Can public goods expansion generate electoral backlash against incumbents? Conventional accountability models suggest that public goods provision typically yields electoral rewards. Yet public goods expansion can also prompt punishment from individuals who do not directly benefit, a possibility that remains theoretically and empirically understudied. We argue that non-beneficiaries of public goods expansion, even in the absence of direct material losses, may perceive a missed opportunity to improve their own situation, generating grievances that translate into electoral punishment. We test this argument with a survey experiment in Andalusia (Spain) that leverages geocoded data on the distribution of general hospitals. Respondents are randomly assigned to one of three conditions: informed about a new hospital with no location specified, described as policy winners (the new hospital is closer), or described as policy non-winners (the new hospital is farther away). We expect winners and non-winners to exhibit systematically different electoral reactions, and this contrast constitutes the core theoretical and empirical contribution of the study.