This article examines whether committee assignment shapes legislative outcomes in the European Parliament. Conflicts over committee jurisdiction have intensified over time, suggesting that control over dossiers may carry substantive policy implications. Yet we lack systematic evidence on whether different committees advance distinct policy positions. Focusing on the Ninth European Parliament (2019–2024), the study exploits the fact that multiple committees often issue proposals on the same legislative dossier, allowing for direct comparison of committee positions within a shared policy context. Using the DocuToads text similarity algorithm, I measure distances between committee reports and, in an alternative specification, between committee reports and the European Commission’s initial proposal. These distances are used to generate pairwise comparisons of committee proposals within dossiers, which are aggregated through a scaling model to estimate a latent ideological ordering under conditions of incomplete overlap. This approach allows for systematic comparison even when committees do not jointly participate in all dossiers. The findings provide novel evidence on the substantive consequences of committee assignment and offer a new empirical strategy for studying intra-parliamentary organization. More broadly, the article contributes to debates on legislative organization by demonstrating how institutional design shapes policy development in a multi-committee setting.