after the successful completion of the transition period (Spain-1982; Portugal-1983).[3] We seek to find out now whether the strength of religious voting has changed across time, and, if so, whether it has changed differently in Portugal and Spain. A logistic regression model has been assembled for the four surveys. Because small sample sizes badly affect the efficacy of these models for the smaller parties, we have opted for concentrating on the two large parties in each country. These are the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE, Socialdemocrat) and *Alianza Popular* and later *Partido Popular* (AP-PP, conservative) in Spain, and the *Partido Socialista* (PS, Socialdemocrat) and *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD, conservative). Considering this, the dependent variable takes value 1 when the respondents have voted for any of the two large parties, and value 0 when they have voted for any other party in the opposed *ideological direction*. Accordingly, in explaining the vote for, say, the PSOE, *Izquierda Unida* (IU) voters – generally located further at the left - are not included in value 0 of the variable; likewise, nationalist voters –often situated further to the right of the PP - are not included in value 0 in the models for AP-PP. Of course, this applies as well to the Portuguese case: when discussing the vote for the PS, Bloco and Communist voters will not be included in value 0, while CDS voters are excluded in the models for the PSD.

Religiosity is our key *independent variable*. Following the standard indicator in the literature (see Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere 1995), we use church attendance – i.e., religious *practice* – to measure individual religiosity. This is possible for Spain-2004 and for the two Portuguese studies.[4]

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[3] For Portugal-1983, we have used the data from the Four Nation Study ("The Political Culture of Southern Europe: A Four Nation Study"), hold in the data bank of the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS). The Portuguese survey (CIS study # 1.459) has a sample of N= 2,000. For Spain-1982 we have used the post-electoral survey run by DATA (N=5,463). As for Portugal-2002, data come from the "Post-electoral Survey", undertaken by the Portuguese Instituto de Ciencias Sociais (ICS), Universidade de Lisboa (N=1,303). Lastly, for Spain-2004, the Demoscopia-Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) post-electoral survey has been employed (N=2,929). The limitations of this study should not be concealed. First and foremost, PP vote is clearly underrepresented. For reasons that are still unclear, a large part of PP voters do not manifest this option before the pollster.

[4] Note that religious practice correlates very highly with the more direct measures of the religious phenomenon, such as religious beliefs as well as subjective evaluations of religious commitment.

As for Spain-1982, the model includes a mixed indicator of practice and *identity,* where the respondent is asked to locate herself in a 6-points scale where feeling "very good catholic" ranks in one extreme, and feeling "an atheist" dwells at the other; the intermediate values use religious practice to define different intensities of religious commitment. In order to enhance the efficiency of the models, we have ungrouped the variable, introducing it in dummy format. Also following the standard recommendations, we have selected as the reference category (RC) a group that is large in size and meaningful in relation to the dependent variable (Hardy 1993: 10). Thus, the category of "never attending to religious services" is taken as the RC in the cases of Spain-2004 and Portugal-2003. For Spain-1982, however, the comparison group – thus omitted from the model – is being "a not very practising catholic". Lastly, the category attending to church "two times per month" is the RC in the case of Portugal-1983. In interpreting the results, we must think about the significance of the *transit* from the reference category to any other religious category, thus having to focus the attention both to the direction of the coefficients as well as the level of significance.

We also seek to asses the bearing of morality on voting choices. While moral views have been traditionally associated with religiosity, the transformations in the religious phenomenon brought about by the secularization process are casting new doubts as to whether or not moral divisions still reflect religious ones. But it is striking the scarce attention paid to the electoral consequences of societal moral divides, as well as to the voting preferences of moral conservatives and moral liberals. For these reasons, a variable measuring attitudes towards abortion has been included in the models for Spain-1982 and 2004, and Portugal-2003. To the best of our knowledge, no such variable can be found in electoral studies in Portugal during the 1980s. It is important to note that the construction of this indicator varies. For Spain-1982 we have employed a variable measuring the attitudes towards abortion, but in a very specific situation: namely, when pregnancy could cause fatal damage either to the mother or to the baby herself. However, for Spain-2004 and Portugal-2003 the indicator reports attitudes towards "abortion on demand" (in both cases a scale ranging from value 1 to value 10). Moral evaluations are space and time-bounded. What appears perfectly acceptable now was the subject of much moral hazard in the past. At the beginning of the 1980s, abortion on demand was simply *not* a possibility either in Spain or in Portugal. Even more, women taking clandestine abortion and physicians helping them could be by law criminally prosecuted, and many of them were indeed prosecuted and sentenced to jail. As a maximum, the debate revolved then around the justification of some scenarios where the general ban on abortion could be specifically lifted. At present time, however, the discussion is on whether or not women should have the right to abort freely, regardless the concurrence of extenuating circumstances (rape, risk of malformations, or physical and mental illnesses).

As for the list of political and social controls, two important political variables as ideology and leadership evaluation escort religious practice in the models. Whether or not candidates count on voters' support has proved to be a decisive explanation for party choice. Particularly in the case of catch-all parties, previous work shows that a positive evaluation of candidates increases the odds of supporting the party he or she represents (Gunther and Montero 2001: 129-131; Costa Lobo 2002). As for ideology, a wealth of previous work has identified the self-positioning in the ideological scale as the best predictor of the vote in Spain and Portugal alike (Torcal and Medina 2002; Gunther and Montero 2001; Sánchez-Cuenca 2003). Although the role of ideology in predicting party choice is not as stronger in Portugal, it still appears as a formidable variable with ample capacity to explain electoral preferences (Freire 2001).

Ideology is a particularly sensitive topic in any discussion of religiosity and electoral behaviour. Because it occurs causally later than most of the independent variables included in conventional regression models, it very often *robes* much of the effect of some independent variables on the vote. This has been documented to take place, for instance, in the case of class voting; in that case, ideology assumes a great deal of the *direct* effect of social class on party choice (Bartle 1998). Class, however, exerts an *indirect*, yet powerful still, effect on voting (Evans 1999; García de Polavieja 2001). Of course failing to acknowledge the distinction between direct and indirect effects can give way to misleading interpretations of the results. Particularly in those cases where religious identities are strongly correlated with ideological positions, the effect of ideology can lead us to believe that religiosity is *not* influential when, in reality, it is so (Calvo and Montero 2002). Precisely as a way to highlight the disruptive effect of ideology, we will show the models in a twofold format: firstly with ideology included ("full model" henceforth), then without.[5] Also, ideology, this time as a dependent variable, will be regressed on a number of variables, including religiosity. With that we hope to demonstrate that the individual location in the left-right scale has much to do with his or her religiosity.

The following equations summarize our models:

SPAIN

Equation (1) Y(Voto PSOE1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 Ideology, Gonzalez'sTher, control variables, ε).

Equation (2) Y(Voto AP1982) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 Ideology, Fraga'sTher, control variables, ε).

Equation (3) Y(Voto PSOE2004) = Y(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Attendance6, Abortion1, Ideology, Zapatero'sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).

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[5] The models also include a number of control variables. These are evaluation of economic performance (for Spain-1982 and 2004 and for Portugal-2002), occupational status, family income, education, age, gender, and community size.

Equation (4) Y(Voto PP2004) = Y(Attendance2, Attendance 3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Abortion1 Attendance6, Attendance7, Ideology, Rajoy'sTher, EconomicPerform, control variables, ε).

PORTUGAL

Equation (5) Y(Voto PS1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology, Soares'Ther, control variables, ε).

Equation (6) Y(Voto PSD1983) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Ideology, Machete'sTher, control variables, ε).

Equation (7) Y(Voto PS2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5, Attendance6, Abortion1 deology, Rodrigues'Ther, control variables, ε).

Equation (8) Y(Voto PSD2002) = f(Attendace2, Attendance3, Attendance4, Attendance5 Attendance6, Abortion1 Ideology, Barroso'sTher, GovernmentPerform, control variables, ε).

