Scholars have pointed out that the widespread unrest due to the perceived state of economy and corruption are electoral drivers for appeal of far-right outsiders in Latin America. Additionally, in the last years, more liberal and secular trends, combined with movements defending the rights of women, sexual minorities and indigenous, have triggered a cultural backlash among conservatives and religious people that have created opportunities for populist and reactive mobilization among the Latin American right. This paper aims to identify the set of preferences that drive Latin-American Far-Right supporters. Specifically, we ask to what extent these voters endorse programmatically their agenda, or whether their support stems from political and economic dissatisfaction. I do so through a comparative lens, addressing a key gap in the demand-side literature on the far right in the region. I focus on the voter bases of six leaders—Nayib Bukele (El Salvador), José Antonio Kast (Chile), Guido Manini Ríos (Uruguay), and Jair Bolsonaro (Brazil). Overall, the findings show that Latin American far-right electorates are not defined by political disaffection, but by very clear ideological and programmatic alignments, mainly conservative, authoritarian and pro-market orientations, especially in the case of Kast, Manini Ríos, and Bolsonaro though with internal variation and limited overlap with religiosity.