Religiosity and party support: observing direct effects

As we introduced before, not every explanatory variable occurs at the same causal moment (Bartle 1998: 501-502). Some of them, notably political variables such as ideology or party attachment, take shape "later" than the so-called structural variables (class, religiosity) or the socio-demographic ones (age, gender, etc). This can create a great deal of problems. In many occasions, intermediate political variables "suck" the explanatory power of a number of variables that occur causally at an earlier stage, making the observer believe that there are not causal effects when, perhaps, they actually exist. According to this basic argument, a distinction must be operated between the direct, and the indirect effects of any given factor on the chosen dependent variable(s). A variable's total effect is thus composed of the sum of direct and indirect effects. "Full" models, including ideology as a control variable, are discussed in this section. Thus, the discussion will revolve around the magnitude of the direct effects of religiosity on party choice. Clearly, the expectation is that religiosity performs worse in the full models than in scenarios where the disruptive effect of ideology is eliminated; these indirect effects will be addressed later.

We begin with the models for Spain-1982 (Table 4; Model A columns). In line with previous findings (Montero and Calvo 2000: 125), we find a religious voting of moderate strength for the PSOE in the context of the 1982 general elections. The observation of the second column of Table 4 shows that the transit from being a "not a very practising Catholic", the reference category, to the two categories of highest religiosity was statistically significant, and in the correct direction. According to the expectations, stepping up in the religious scale jeopardized the odds of PSOE voting in 1982. But the same cannot be said as to the transits towards categories of lower religiosity. Particularly notorious is the transit towards atheism, which does not take the expected direction (and

is only mildly statistically significant).[6] So, at the beginning of the 1980s, and in the context of a particularly distinctive electoral race (Linz and Montero, 1986), what Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere (1995) termed "church integration" operated as a deterrent of socialist support. What about the bearing of moral views on voting? In the case of PSOE voting in 1982, whether or not the respondent justifies a restricted legalization of abortion (the hot topic at a time when "abortion on demand" was clearly not an issue), does not seem to exert an autonomous effect on party choice. While the direction of the coefficient suggests that PSOE voters tended to hold permissive moral views, the variable has no statistically significant effect. As we will see right now, this stands in contrast with the case of AP voting in that same year, when the abortion variable was significant.[7]

Table 4

Moving now to AP voting in 1982, it must be noted that, like in the case of the PSOE, a change in the reference category has revealed some aspects in the relationship between religiosity and conservative voting that were not obvious in our previous research (see Montero and Calvo 2000).[8] Most interesting of all is the certain symmetry that we have found between the models for this Spanish election. The model for the PSOE tells the story of those that were more determined to resist the wave of socialist support that swept the Spanish electorate in 1982: religious people appeared less eager to opt for the PSOE than any other social group.[9] A similar argument applies to the case of AP voting: while no clear orientations are found as to whether or not religiosity determined party support, the model helps to identify those that would be hardly ready to vote for this political party. Observing the third column of Table 4, the transit from the RC to two of the less religious categories is statistically significant and in the correct direction. Non-religious people did not like AP in closely the same way that religious people were wary of the PSOE. However, the transit towards the highest religious categories did not look determinant for the prospects of AP

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[6] We have attempted to improve the model specification displayed in a previous analysis of the same election (Montero and Calvo [2000: Table 8.4]). Apart from the inclusion of the abortion variable, the variable "occupational status" distinguishes now between "employed", "unemployed", "retired", "student", and "housewife" ("self-employed" being the reference category). "Trade union membership" has been eliminated; in contrast, "income" is now in our models. Finally, instead of in the continuous format, "education" and "age" have been fragmented into dummy variables. Thanks to these changes, the overall R^2 for the PSOE model has improved from 0.41 (N=1,346) to 0.46 (N=962); 85.86 percent of the cases have been now correctly classified. As for AP vote, the overall explanatory power of the model remains largely the same (0.72 to 0.70).

[7] In this model, both income and education demonstrate a high predictive capacity for PSOE voting (higher levels in both variables representing a deterrent of PSOE support).

[8] There, the reference category was "attending to church every Sunday".

[9] Of course this does not mean that all religious people, at the time close to 35 per cent of the population, voted conservative. In the 1982 "earthquake" electoral context, the PSOE swept the board virtually in every constituency considered. What we claim is that religious people were among the more immune to an otherwise overwhelmingly powerful trend.

support. Moreover, finding a negative coefficient in the transit towards the highest religious category is perplexing, to say the least.

Sticking to a principled condemnation of abortion was beneficial for AP voting. These results introduced one of the defining features of Spanish politics as far the issue of morality is concerned: while the right galvanises the support of the morally conservative, the left seems unable to do so. Conservative voting attracts a relatively much higher share among moral conservatives than leftist voting does in its quest to garner the support of moral liberals. Interestingly, moral liberals seem to be more flexible at the time of casting the vote, displaying an observable tendency towards supporting several political parties, including those towards the left of large social democratic parties, i.e., the Communist party, or Izquierda Unida (its new organizational format since 1986).

In short, at the level of direct effects, we have found a mild, but important, effect of religion on the vote in Spain-1982. Religiosity seems to be linked with a form of "negative voting". In other words, if religiosity was not strong enough to determine the vote, it, however, showed a capacity to set limits in the range of plausible alternatives. Let us move to the models for Portugal-1983 (Model A columns in Table 5). The probability of voting for the PS (against the probability of voting for any other party further to its right) was not very much affected by religiosity in the 1983 context. Meeting the expectations, the coefficients organize a scenario where PS voters tend to be less religious than those voting for rights parties. However, the effect is not strong in terms of statistical significance, as only the transit from the comparison group to the least religious category is statistically significant (and only at the confidence level of 90 per cent). In contrast, climbing up the religious lather increased the odds of PSD voting in 1983, as the significance of the transits from the RC towards the highest religious categories demonstrates. This relationship, however, is not a robust one. While higher levels of religiosity favoured the electoral fortunes of these parties, the model also tells that a decreasing religiosity might also help the PSD vis-à-vis any other party towards its left. These latter transits are not statistically significant; still, the surprising direction of the coefficients makes us suspect that something is distorting the effect of religiosity on this kind of voting.

Table 5

In any case, the overall explanatory capacity of the model is constrained in the Portuguese case, particularly as far as PSD voting is concerned. In both countries, religiosity failed to bring about strong consequences on voting choices during the early 1980s. Neither in Portugal, nor in Spain electoral competition revolved around religiosity for reasons either contextual or structural. While in Spain the relevance of religiosity was overshadowed by the ability of the PSOE to receive a sort of universal vote in the extremely realigning and volatile 1982 elections (Linz and Montero 1986;

Gunther and Montero 2001: 121-122), in Portugal voters of every religious group made roughly similar choices between the two larger parties (Bacalau 1994: 65 ff). Religious identities did not lead to strong electoral alignments, and hence the competition to gain the specific support of religious constituencies was not stiff. Notwithstanding this, we have found meaningful differences between the two cases compared. If in Spain religiosity showed some capacity to set limits on the plausible alternatives of voter, we have come to the conclusion that, in Portugal, religiosity was simply unimportant as a predictor of voting decisions. We comment further on these differences in the last section of the paper.

Let us move now to the most recent elections with post-electoral surveys available: namely, Spain-2004 and Portugal-2002 (Model A columns in Tables 6 and 7). A highly significant religious variable commands a model for PP-vote – then the incumbent party - that shows great efficacy in explaining the probability of voting for this party. Even when controlled by ideology, virtually every religious category shows an autonomous effect on the dependent variable.[10] Of course this invites further questioning as to what has changed in the context of conservative voting in Spain, which explains such a remarkable transformation in the salience of the religious variable. What has not changed is the strong effect of moral views on conservative voting in Spain. In 2004, as in 1982, holding negative views about the legalization of abortion increases the likelihood of PP voting. Moral conservatives, who happen to be the most religious, persist in their loyal support to the right.[11] Yet the same does not hold true in the other side of the continuum: replicating the situation at the beginning of the 1980s, the PSOE still fails to conquer the minds of the moral liberals. In contrast with the notorious influence of religion on the vote for the PP in 2004, the decision to choose the PSOE vis-à-vis any other electoral choice further to its right seems to have a weak religious component. Considering the full model, the data presented in Table 6 confirms the existence of only a mild relationship between religiosity and PSOE vote (only one transit is statistically significant). As a matter of fact, PSOE voting is better explained by looking at other variables, such as the assessment of the economy, which is again highly significant, or, of course, ideology. Similarly, income is negatively related with this kind of vote, and so education is; higher educational status lead voters towards more conservative orientations.

Tables 6 and 7

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[10] Note that in these elections, the RC is the lowest religious category.

[11] Economic performance, gender, and, of course, ideology, and Rajoy's evaluation contribute also to explain the decision of voting for the PP in 2004. Given that in 2004 the PP was the incumbent party, positive evaluations of the economy reinforced the tendency of supporting the continuity of the government.

In sharp contrast, a quick perusal at the results of Table 7 confirms that, in contemporary Portugal, religiosity continues to be a weak predictor of the vote. At least when the question is why Portuguese citizens opt among the two largest political parties, in a context of a party system that is more fragmented than the Spanish one, the answer still is not to be found within the confined of societal religious divides. While in Spain the PP and the PSOE have electoral constituencies more or less well defined in religious terms, (something that, undoubtedly, impinges on policy making), in Portugal none of the religious categories show any statistical significance. Both PSD and PS voting appear immune to the bearing of religiosity, composing a picture where religiosity has lost any capacity for shaping the electoral preferences of Portuguese voters. Equally relevant, but perhaps not that surprising, is the confirmation that moral views are *neither* able to predict the vote for the two largest parties in Portugal. Neither the PS, nor the PSD are garnering the support of the moral liberals. In fact, both parties compete for the support of the conservatives, who happen to outclass moral liberals in contemporary Portugal. Thus, we believe that morality, as religiosity, does not organize the competition among the two main Portuguese political parties. Both issues matter, but as a way to organize the voting decision between large, centrist political parties (PS, PSD) and the smaller, more extreme-oriented ones (Bloco on the left, CDS on the right).

Religiosity and party support: indirect effects

Religiosity is a textbook example of a variable apparently incapable of bring about direct effects. Being so closely related with key political controls, such as ideology (see below), it often gives the impression of being unimportant, when it is not so. Conscious of the potential magnitude of this problem (see Montero and Calvo 2000), we have devised a twofold strategy to reveal the indirect effects of religiosity on voting that remained, perhaps, hidden in the discussion of direct effects. Firstly, we proceed with a simple exercise that consists of deleting ideology from Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7. If the indirect effects hypothesis holds, we should witness noticeable changes in the behaviour of the religious categories as soon as ideology is expelled from the models. Naturally, our interpretation goes in the direction of insisting on the changes produced by this action in the other explanatory variables. We do not consider whether or not the models perform better or worse as a whole. These results are offered in the Model B columns in Tables 4 (Spain-1982), 5 (Portugal-1983), 6 (Spain-2004) and 7 (Porgual-2002). Secondly, a linear regression model has been assembled to explain ideology (Table 8). From a certain theoretical standpoint, ideology is understood as a composite variable that summarizes a number of individual's characteristics (Knutsen 1995, 1997, 1998). It is expected that the more religiosity translates into ideological positions, the lower its capacity to exert direct effects. Thus, our chief aim is to find out whether being "leftist" or

"rightists", is connected with the values of the respondent (or, alternatively, whether ideology depends on other factors).

What happens if ideology is not included in the models as a political control? For one, the models collapse. Given the proven strength of ideological voting in both countries (Gunther and Montero 2001), it is not surprising that the overall explanatory capacity of the models drops as a consequence of this decision. Indeed, the R^2 falls dramatically in the Spanish and the Portuguese surveys alike. Nevertheless, it is the impact on the significance of the independent variables what should interest us now. As for Spain-1982, as soon as ideology departs, religiosity is recuperated as an important predictor of PSOE voting (Table 4). Without ideology, religiosity gains new strength to explain not only negative voting preferences, as we saw before, but also positive ones. For instance, the transit from the comparison group towards the less religious categories becomes significant, confirming that a decreasing religiosity helped PSOE voting in 1982, but only when translated into leftist ideological positions. Equally significant is the transformation in the model for AP in the same year: without ideology, religiosity emerges as a very powerful predictor of its vote, satisfying the expectation of AP as the natural destination of religious voters (and an unlikely one for non-religious). In the case of Portugal, however, no indirect effects of similar magnitude are revealed (Table 5). Despite the positive consequences of the elimination of ideology on the significance of some factors – occupation and even religiosity itself for the PS -, the results as to the bearing of religiosity do not change very dramatically. Particularly surprising is the limited effect in the significance of the religious variable in the vote for the PSD. Being ideology expelled, the coefficients do take now the expected direction. Also, the transit from the RC to the highest religious category gains in statistical health. However, scaling down in the level of religious commitment continues to be unimportant as regards PSD voting.

As for Spain-2004, the elimination of ideology still stirs spectacular consequences on the performance of religious categories (Table 6). Note for instance the significance, at the highest level, of every religious category in the explanation of PP voting. Also, abortion seems to be gaining new vigour as political controls are temporarily eliminated. All this confirms that the interweaving of religious and ideological identities is, at least in the case of conservative voters, a defining feature of the Spanish politics. Conservative voting has a distinctive religious element that, however, often fails to shine in due regard as it takes the face of conservative ideological positions. Leftist voters, on the contrary, are coming to display a less cohesive religious profile. The results presented in Table 6 confirm that, in the case of PSOE voting, the problem of hidden effects has softened somehow with the passing of time. While the departure of ideology clearly benefits the performance of religion as a factor to explain PSOE vote, the variable fails to acquire a profile as a good predictor

of this kind of voting. In any case, if ideology is not present in the models, higher levels of religiosity decrease the likelihood of PSOE voting. This is a statistically significant effect.

Does the elimination of ideology transform the role of religiosity in the explanation of voting choices in Portugal-2002? The answer goes clearly in the negative. The striking continuity in the (reduced) significance of the religious variables after eliminating religiosity applies to religion and morality alike. Thus, we must conclude that the absence of discernible direct effects of religiosity on the vote in Portugal is substantive, rather than technical. While in Spain there are reasons to believe that religiosity matters, but through the definition of ideological identities that, in turn, shape voting choices, in Portugal the story is a different one: at least as far as the vote for the largest parties is considered, religiosity is simply not a factor anchoring this type of vote.

Having completed half of the task, we proceed now with the second strategy introduced at the beginning of the section. Table 8 shows the result of a model where ideology is regressed on a number of variables: namely, the respondent's recollection of his or her mother's ideology, church attendance (again in dummy format), gender, age, education (measured as number of years in education), occupation (in dummy format), and family income (taken as a continuous variable).[12] On any account this is an incomplete model specification, particularly given the emphasis that the literature is placing on ideology as determined by a shifting and evolving political environment (for a review see Torcal and Medina 2002). Yet we are not interested in the partisanship element of ideology. Much to the contrary, our interest points at the relationship between ideology and variables that occur causally at an earlier stage. In short, when voters locate themselves in the ideological continuum, to what extend are they reflecting religious value orientations?[13]

Table 8

The model performs nicely. Firstly, it shows a high overall predictive strength (with an R^2 of 0.46). Secondly, most of the coefficients included are statistically significant, religiosity being one of them. At the maximum level of statistical significance, *every* transit from the RC towards higher religiosity pushes the respondent towards the right. Such a result clearly confirms that religiosity and ideology are closely related. To a considerable extent, ideological identities respond to previously

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[12] Having found only very weak indirect effects in the Portuguese case, we have decided to limit this exploration to the Spanish case.

[13] As has been said, the model includes a variable measuring the respondent's recollection of his or her mother's ideology. That is meant to tap the well-known socialization argument, which sees ideology (and party identification) as the consequence of a socialization process taking part within the family. Previous work in this subject has found that, as far as the transmission of ideological views is concerned, the bonds are closer between sons and their mothers, rather than between sons and their fathers (Jaime 2000).

conformed religious value orientations. Particularly in the case of AP/PP voting in Spain, high levels of religiosity lead voters to rightist ideological positions that, in most cases, will represent PP voting. But the same applies to the choices of non-believers. Feelings of disassociation from religion will be converted into leftist ideological positions that, again, suggest leftist voting.

The conclusion of this section is twofold. Firstly, in order to capture the true magnitude of the bearing of religiosity on party choice, the analysis must go beyond the observation of direct effects. And secondly, the importance of this kind of effects is uneven. In Portugal, the weakness of religiosity as a predictor of the vote does not conceal indirect effects of considerable magnitude. In Spain, however, religiosity and ideology trace a complex interaction that distorts the influence of the former on party choice.

Equal but different

In this paper both important similarities as well as striking differences as regards the relationship between religion and politics have been identified. Perhaps the single most important feature that Spain and Portugal has in common is that, in spite of a tradition of internecine disputes around religion, the potential for a pervasive religious cleavage has never been activated. In the late 1970s, the social climate in both Portugal and Spain contained some potential for pervasive religious conflicts (Gunther and Montero 2001; Montero 1997). This is particularly seen in the virulent anti-clericalism associated with the Republican experience in both countries, which in part explained their eventual demise and replacement by enduring authoritarian regimes that enjoyed Church support. It could have been perfectly possible for the new political elites to politicise a number of religious issues that simply lay dormant.

Religious *peace*, however, replaced conflict, and the foundations for a softer relationship between religiosity and political behaviour were established in both countries already in late 1970s. We have previously explained the de-activation of religious conflicts during these crucial times in terms of the role of political elites as cleavage (de)activators (Montero and Calvo 1999). As it is commonly known, the impact of processes of social change on cleavage consolidation is usually framed by the widely-accepted threefold conceptual schema by Bartolini and Mair (1990: 212 ff.). In terms of the religious cleavage, the most immediate impact of social change is said to be the elimination of religious differences at the societal level. This blurring of religious divisions at the societal level has, according to this theory, an immediate impact on the formation of political identities. As there are no clearly defined religious social groups, religiosity can hardly be expected to determine people's understanding of politics. Consequently, and this brings us to the third dimension of this schema, confessional and religious parties (that is, the organisational expression of

existing religious divides at the societal level) virtually eliminate their programmatic references to religious issues. This strategy eventually explains why these issues have ceased to be an object of confrontation in the partisan arena. In short, the erosion of religious subcultures, paralleling the process that affected the traditional working class, should lead to party choices being increasingly based on individual preferences rather than on collective identifications (Dogan 1996; Gallagher, Laver, and Mair 1995: 225).

Convincing as the threefold sequence appears to be, it says little about the mechanisms that are supposed to set these dynamics in motion. Moreover, in the view of existing assumptions, cleavages are said to solely *reflect* objective interests and identities, implying that the strength of their correlation with individuals' electoral choices is merely a function of particular individuals' position in the social structure. We, in contrast, believe that *political agency* matters. In more cases than it is usually recognised, given a certain distribution of religious traits among the citizenry, political actors (the complex web of organisations, parties, elites, as well as their preferences, strategies, exchanges, decisions, discourses) are in a position to shape *from above*, with differing but nonetheless discernible degrees of autonomy, the religious cleavage (Sartori 1969: 89). Paraphrasing the argument originally made by Przeworski and Sprague (1986: 10-11, 143) and developed for the analysis of the formation of Christian democratic parties by Kalyvas (1996: 8-9), we claim that the religious conflict is salient in a given society if, when, and only to the extent to which it is important to political parties which mobilise religious or secular citizens. During the consolidation of democracy, Portuguese and Spanish elites opted not to centre on the religious cleavage. This explains the mild effects of religious voting on the early elections considered in this paper. Using the Portuguese case as an illustration, during the transition period the Church was tainted by the association with the authoritarian regime of Salazar, even if the role of Catholic groups in the opposition to Salazar partially restored legitimacy. As Pasquino (1990: 49) points out, "Catholics were unwilling to engage, *qua* Catholics, in politics", and we should add that Catholics leaders were even less willing to do so. On the other hand, the religious scab was less fresh than across the border – *inter alia*, due to the length of the Salazarist regime, its aversion to radicalism (which precluded a virulent backlash and reversal of the republican project), and notably the relative peaceful demise of the Portuguese First Republic, when compared to the Civil War of its Iberian neighbour. Established as a moribund cleavage, religiosity only but receded as an explanatory factor for party choice in both countries during the 1980s. The religious peace insinuated during the transition years evolved into a quasi-structural definition of the political role of religiosity. Without any salience in the electoral competition, the soft approach that governed the relationship between the church and the governments in Portugal and Spain simply eliminated the need to think in religious terms at the time of casting the vote.

Nevertheless, that religion is prevented from representing a major cleavage does not preclude religiosity from influencing party choice in a significant fashion. In short, religious voting can be found in contexts of weak, or even non-existent religious cleavage. This is the terrain where the comparison between Spain and Portugal shines as an illuminating example of the different intensities that religious voting can adopt in context of institutional religious peace. For one, as we have seen, religious voting is more salient in Spain than in Portugal. With different intensities according to political parties as well as to time point, we have nonetheless found a consistently strong association between religiosity and, particularly, conservative voting in Spain. In Portugal, however, neither conservative, nor leftist voting seems to be linked with religion in any meaningful way. To explain these differences, the founding processes by which the party systems in both countries, as well as the initial alliances between voters and parties, should be considered. Despite the expressed determination on the part of both political and religious elites *not* to politicise religion (Linz, 1993), Spanish voters were offered a limited range of electoral options (at least narrower than in Portuguese case) that, moreover, could be roughly classified along religious terms. Building on the manifested ties with the recent Francoist past, and helped by the ideological and moral profiles of the party's governing elite, voters could attribute a certain religious identities to AP that was different from the one conferred on the PSOE or the Communist Party. Portuguese voters, however, faced a more complex task. Exposed to a much diversified party system, and in a context where the largest political parties only seemed to differ in the issue of regime type (Jalali, 2002), the possibility of classifying the PSD and the PS according to religion was largely impossible. The evolution of political events in both countries are only but exacerbating these differences. Whereas in Spain, a number of policies relating to religious education, moral issues or church-state relations raised the profile of the PP as a morally conservative, religious political party (against the morally liberal stance of the PSOE), in Porgual both the PS and the PSD continue to share basic views in relation to crucial religious and moral problems.

It is interesting to note that all this has resulted in notorious differences in the religious profiles of the different political parties. According to the data provided in figures 1 and 2, the two largest Portuguese political parties soon exhibited very similar religious profiles. In both cases those that we call "nuclear Catholics" represented more than fifty per cent of their voters. In a country that has systematically ranked among the more religious in Europe, the main political parties compete for a very large part of the electorate that, however, is largely uniform in religious terms. A different argument, of course, should be elaborated to explain the choice between the large and the extreme Portuguese political parties. In Spain, however, the religious profiles of AP and the PSOE were very different from the onset. In spite of the fact that in 1982 the PSOE outdid AP in every religious category, it was among the more religious where the latter party managed to perform better.

Figures 1 and 2

A second difference between our cases compared relates to the definition and evolution of the triangular relationship conformed by religiosity, ideology, and party choice. One key finding of this analysis is that whereas in Portugal ideology does not obstruct the bearing of religiosity on party choice, in Spain it clearly does so. It is the fact that ideology is not obstructing the effect of religiosity what accounts for the absence of indirect effects in the Portuguese case. Tables 9 (Spain) and 10 (Portugal) display three-way contingency tables with religiosity, ideology and party choice as variables. The third and forth columns summarize the voting preferences of the different religious groups. Such basic information revels again interesting differences between Spain and Portugal. While in the former case, religious voters have adopted more distinctive voting intentions as time has passed by, in the latter the irrelevance of religion has become even more apparent: in 2002, every religious group split evenly between the two large options. But nothing of the sort has happened in the march 2004 general elections in Spain; in this case, nuclear Catholics (around 20 per cent of the total population) opted for the PP, while Non-believers (around 40 per cent) preferred the PSOE.

The tables also confirm that religiosity is not bounded to ideology in Portugal in the same way that it is so in Spain. For each of the percentages resulting after cross-tabulating religion and party choice, the table displays a distribution according to ideological categories. For instance, the percentages shown in the fourth row of Table 9 represent the ideological distribution of those nuclear Catholics that voted for AP in 1982 (28 per cent), and for the PP in 2004 (40 per cent). We are interested to see whether or not, for each different party, the distribution adopts a different shape according to religion. Should this be the case, we could conclude that ideology is closely linked with religion. Otherwise, the conclusion will be that ideological identities are formed *regardless* religious identities, thus suggesting a definition of ideology free of value orientations. As expected, the contrasts are striking. While in Portugal ideological distributions for each political party replicate the same pattern across the different religious groups, in Spain the shape of this distribution seems to depend highly on the degree of religiosity. An example based on PP voting on 2004 will illustrate the point. In the case of those nuclear Catholics who voted for the PP, ideological conservatism (right and extreme right) amounted to 60 per cent of the category. In contrast, only 47 per cent of those non-believers had voted for the PP were ideologically conservative. Variations of this kind cannot be found in the Portuguese case.

Tables 9 and 10

Concluding remarks

Portugal and Spain present an interesting counterpoint in terms of electoral behaviour. Despite evident similarities anchored in history, culture, and geography, these two countries have come to develop different scenarios for the development of religious voting. Indeed, our models seem to challenge the perception of Iberian countries as split along religious lines. In the context of a recently completed transition period, these elections took place in an environment were religious conflicts had been deliberately silenced. Moreover, the identification with strong religious identities were also explicitly excluded in the strategies followed by party leaders when building *ex novo* new party systems in both Iberian countries. Consequently, religious identities were doomed to play only a secondary role in the definition of electoral alignments at the beginning of the 1980s. All that notwithstanding, our data confirm the existence of a religious voting of considerable strength in Spain. Perhaps without becoming determinant, we have seen that religiosity, particularly in the case of the diminishing group of nuclear Catholics, still help voters to opt among political parties.

In this paper we have shown that the differences between Spain and Portugal operate at different levels. On the one hand, the different role of religiosity on voting is linked with "substantive" realities, such as diverging party systems or distinctive religious maps. On the other hand, however, we have also found interesting "operational" differences in the mechanisms that translate religious identities into party choice. In Spain, ideological identities incorporate value orientations to a great extent, in Portugal the location in the left-right scale appears to be less value-dependent. While a careful examination of why both "left" and "right" means different things in different places escapes the limits of this paper, we have come to the conclusion that a great deal of the differences between the cases has to do with varying definitions of ideological identities. In Spain, to a considerable extent, religious identities translate into ideological identities. In Portugal this does not happen.

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Table 1. Subjective religiosity in Europe, 2002-2003 [a]

	Average	Median	Mode	Standard deviation	N
Greece	7.7	8	10	2.2	2,566
Poland	6.6	7	8	2.4	2,110
Italy	6.1	6	6	2.5	1,207
Ireland	5.8	6	5	2.4	2,046
Portugal	**5.7**	**6**	**5**	**2.5**	**1,511**

Finland	5.6	6	7	2.6	2,000
Austria	5.2	5	5	3	2,257
Switzerland	5.2	5	5	2.8	2,038
Netherlands	5.1	6	7	2.9	2,364
Belgium	5.0	5	5	3.0	1,899
Slovenia	4.9	5	5	2.8	1,519
Israel	4.7	5	5	3.1	2,499
Denmark	4.4	5	5	2.5	1,506
Hungary	4.4	5	5	3.0	1,685
Spain	**4.4**	**5**	**5**	**2.7**	**1,729**
United Kingdom	4.3	5	5	2.8	2,052
Germany	4.2	5	0	2.9	2,919
Luxemburg	4.1	4	0	3.1	1,552
Norway	4.1	4	5	2.5	2,036
Sweden	3.7	3	0	2.8	1,999
Czech Republic	3.1	2	0	2.9	1,360
European Average	5	5	5	2.9	40,574

[a] Figures are means in scales of self-definition of religiosity, where value 0 is "not being religious at all", and value 10 implies being "very religious". Countries are sorted according to the means.

Source: ESS 2002-2003.

Table 2. Selected indicators of religiosity in Spain (1981, 1990, and 1999) and Portugal (1999) (in percentages)

Indicator	Spain			Portugal
	1981	1990	1999	1999
Religiosity				
As a person you are…				
Religious	63	63	56	82
Not religious	30	28	33	14
Atheist	4	4	6	3
You consider yourself as…				
Very good catholic + practising catholic	37	30	29	-
Not very practising catholic	27	28	28	-
Not practising catholic	19	26	25	-
Indifferent	10	12	12	-
Not believer, atheist	4	4	6	-
Other religion	1	1	1	-
Importance of religion in your life…				
A lot of + quite	-	54	42	71
Little + not any	-	45	58	29
Beliefs				
Belief in…				
God	87	81	81	93
Life after dead	55	42	40	47
Heaven	50	48	42	63
Hell	34	27	27	35
Sin	58	57	44	73
Importance of God (means in scale 1 to 10)	6.39	6.25	5.97	7.53
You find comfort and strength thanks to religion	57	53	49	76
You have moments of praying and meditation	60	61	61	71
Religious practice				
Attending to church				
Once per week or more	41	33	25	40
Once per month	12	10	10	12
Sometimes	10	17	9	8
Never or almost never	36	40	56	40
Church				
You have confidence in church				
A lot of + quite	50	53	41	73
No much or none at all	49	47	57	27
You think church is giving proper answers to...				
Moral and individual problems	39	39	33	58
Problems in family life	34	38	29	52
Spiritual necessities of the people	45	49	48	69
Social problems in the country	-	33	23	41
(*N*)	(2.305)	(2.637)	(1.200)	(1.895)

Sources: For Spain, World Values Surveys (WVS) 1981, 1990, and 1999. For Portugal, WVS 1999.

Table 3: Frequency of church attendance in Europe, 2002 [a] (in percentages)

Country	At least once a week	At least once a month	Occasionally	Almost never or never
Poland	56	19	17	8
Ireland	54	13	10	23
Italy	31	12	20	37
Portugal	**29**	**15**	**8**	**48**
Greece	27	28	28	16
Spain	**21**	**9**	**17**	**53**
Slovenia	20	10	31	39
Israel	19	7	27	47
Austria	18	15	19	48
Luxembourg	15	10	17	58
United Kingdom	13	6	12	68
Netherlands	12	9	13	66
Switzerland	11	12	27	50
Hungary	11	7	22	59
Belgium	11	8	15	66
Czech Republic	9	5	16	70
Germany	8	10	21	60
Norway	5	6	24	65
Sweden	5	6	17	72
Finland	5	7	25	64
Denmark	3	7	21	69
Total	18	11	20	51

[a] The question is as follows: "Apart from special occasions, such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays? Every day; More than once a week; Once a week; At least once a month; Only on special holy days; Less often; Never". Countries are ordered by the highest frequency.

Source: European Social Survey, 2002.

Table 4: Logistic regressions to explain party vote in Spain 1982[a]

Variables	Model A: With ideology		Model B: Without ideology	
	Vote PSOE	Vote AP	Vote PSOE	Vote AP
Religious attendance (RC: "Not very practising Catholics")				
Atheist	-0.4299*	-2.5264***	0.3682	-2.7601***
	(0.2573)	(0.8576)	(0.2483)	(0.7008)
Indifferent	0.5403**	-1.2621**	1.0482***	-1.7279***
	(0.1911)	(0.5625)	(0.1784)	(0.4584)
Not Practising Catholics	0.1310	-0.4838	0.3917***	-0.7039***
	(0.1542)	(0.3809)	(0.1471)	(0.2676)
Practising Catholics	-0.7101***	0.2824	-0.8921***	0.7558***
	(0.1495)	(0.3017)	(0.1421)	(0.2221)
Very Good Catholics	-0.9271***	-0.7859	-1.2933***	0.4538
	(0.2799)	(0.5388)	(0.2577)	(0.3270)
Attitudes towards abortion	-0.1225	0.6790***	-0.0966	0.7075***
	(0.1091)	(0.2490)	(0.1029)	(0.1824)
Ideology	-4.3837***	13.4816***		
	(0.3828)	(1.1561)		
Manuel Fraga's (AP) thermometer		7.6804***		9.5461***
		(0.7218)		(0.5889)
Felipe Gonzalez's / (PSOE)	7.6053***		7.8633***	
	(0.3767)		(0.3555)	
Governmental Performance	0.3449*	-0.6002	0.4554***	-0.8379**
	(0.1916)	(0.4357)	(0.1767)	(0.3385)
Occupational status (RC: employed)				
Retired	-0.6317**	0.1190	-0.4330*	-0.1653
	(0.2785)	(0.6497)	(0.2642)	(0.4146)
Unemployed	-0.4165*	-0.1685	-0.2091	-0.5200
	(0.2181)	(0.5958)	(0.2094)	(0.4446)
Student	-0.1457	-0.1534	-0.0192	-0.1299
	(0.2036)	(0.4347)	(0.1910)	(0.3227)
Housewife	0.1947	0.0624	0.2705	0.0419
	(0.1861)	(0.3988)	(0.1723)	(0.2933)
Family income (RC: Up to 10,000 ptas.)				
10,001-20,000 ptas.	-2.0060***	0.4197	-2.0467***	2.4033*
	(0.6665)	(1.1060)	(0.6582)	(1.3071)
20,001-30,000 ptas.	-2.6796***	0.2084	-2.6369***	2.0545*
	(0.6058)	(0.8293)	(0.6166)	(1.2229)
30,001-50,000 ptas.	-2.4396***	0.3904	-2.4682***	2.0702*
	0.5854)	(0.8014)	(0.5995)	(1.2157)
50,001-70,000 ptas.	-2.8763***	0.6406	-2.9024***	2.4477**
	(0.5870)	(0.7883)	(0.6006)	(1.2146)
70,001 –100,000 ptas.	-3.6230***	0.7152	-3.6181***	2.7004**
	(0.5961)	(0.8149)	(0.6069)	(1.2316)
100,000 – 250,000 ptas.	-3.8277***	0.9340	-3.9168***	2.9970**
	(0.6031)	(0.8365)	(0.6147)	(1.2447)

More than 250,000 ptas.	-3.3927***	2.2570	-3.7737***	4.3648***
	(0.7122)	(1.4292)	(0.7477)	(1.3633)
Education (RC: primary school)				
Secondary education	-0.4601***	0.8502***	-0.4559***	0.8872***
	(0.1470)	(0.3163)	(0.1374)	(0.2302)
University (undergraduates)	-0.6415***	1.1362**	-0.6625***	1.1378***
	(0.2244)	(0.4853)	(0.2095)	(0.3705)
University (postgraduates)	-0.3322	0.3252	-0.4450**	0.5585
	(0.2387)	(0.5355)	(0.2215)	(0.4090)
Gender (RC: female)	0.0795	0.6989**	0.1039	0.5882**
	(0.1526)	(0.3356)	(0.1416)	(0.2521)
Age (RC: 18-36 years)				
37-41	-0.2229	0.0928	-0.3437*	0.1364
	(0.1976)	(0.4583)	(0.1921)	(0.3312)
42-51	-0.2235	0.2666	-0.3031**	0.5562**
	(0.1663)	(0.3629)	(0.1579)	(0.2518)
52-66	-0.3584**	0.4917	-0.4778***	0.7056**
	(0.1764)	(0.3735)	(0.1671)	(0.2828)
More than 67 years	-0.4438	0.0049	-0.6671**	0.5952
	(0.2884)	(0.7184)	(0.2766)	(0.4465)
Community size	0.0651***	-0.0811	0.0710***	-0.0088
	(0.0251)	(0.0595)	(0.0237)	(0.0450)
Intercept	0.3058	-14.7033***	-1.9394***	-10.7755***
	(0.6822)	(1.2128)	(0.6589)	(1.3454)
(*N*)	(2851)	(2106)	(2900)	(2146)
Prob.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R*²*	0.45	0.79	0.40	0.65
Log likelihood	-1089.99	-248.64	-1197.82	-423.50
Correctly classified	83,76%	95,44%	82,00%	92,64%

ᵃ Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.
Sources: DATA 1982

Table 5: Logistic regressions to explain party vote in Portugal 1983 [a]

Variables	Model A: With Ideology		Model B: Without Ideology	
	Vote PS	Vote PSD	Vote PS	Vote PSD
Religious attendance (RC: "two times per month")				
Never	0.7926*	0.8688	1.023***	-0.0410
	(0.4630)	(0.6305)	(0.328)	(0.4907)
Sometimes	0.2549	0.1358	0.1625	0.0662
	(0.4326)	(0.6045)	(0.3399)	(0.4535)
Every Sunday	-0.6219	1.0475*	-1.3372	0.8584*
	(0.4015)	(0.5963)	(0.3314)	(0.4623)
More than once per week	-0.7054	2.0330***	-0.7858	2.0067***
	(0.6129)	(0.8029)	(0.5415)	(0.7493)
Ideology	-6.8926***	8.2448***		
	(1.2045)	(1.3714)		
Machete's (PSD) thermometer		2.8327***		3.2250***
		(0.7605)		(0.6144)
Mario Soare's (PS) thermometer	5.0089***		4.3767***	
	(0.6733)		(0.522)	
Occupational status (RC: self-employed)				
Employed	1.1357***	-0.8528	0.9917***	-1.1578***
	(0.4403)	(0.5392)	(0.383)	(0.452)
Unemployed	1.7595**	-1.6615	1.2369*	-1.4069
	(0.7334)	(1.0333)	(0.661)	(0.902)
Retired	1.4146**	-0.4128	1.2826***	-0.6077
	(0.622)	(0.6686)	(0.498)	(0.593)
Student	1.2130	-0.1199	0.5214	0.5840
	(0.9469)	(1.1392)	(0.754)	(0.822)
Housewife	1.4039***	-1.1065	1.0547**	-1.0943**
	(0.5360)	(0.6772)	(0.423)	(0.518)
Family income (RC: less than 20.000 escudos)				
20,000-29,999 escudos	0.5004	-0.2657	0.5216	-0.1611
	(0.5202)	(0.5998)	(0.400)	(0.551)
30,000-39,999 e.	-0.4342	0.7069	-0.1907	0.6179
	(0.557)	(0.5787)	(0.384)	(0.525)
40,000-49,999 e.	-0.5789	0.1026	-0.6259	0.5314
	(0.599)	(0.5925)	(0.445)	(0.546)
50,000-59,999 e.	-0.6653	0.8017	-0.5075	0.9522*
	(0.605)	(0.6307)	(0.469)	(0.561)
60,000-69,999 e.	-1.3695**	0.4875	-1.3229**	0.7224
	(0.714)	(0.8792)	(0.543)	(0.645)
79,999 e.	-1.1893	1.5110	-0.8898	1.1437
	(0.747)	(0.9882)	(0.619)	(0.903)
Education (RC: primary school)				
Professional training	-0.8572	n.d.	-0.7644	n.d.
	(0.729)		(0.759)	
Secondary school	-0.8181**	-0.3706	-0.6735*	-0.3748
	(0.375)	(0.4920)	(0.353)	(0.392)

University	-2.4130***	0.7217	-1.7621***	0.4968
	(0.596)	(0.7175)	(0.509)	(0.588)
Gender (RC: female)	-0.1001	0.1135	-0.2826	0.4228
	(0.364)	(0.4715)	(0.288)	(0.386)
Age (RC: 18-36 years)				
31-45	-0.4252	0.1165	-0.4552	-0.0827
	(0.419)	(0.4889)	(0.351)	(0.384)
46-65	-0.2608	-0.2542	-0.2304	-0.5178
	(0.412)	(0.5684)	(0.359)	(0.439)
more than 65 years	-0.9528	0.6825	-1.1027**	0.1885
	(0.599)	(0.7507)	(0.497)	(0.656)
Community size	-0.0650	0.3648**	-0.1084	0.2641**
	(0.140)	(0.1624)	(0.1078)	(0.1367)
Intercept	2.2957**	-7.7827***	-1.3607**	-2.7400***
	(0.9370)	(1.3115)	(0.6924)	(0.8232)
(*N*)	(457)	(335)	(531)	(358)
Prob.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R^2	0.41	0.39	0.25	0.19
Log likelihood	-175.27	-127.80	-256.24	-179.06
Correctly classified	83.81%	85.07%	74,95%	76,54%

[a] Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.

Sources: The Four Nation Study (1985).

Table 6: Logistic regressions for explaining party vote in Spain, 2004 [a]

	Model A: With ideology		Model B: Without ideology	
	Vote PP	Vote PSOE	Vote PP	Vote PSOE
Religious attendance (RC: never) [b]				
With less frequency	1.1691*	-0.0984	1.2953***	-0.1985
	(0.7170)	(0.2982)	(0.4768)	(0.2452)
Just in special religious celebrations	1.9472***	0.1117	2.0659***	-0.0585
	(0.6814)	(0.2698)	(0.4814)	(0.2367)
At least once per month	0.7711	-0.3307	1.9053***	-0.6233**
	(0.8375)	(0.3720)	(0.5452)	(0.3224)
Once per week	1.6476**	-0.9617***	1.8492***	-1.1301***
	(0.7552)	(0.3594)	(0.5487)	(0.3000)
More than once per week	2.2026**	-0.5868	2.4462***	-1.1184**
	(0.9777)	(0.5753)	(0.7875)	(0.5253)
Attitudes towards abortion	-1.7930**	0.1543	-2.1464***	0.4013
	(0.9139)	(0.3855)	(0.6002)	(0.3331)
Ideology	12.8934	-4.3564***		
	(2.0479)	(0.6955)		
José L. Rdz. Zapatero's (PSOE) thermometer		6.9745***		7.5044***
		(0.6516)		(0.5887)
Marinao Rajoy's (PP) thermometer	8.8716***		9.9116***	
	(1.0053)		(0.9748)	
Economic performance	-2.8272***	0.4380***	-2.6900***	0.5887***
	(0.4303)	(0.1448)	(0.3901)	(0.1191)
Occupational status (RC: self-employed)				
Retired	0.6483	-0.1032	0.6856	-0.1054
	(0.7553)	(0.3773)	(0.5244)	(0.3387)
Unemployed	-1.2206	0.0804	-0.9665	0.2332
	(0.8696)	(0.4947)	(0.7398)	(0.4189)
Student	-2.9846	0.6074	-0.9254	0.6627
	(1.6989)*	(0.5899)	(1.0589)	(0.5016)
Housewife	0.5350	0.3313	0.3649	0.4692*
	(0.5537)	(0.3144)	(0.4570)	(0.2787)
Family income (RC: less than 600 Euros)				
600-900 Euros	-0.4498	-0.1551	-0.2604	-0.3174
	(0.7989)	(0.3624)	(0.5290)	(0.3158)
900-1,500 Euros	-0.6816	-0.3120	-0.1846	-0.2884
	(0.8004)	(0.3620)	(0.5162)	(0.3134)
1,500-2,100 Euros	-0.0714	-0.5041	-0.1010	-0.3388
	(0.8807)	(0.3908)	(0.5976)	(0.3414)
2,100-2,700 Euros	1.2241	-1.9925**	1.3502*	-0.8323**
	(0.9911)	(0.4524)	(0.7269)	(0.3945)
More than 2,700 Euros	-0.7680	-0.2982	0.7350	-0.3145
	(1.1248)	(0.8060)	(0.9442)	(0.6346)
Education (RC: primary school)				
Secondary school and professional training	-0.2117	-0.0151	-0.1220	-0.1525

	(0.4925	(0.2540)	(0.4186)	(0.2275
University (3 years)	-0.3868	-0.1237	-0.1557	-0.1485
	(1.0254)	(0.5471)	(1.2335)	(0.5475)
University (4 or more years)	0.6030	-0.9026***	0.3046	-0.8055***
	(0.6043)	(0.2855)	(0.5434)	(0.2455)
Gender *f*	0.8779**	-0.1996	0.7038*	-0.1198
	(0.4365)	(0.2329)	(0.3787)	(0.1971)
Age (RC: female)				
37-41	1.8287***	0.0957	1.1358**	0.0958
	(0.6386)	(0.3276)	(0.4871)	(0.2904)
42-51	0.2739	-0.2980	0.2735	-0.2183
	(0.6214)	(0.2752)	(0.4888	(0.2401)
52-66	0.3560	0.0423	-0.0093	-0.1156
	(0.6651)	(0.3062)	(0.4438)	(0.2771)
67-81	-1.0854	0.0831	-1.0107*	-0.0050
	(0.8974)	(0.4307)	(0.6263)	(0.3790
More than 81 years	1.7257**	-0.7297	1.5276*	-1.3087*
	(0.7883)	(0.7962)	(0.8845)	(0.7304)
Community size	0.0254	-0.0276	0.1008	-0.0461
	(0.1382)	(0.0627)	(0.1036)	(0.0546)
Intercept	-6.9775***	-2.3014***	-1.2933	-5.0911***
	(1.6626)	(0.8707)	(1.1844)	(0.6396)
(*N*)	(859)	(971)	(955)	(1100)
Prob.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R^2	0.79	0.43	0.68	0.36
Log likelihood	-113.36	-376.23	-176.80	-476.07
Correctly classified	95.23%	82.70%	91.83%	79.73%

a Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.
Sources: Demoscopia-UAM survey.

Table 7: Logistic regression explaining party vote in Portugal, 2002 [a]

Variables	Model A: With ideology		Model B: Without ideology	
	Vote PSD	Vote PS	Vote PSD	Vote PS
Religious attendance (RC: never)				
One per year	-0.7458	0.1630	-0.5598	0.1367
	(0.7180)	(0.8366)	(0.7054)	(0.6865)
Two to eleven times per year	-0.3518	-0.2132	-0.4377	0.1022
	(0.6413)	(0.7077)	(0.6902)	(0.5826)
Once per month	0.6947	-1.0312	0.7725	-0.8973
	(0.7604)	(0.8163)	(0.7289)	(0.6887)
Two or more times per month	-0.4189	-0.2760	-0.2706	0.0978
	(0.7179)	(0.7826)	(0.7361)	(0.6639)
Once per week or more	-0.3829	-0.2616	-0.0660	-0.2792
	(0.7301)	(0.7902)	(0.7291)	(0.6379)
Attitudes towards abortion	-0.4507	-0.0644	-0.3581	-0.0667
	(0.5825)	(0.5290)	(0.4881)	(0.4862)
Ideology	5.1656***	-5.953***		
	(1.2768)	(1.0689)		
Barroso's (PSD) thermometer	0.6163***		0.7056***	
	(0.0807)		(0.0786)	
Rodrigues' (PS) thermometer		0.5415***		0.5886***
		(0.0892)		(0.0757)
Government performance	1.1239***	-0.9527***	1.2159***	-1.0869***
	(0.2838)	(0.3651)	(0.2758)	(0.3190)
Occupational status (RC: self-employed)				
Unemployed	0.7538	-0.1549	0.7797	-0.2499
	(0.9063)	(0.9893)	(0.7015)	(0.7802)
Student	-0.2183	-0.0900	-0.2006	0.0421
	(0.9194)	(0.7682)	(0.9727)	(0.9190)
Retired	-0.3144	0.1539	-0.2188	0.1191
	(0.7702)	(0.5811)	(0.7303)	(0.4892)
Housewife	-0.6598	0.0408	-0.2071	-0.0805
	(0.5859)	(0.5067)	(0.5677)	(0.4687)
Family income (RC: less than 300 Euros)				
301-750 Euros	0.5663	-0.1230	0.0569	0.0803
	(0.7798)	(0.6885)	(0.7300)	(0.4677)
751-1,500 Euros	0.7612	-0.5524	0.3295	-0.4074
	(0.8066)	(0.6772)	(0.7510)	(0.5087)
1,501-2,500 Euros	0.7800	0.0267	0.5652	0.1035
	(0.8008)	(0.8336)	(0.7550)	(0.6625)
More than 2,500 Euros	0.8497	-0.7379	0.8799	-0.6076
	(1.1569)	(1.0737)	(0.9999)	(0.7693)
Education (RC: primary school)				
Basic level completed	-0.3184	0.3080	0.1352	0.1319
	(0.5370)	(0.5053)	(0.4714)	(0.4435)
Secondary school	0.8220	-0.9618**	1.0740**	-0.9087*
	(0.5720)	(0.5266)	(0.4749)	(0.4766)
University	-0.0186	-0.3750	0.2431	-0.4224

	(0.6352)	(0.6218)	(0.5758)	(0.5858)
Gender (RC: female)	-0.3119	-0.0546	-0.3205	-0.0236
	(0.3947)	(0.3756)	(0.3484)	(0.3310)
Age (RC: 18-36 years)				
31-45	1.0712**	-0.6596	0.8233**	-0.5928
	(0.5375)	(0.4936)	(0.4285)	(0.4862)
46-65	1.6338***	-1.0990*	1.5415***	-0.9726*
	(0.6178)	(0.5456)	(0.5609)	(0.5346)
More than 65 years	1.1983	-1.3495*	0.8763	-1.2381*
	(0.9594)	(0.8114)	(0.8319)	(0.6633)
Community size	-0.0796	0.0599	-0.0700	0.0882
	(0.0875)	(0.0781)	(0.0809)	(0.0675)
Intercept	10.1787***	4.0077**	-8.6096***	0.3803
	(1.8382)	(1.7189)	(1.4500)	(1.2999)
(N)	(377)	(370)	(395)	(386)
Prob.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Pseudo R^2	0.56	0.49	0.49	0.38
Log likelihood	-115.22	-128.93	-139.53	-165.01
Correctly classified	87.80%	86.22%	86.08%	82.64%

[a] Robust standard errors in parenthesis. Levels of statistical significance are ***at 1%; ** at 5%; * at 10%.
Sources: ICS survey.

Figure 1, Religiosity and Party Support (Spain)

Sources: Four Nations Survey (1985), the World Values Survey (1990), the European Values Survey (1999), and the Demo...

Figure 2, Religiosity and Party Support, Portugal

Sources: Four Nations Survey (1985), the World Values Survey (1990) and the European Values Survey (1999),

Table 8: Regression linear model to explain ideology in Spain, 2002*

	Ideology	
	Coefficients	**Standard Errors**
Mother´s ideology	5.2343***	(0.2215)
Religious attendance (RC: Non-believer)		
Almost never	0.6662***	(0.1030)
Sometimes a year	1.0612***	(0.1174)
Sometimes a month	1.0433***	(0.1404)
Almost every Sunday	1.3436***	(0.1296)
More than once a week	1.9716***	(0.2629)
Occupation (RC: Worker)		
Pensionist	0.3913***	(0.1360)
Unemployed	-0.1527	(0.1262)
Student	-0.0615	(0.1162)
Housewife	0.1974*	(0.1060)
Family income	0.0178	(0.0251)
Education	-0.0907***	(0.0249)
Age	-0.0132***	(0.0031)
Gender	0.0910	(0.0740)
Constant	1.9638***	(0.2137)
N	1848	
F	92.76	
Prob>F	0.00	
R²	0.46	

* Standard errors in brackets. Level of significance: * at 10%, ** at 5%,***at 1%
Source: CIS 2384 (2002)

Table 9. Three-way table; Religiosity, party choice and Ideology (Spain, 1982 and 2004)

Religiosity(*)	Vote	Totals		Extreme left		Left		Center-left		Center-Right		Right		Extreme Right	
		1982	2004	1982	2004	1982	2004	1982	2004	1982	2004	1982	2004	1982	2004
Nuclear catholic	AP-PP	28	40	--	1	1	2	6	18	14	18	64	44	14	16
	UCD-CDS[a]	10		--		3		44		29		23		2	
	PSOE	29	33	6	7	47	52	35	31	7	6	4	3	--	1
	PCE-IU	1	2	70	28	20	71	10	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nominal catholic	AP-PP	16	21	--	--	2	1	13	24	16	27	59	40	10	8
	UCD-CDS	6		--		11		40		38		11		--	
	PSOE	56	47	9	14	64	58	21	22	3	3	2	2	--	--
	PCE-IU	1	4	50	34	37	54	12	10	--	--	--	--	--	2
Non believer	AP-PP	5	8	1	--	5	7	7	25	26	21	54	27	7	20
	UCD-CDS	2		--		28		53		17		--		3	
	PSOE	53	47	15	22	68	57	13	16	2	4	1	--	--	1
	PCE-IU	6	9	67	39	29	52	4	5	--	2	--	--	--	2

Sources: DATA 1982 and Demoscopia 2004.

*Religiosity has been grouped into three basic categories: Nuclear Catholics, Nominal Catholics and Non-believers. For Spain 1982, Nuclear Catholics are those who consider themselves either as "very good Catholics" or as "Practising Catholics"; Nominal Catholics are those who feel themselves to be "not very practising Catholics". Lastly, Non believers are those who are "not practising", "indifferent" or "atheists". For Spain 2004, the Nuclear Catholics category is formed by those attending to church either "every day", "more than once a week" or "once a week"; Nominal Catholics and those who attend to church "once a month", "just in special religious celebrations" or "less frequency"; lastly, non believers are those who "never" attend to church.

** Extreme left represents those individuals located at values 1 and 2 in the self-placement scale; Left corresponds with values 3 and 4; Center-left corresponds with value 5; Center-right with value 6; Right with values 7 and 8 and Extreme right with points 9 and 10.

(a) UCD-CDS only for 1982.

Table 10. Three-way table; Religiosity, party choice and Ideology (Portugal, 1983 and 2002)

Religiosity*	Vote	Totals		Extreme left		Left		Center-left		Center	Center-Right		Right		Extreme Right	
		1983	*2002*	1983	2002	1983	2002	1983	2002	2002	1983	2002	1983	2002	1982	2002
Nuclear catholic	APU/PCP-BE[a]	*4*	*3*	46	17	31	--	15	33	50	8	--	--	--	--	--
	PS	*48*	*37*	3	5	12	19	47	13	42	19	5	9	9	9	5
	PSD	*31*	*46*	--	--	3	3	16	--	15	25	8	40	41	17	31
	CDS[b]	*16*	*13*	2	--	--	4	10	--	8	14	11	42	35	32	42
Nominal catholic	APU/PCP-BE	*19*	*9*	33	28	51	30	10	19	16	4	3	1	3	--	--
	PS	*51*	*44*	4	5	18	15	43	32	30	20	8	11	5	4	4
	PSD	*21*	*42*	--	1	2	1	20	1	22	34	16	32	45	12	13
	CDS	*9*	*5*	--	--	6	6	11	--	31	8	--	57	25	17	37
	APU/PCP-BE	*32*	*16*	42	48	37	30	15	9	9	2	4	2	--	1	--
	PS	*44*	*42*	8	5	24	17	50	33	29	13	5	1	9	3	2
Non believer	PSD	*18*	*37*	--	--	2	2	17	2	16	45	18	28	53	8	10
	CDS	*5*	*5*	--	--	7	--	--	--	28	20	--	47	28	27	43

* For Portugal 1983, Nuclear Catholics are those who attend to church "more than once a week" and "every Sunday"; Nuclear Catholics "two times a month" and "sometimes"; and Non Believers are those who "never" attend to church". For Portugal 2002, Nuclear Catholics attend to Church "once a week or more"; Nominal Catholics grouped those who attend to Church "two or more times a month", "once a month" and "two to eleven times a year"; finally the category Nuclear believers are those who attend to Church "once a year" or "never".

** *Ideology* is constructed in the same way that for Spain in the case of Portugal 1983. However, for Portugal 2002 there are slightly differences because the original self-placement variable has 11 values ranging from 0 to 10 and being the 5 value the modal. For that reason, we have introduced a new category called "Center" for this particular location. Thus, this variable remains as follows: 0-1, "Extreme left"; 2-3, "Left" 4, "Center-Left" 5, "Center"; 6, "Center-Right"; 7-8, "Right"; 9-10, "Right".

(a) APU-PCP was a leftist coalition in the 1983's elections. For 2002 the *Bloco*, a new leftist party far away from PCP ran together in coalition with the communists.
(b) CDS, the most conservative party in Portugal, also formed and electoral coalition with other smaller conservative and rightist parties in the 2002's elections.

Sources: Four Nations Study (1983) and ICS (2002)